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Abstract 
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The use of federalism as an integral component in post-conflict statebuilding 
processes is becoming increasingly common (e.g. Iraq, Yemen & Sri Lanka). 
The current academic literature, however, is divided between those that argue 
that federalism in such fragile environments will increase the likelihood of 
secession and ‘balkanisation’ and that those that argue that only federalism can 
provide the periphery with constitutionally protected rights against the centre. 
However, currently there is little empirical evidence to support either view. This 
research seeks to contribute to this gap by assessing whether the recent 
introduction of federalism in Somalia since 2013 has led to the delivery of 
tangible governance and peacebuilding outcomes.  
This thesis specifically focuses on the federalism process in Jubaland, a state 
which formed in 2013. Data was gathered across the region using a statistically 
significant perception survey and was supplemented by Key Informant 
Interviews. The surveys were designed to assess public opinion towards 
federalism and understand how its introduction was perceived to have impacted 
local governance and conflict dynamics. This analysis was further extended to 
assess the impact of federalism in other federal member states including 
Puntland, Galmadug and Southwest based on a review of available secondary 
literature. An analytical framework assessed the strength of Federal 
Government-Federal Member State, intra-state and inter-state relations and the 
extent to which a particular state had undertook tangible governance reforms. 
The key findings of the research indicate that the population in Jubaland is 
strongly supportive of federalism in principle and the manner in which it has 
been implemented. Federalism was seen by the majority of the population as a 
way of maintaining Somali unity whilst protecting local interests and meeting 
ii 
 
local needs. The approach of the Jubaland authorities to adopt a consociational 
approach to governance led to the establishment of a sustainable political 
settlement and the inclusion of minority groups for the first time.  
 
However, these successes have not been experienced more widely across 
Somalia. Other federal member states have experienced poor relations with the 
federal government. Internally, some states also have weak and violent 
relations with groups who are competing for influence and poor external 
relationships with other federal member states. In general, there is a low 
commitment to governance reform at federal-state level.  
 
These findings underpin the final conclusion that whilst federalism in Somalia 
has enabled improved governance and peacebuilding outcomes in Jubaland, it 
is the manner of how federal governance has been implemented in other 
federal states that explains the disparity in results across the country as a 
whole.  More widely, this research suggests that federalism in post-conflict 
contexts is neither a panacea for peace and stability, or in of itself, a catalyst for 
inevitable fragmentation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Problem Statement 
 
Somalia has long been widely regarded as synonymous with the archetypal 
failed state. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991, the 
country has seen the nature of the conflict flux between clan-based civil war, 
warlordism and present day jihadism. The international response to the crisis in 
Somalia has also shifted from large-scale military and humanitarian 
interventionism to international abandonment and then, more recently, to a 
reprioritisation of Somalia as a major recipient of international aid receiving $1.3 
billion in 2015.2 This latest phase has been largely driven by donor government 
fears of the rise of an ungovernable space in which violent extremism can 
prosper and destabilise the region and threaten Western interests. In addition, 
given the influx of refugees fleeing conflict-affected states to Europe, many 
donor governments are increasingly supportive of statebuilding efforts to 
contain crises, given domestic pressure to be seen to be managing immigration 
effectively.  
 
Initially, there was some optimism regarding the formation of a new government 
in 2012 which was selected on Somali soil for the first time since the collapse of 
the state. This led to the much-heralded, ‘New Deal for Somalia’, an 
overarching framework between the new authorities, the international 
community and civil society to agree and implement the peacebuilding and 
statebuilding priorities for the country. By mid-2016, however, the political 
situation for Somalia appeared precarious with the implementation of reforms 
remaining highly uneven. Despite managing to survive, albeit chaotically, for 
nearly four years in power, results from the first Parliament, were not 
encouraging, with at least three key areas relating to statebuilding processes 
being major causes for concern. 
                                            
2 Aid Coordination Unit/Office of the Prime Minister, Aid flows in Somalia – Analysis of aid flow 
data, 2015, http://new-deal.so/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Aid-Flow-Analysis-24Feb2016-1.pdf. 
Accessed 14th March 2016. 
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Firstly, progress on amending and ratifying the constitution ground to a halt in 
mid-2016 with the redrafting work incomplete. The process was hampered by a  
complex arrangement between Ministries and various Commissions to oversee 
and implement the process and lacked any public or civil society consultation. 
Originally intended to be ratified by a public referendum, this  was  postponed 
until the 2017-2020 parliament with speculation  that it will be abandoned in 
favour of a parliamentary vote. Initially intended to act as a mechanism to unite 
the country, the finalisation of the constitution has instead become an issue that 
now evokes suspicion and illustrates the inability of the Federal Government to 
resolve its internal political disputes. 
 
Secondly, the much promised one-person, one-vote election, central to Vision 
2016, a key government policy framework outlining the Government’s main 
priorities, was in early 2016 curtailed to what was in-effect another clan 
selection process. The model, similar to the one used in 2012, albeit with a 
much larger electoral college of 14,025 delegates, held elections for each of the 
275 seats and was held in federal state capitals rather than Mogadishu alone. 
After many months of delay, the process finally elected President Mohamed 
Abdullahi "Farmajo" Mohamed on 8th February 2017.3  However, the failure to 
implement a universal election in 2016,  drained public support for the previous 
administration  and increased the pressure on the new government  to deliver 
tangible results by 2020. 
 
Thirdly, the security situation remains unpredictable, with many parts of Somalia 
remaining highly volatile. Even within the heavily secured areas of Mogadishu 
where al Shabaab is now defeated as a conventional military force, its new 
modus operandi of asymmetric-warfare including suicide-bombings, targeted 
assassinations and improvised explosive devices against high-value 
government, UN and civil society targets has been particularly successful.  
                                            
3 BBC News, Somalia's Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo chosen as president, 8th February 2017. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38904663.  Accessed on 8th May, 2017. 
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Indeed, al Shabaab’s efforts are no longer limited to within Somalia’s borders. 
The attacks on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013, in which al Shabaab 
claimed responsibility, has illustrated the emergence of a new internationalist 
agenda, successfully building allegiances with sympathetic jihadist networks 
based in Kenya. Other attacks, including those near the Somali-Kenyan border, 
such as at Garissa University in April 2015, demonstrate the group’s ability to 
conduct complex and spectacular attacks and the vulnerability of Kenya to such 
threats. Within Somalia, despite AMISOM advances and deadly infighting within 
its senior leadership, al Shabaab still controls significant swathes of Somalia’s 
territory. In 2016, al Shabaab appeared to be undergoing something of a re-
emergence, following the significant military defeat of Kenyan forces in El Adde, 
Gedo, the attempted downing of Daallo flight 159, numerous large-scale attacks 
against civilians in hotels and restaurants in the capital, including Mogadishu 
International Airport in July 2016. 
Whilst the analysis of the three issues above forms a fairly bleak assessment, 
the one area which offers a more positive analysis, and which is central to this 
thesis, is the progress made in implementing federalism and the formation of 
federal states within Somalia.  Initially, the political tensions and outbreak of 
violence during the formation of Jubaland in 2013 had the potential to quickly 
escalate into full blown warfare, yet ultimately subsided. This paved the way for 
the emergence of other new Federal Member States between 2014-16 in South 
West, Galmadug and Hirshabelle and ongoing discussions regarding the status 
of the capital, Benadir.  
Whilst the longstanding self-declared independence of Somaliland is  
unrecognised by the international community, the federalisation process in the 
rest of Somalia, including Puntland, appears to have had an intrinsic political 
energy which was significantly absent from other key priorities. This 
development, which is contrary to the lethargy that often accompanies 
statebuilding processes in fragile states, is potentially significant. It occurred 
despite the fact that whilst the Provisional Constitution clearly provides for the 
emergence of a federal system, clarity on the technicalities of implementing 
federalism was weak, allowing plenty of space for interpretation and 
contestation.  
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The federalisation process, however, has itself has been fraught, chaotic and at 
times extremely violent.  The political will to address these issues from the 
central Federal Government and emerging regional state authorities has been 
highly dependent on their assessments of the likely ramifications of the power 
balance between clans and the extent to which the particular composition and 
boundaries of new regional states will affect these calculations. However, 
despite all of these challenges, this is one area in which Somalia realised 
substantial political change since 2012, perhaps for the first time in over twenty 
years.  
 
Motivation for study 
 
The motivation for this study is not only to contribute to the broader discourse 
on federalism but also to deepen my understanding of these issues given their 
centrality to my work with the Saferworld Somalia and  Somaliland Programme. 
Saferworld is a UK INGO supporting peacebuilding and statebuilding processes 
in a number of conflict-affected states globally. Over the last seven years one of 
the most significant achievements of the programme has been the creation of 
three broad-based Non-State Actor Platforms (NSAPs) in Somaliland, Puntland 
& South Central. The NSAPs were created in 2007 to ensure that Somali voices 
are included in peacebuilding, statebuilding and security processes which have 
often been criticised as being the preserve of international actors and a small 
(and often corrupt) Somali elite.  
The Somalia South Central Non State Actors Association (SOSCENSA) was 
also a local Saferworld partner for an EU funded research project, Building 
foundations for political reconciliation in Jubaland. As detailed fully at the 
beginning of Chapter Four, this project would entail a large-scale public 
perception survey examining the broader issues around federalism in Jubaland, 
a dataset which this research thesis also utilised.  
Whilst the NSAPs have been successful to some degree in encouraging greater 
public participation in peacebuilding, Saferworld’s ability to provide its own 
analysis of what should be the focus for sustainable peacebuilding and 
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statebuilding, rather than simply how, has been more limited.  Whilst many of 
these questions are for Somalis alone to decide, it is anticipated that the 
conclusions emerging from this research may be of some usefulness to 
peacebuilding agencies working in Somalia and Somaliland and potentially the 
larger policy community supporting federalism, statebuilding and peacebuilding 
in fragile states more broadly. 
Lastly, whilst the apparent progress of the federalism process was not foreseen 
at the outset of this study, understanding the depth of change and the reasons 
why this has occurred is, in the author’s opinion at least, even more critical to 
the broader practice of post-conflict statebuilding than originally thought. 
 
Central & secondary research questions  
 
Given the discussion above, this thesis will seek to answer the following 
overarching research question: 
To what extent has the introduction of federalism in Somalia contributed to 
improved governance and peacebuilding outcomes? 
In order to answer this overarching question, four subsidiary questions, will be 
explored: 
1) How have historical events in the Horn of Africa shaped the present-day 
discourse on federalism as the primary governance model for Somalia?  
2) To what extent does the theoretical literature and evidence from other 
contexts support the proposition that federalism is likely to be an effective 
approach towards  governance in Somalia and Somaliland?  
3) To what extent do the nascent efforts to engage in a federal model of 
governance in Jubaland demonstrate the likely peacebuilding and 
governance benefits of such an approach?  
4) To what extent has the federalism process in other federal member 
states more broadly contributed to improved governance and 
peacebuilding outcomes?   
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These questions are relevant as Somalia has been subjected to a series of 
internationally-sponsored peacebuilding and statebuilding processes between 
2000-2012 that have mostly failed and, in the view of many Somali observers, 
have sometimes made conditions significantly worse. The reasons why these 
international efforts tended to fail are complex, both broad in scope and specific 
to particular points in Somalia’s modern history, the most significant of which 
are introduced below. 
The painful legacy of Italian and British colonialism in the Horn of Africa led to 
those identifying as Somali living across (and contesting) multiple arbitrary 
borders. The resulting disparity between the Somali nation and the Somali state 
is highly visible, given the large numbers of ethnic Somalis residing in largely 
poor marginalised open border regions in Kenya and Ethiopia. Whilst a national 
census has not been completed since the collapse of the state, deciding on who 
is a legitimate Somali citizen will likely have significant implications should 
universal elections take place. Significantly, it is estimated that around one 
million Ogadenis reside on the Kenya/Ethiopian side of the border, enough to 
significantly alter the outcome of any election and one that could result in 
serious tensions with other major clans.      
Post-independence, the import of new ideological forms of governance is widely 
seen to have failed. Notably Siad Barre’s ‘scientific socialism’ attempted to 
eradicate ‘clan’, the essential building-block of Somalia’s ethnography and 
society was widely seen as one of the catalysts of the civil war, not least 
because Barre continued to covertly support his own clan interests. Its 
suppression ultimately led to the hardening of clan identity and violent clannism 
which reached its peak during the civil war 1989-2006.  
The collapse of the Somali state, due in part to changing global Cold War 
allegiances, meant that a state which was able to take a broadly developmental 
approach with backing from the USSR quickly floundered once this support was 
withdrawn. In addition, previous high investment by the Soviet bloc into the 
military resulted in a quickly fragmenting country being awash with weapons 
which greatly catalysed violence throughout the civil war. 
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The intervention of the US and Ethiopia in removing the Union of Islamic Courts 
(UIC) in 2006 is arguably the closest Somalia has come to achieving a degree 
of stability, law and order since 1991 and has been widely argued to be a 
missed opportunity for Somalia. Furthermore, whilst the UIC was successfully 
removed, the movement morphed into al Shabaab and subsequently became 
aligned to a violent jihadist ideology that went on to later regain huge swathes 
of the country, including the capital, Mogadishu. Whilst eventually defeated as a 
conventional military force, its ability to carry out large spectacular asymmetric 
attacks has significantly hindered statebuilding efforts throughout the 2012-
2016 parliament. 
Driven by a post 9-11 security agenda and in response to the emergence of al 
Shabaab, donor governments have increasingly used aid for security and 
political purposes which has risked transforming humanitarian agencies to 
become overtly political actors in Somalia. This reduction in humanitarian space 
has limited the ability of such actors to respond impartially to needs and has 
arguably increased the risks to staff who were already working in a highly 
dangerous environment.  
Lastly, the international community’s relentless focus on establishing a central 
government at all costs has encouraged the emergence of an ineffective, 
kleptocracy to form, despite significant Somali resistance to central government, 
given the brutality they experienced under the Barre dictatorship. As this thesis 
will explore in more detail, this tendency continues in 2017, given significant 
pressure to hold universal elections by 2020. Little or no consideration is given 
to how democratic norms can be built from the bottom-up by ensuring that 
newly emerging federal states are able to transfer power peacefully through the 
delivery of free, fair and universal elections at the sub-national level. 
Thus, with such a painful and frustrating history, the introduction of any new 
governance model as a solution to addressing Somalia’s continued instability 
needs to understand these dynamics fully and reflect upon and not repeat the 
reasons why previous interventions and approaches did not succeed.  
This research also aims to contribute more broadly to knowledge on the 
significance or effectiveness of federalism as a central statebuilding and 
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peacebuilding approach in failed and post-conflict states. Since the 1990s, 
federalism has been promoted in a number of contexts including Iraq, Sri Lanka 
and Yemen as a useful or essential step in addressing both the past drivers of 
conflict and in ensuring future stability.  
Viewed as an effective conflict management mechanism, particularly in 
ethnically-divided post-conflict states, federalism has been promoted by many 
analysts and policy-makers as a model which can more effectively enable 
sustainable power-sharing between communities. Importantly, it is also able to 
limit the ability of the central government to repress and control the 
development of particular populations.  Given this theoretical potential, 
federalism has been the basis of post-conflict settlements as a way of 
accommodating particular ethnic groups’ demands for greater autonomy. 
 
Research approach 
 
This thesis will use mixed methods, including an extensive literature review and 
analysis of secondary sources particularly in Chapters two, three and five. 
Chapter four will use primary data from a large-scale statistical survey 
undertaken in Jubaland under an EU programme that the author was working 
on whilst employed by Saferworld at the time of the research.  
 
As described in detail at the beginning of Chapter Four, Jubaland was the first 
federal member state in recent times to form and implement a federal approach 
in 2013.  The survey was completed by 961 respondents and was accompanied 
by a series of focus group discussions and Key Informant Interviews and 
focused specifically on how the implementation of federalism was perceived to 
have impacted local governance and peacebuilding dynamics. 
 
The Saferworld research culminated in the publication of a report entitled, 
Forging Jubaland – community perspectives on federalism, governance and 
reconciliation. The primary purpose of this report was to evidence a series of 
policy recommendations for the Somali authorities and the donor community in 
regards to how future efforts to support federalism could be strengthened. 
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However, the primary purpose of this research is to understand, using a similar 
dataset and from an academic perspective, how the introduction of federalism 
has impacted broader peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in Somalia. In 
addition, this study may also offer some evidence more generally on the 
introduction of federalism in post-conflict contexts. 
 
 
Thesis structure 
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter two seeks to address the first  
subsidiary question by providing an overview of how historical events in the 
Horn of Africa from colonialism to the present day have shaped the current 
discourse on federalism in Somalia and Somaliland.  This chapter, drawing on a 
review of a number of key works, will explore how five intertwining narratives 
have shaped statebuilding in contemporary Somalia; the centrality of clan; 
antagonism towards centralised government; Islam & Islamism; the irredentist 
vision; and colonialism and occupation. This chapter will review how these five 
narratives have resulted in the rise of the federal agenda as a reaction to these 
historical events.  Additionally, it will explore why federalism is viewed as a 
governance mechanism that is able to placate powerful centrifugal and 
centripetal statebuilding forces, which have to date remained untamed.  
 
Chapter three seeks to answer the second subsidiary question and examines 
the literature that supports and opposes the introduction of federalism as an 
appropriate and relatively effective approach to enable sustainable 
peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile and conflict affected states, including 
Somalia, relative to other possible constitutional approaches  
 
Undertaking a broad literature review (Choudry, Feeley, Lewis, Lijphart, Lewis, 
Tarlton, Wheare), the chapter reviews and examines the strengths and 
weaknesses of a federalism, comparing and contrasting this to two other 
alternatives; consociation and the decentralised unitary state both in general 
and more specifically their relevance to the Somali context.  
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Of particular significance to the broader thesis, this chapter will include a 
discussion of how post-conflict federalism is often seen to be an integral  
component of contemporary statebuilding processes which is markedly different 
to classical federalism, which is more normally associated with stable northern 
countries such as Switzerland and the United States.  This chapter will thus 
review the apparent divide in the post-conflict federalism literature. Firstly, there 
are those that view federalism as a stabilising force in post conflict countries 
and able to balance better political power between minorities and majorities. 
Secondly, there are those that fear the opposite, that its introduction will 
increase the risk of secession and strengthen the emergence of ethnic 
enclaves. It is envisaged that this thesis, through an analysis of a statistically 
significant data set assessing community perception towards the introduction of 
federalism in Jubaland (Chapter four) will make a modest contribution to this 
debate. 
 
Chapter four seeks to answer the third subsidiary question, assessing the 
extent to which the implementation of federalism has resulted in peacebuilding 
or governance dividends from a case-study perspective, using Jubaland as an 
example. Beginning with a detailed section on the research methodology used, 
this chapter draws on interviews with a range of state and non-state actors, 
stakeholders and interpretation of the results of a large-scale and significant 
perception survey. As the summary of Chapter one outlined, one of the major 
challenges in the debate as to whether federalism in post-conflict countries is 
likely to contribute to a more stable or deleterious state, is the lack of significant 
datasets to inform the debate.  In response to this, the chapter will 
systematically analyse community perspectives on federalism ‘in principle’ and 
assess citizens’ experiences of the formation process of the Interim Jubaland 
Authority. Other areas of inquiry will include assessing the performance of the 
Jubaland Authority, the formation of the regional assembly, and finally the 
respective roles of the Federal Government and the international community in 
the Jubaland state formation process. 
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Chapter five, building on the detailed statistical analysis of Chapter four, seeks 
to answer the fourth subsidiary question and assess the extent to which the 
adoption of federalism in other federal member states in Somalia has advanced 
the underlying governance and peacebuilding needs of the population more 
broadly. Over the course of the research, the federalism process has 
progressed considerably, albeit in an uneven manner, following very different 
routes which this chapter will initially summarise. The chapter will analyse the 
success of federalism in Puntland, South West and Galmadug and compare the 
progress to the development of Somaliland which has pursued an alternative 
secessionist agenda.  
Finally, Chapter six, following a summary of the key research findings, will seek 
to consider the implications of the conclusions from Chapter four and five are 
likely to influence the future trajectory of peacebuilding and statebuilding 
process in the coming years. The chapter concludes with a series of reflections 
on the implications of the research findings on the existing literature on 
statebuilding in Somalia and post-conflict federalism alongside some suggested 
areas for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Somalia & ‘The State’ 
 
This chapter will seek to answer the first  subsidiary question; How have 
historical events and narratives in the Horn of Africa shaped the present-day 
discourse on federalism as the primary governance model for Somalia? This is 
particularly important in the Somali context as the deeply contested debate on 
the form of its future governance system is distinctly framed by this history. Any 
assessment of whether a particular governance model is appropriate for a 
particular country needs to understand the historical, social and political drivers 
that drive political and social organisation.  
 
This chapter will begin with a historical summary of the state in Somalia, 
charting significant events and social phenomena from pre-colonial times to the 
present day, divided into five intertwining narratives; the centrality of clan and 
the rise of Islam; colonial Somalia & the brutality of occupation; the rise and fall 
of the irredentism; the rise of warlordism & failed humanitarian intervention; and 
kleptocracy & the rise of violent Islamism. The chapter will then outline four key 
ways in which this history has shaped the current statebuilding discourse and in 
particular that of federalism. 
 
 
Somalia – A historical summary 
Pre-colonial Somalia –The centrality of clan and the rise of Islam (pre 1862) 
 
Prior to European colonialism, Somali society was based upon a pastoral and 
agro-pastoral political economy with clear gender roles in which ‘womenfolk 
were primarily responsible for the management of domestic concerns, including 
the condition of the portable home or Agal; men dealt with issues of security, 
knowledge about the weather and the range, general welfare of the herd, and 
formal relations with the world outside, including relatives.’4 
 
                                            
4 Samatar, I. A., The Porcupine Dilemma: Governance and Transition in Somalia, Bildhaan, 
2007, Vol 7, p 52. 
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Although a formal centralised legal system did not exist, this did not mean that 
sophisticated norms that sought to regulate aspects of Somali society were 
absent. For instance, Miilo, refers to a ‘precise and transparent procedure for 
fair distribution of water, the most precious of all resources on the range.’5 
Indeed, one Somali cultural practice that still resonates today includes the 
importance of kinship.  This was practiced through two networks, Tol – which 
refers to a common male lineage and Xidid that refers to marriage ties.  These 
networks are of particular importance relating to the payment of blood money or 
Mug whereas Xidid expanded social responsibility to in-laws, balancing the 
commitment to the Tol.  Underlying much of these inter and intra-clan relations 
was and remains the unwritten code of Xeer, which has a remit which includes 
the, ‘preservation of the wisdom of the ages and habits of the community, 
delineation of obligations and entitlements and supervision of criminal justice.’6 
This kinship was the basis of the Somali clan system whereby ‘Somalis gave 
political allegiance first to their immediate family, then to their immediate 
lineage, then to their clan of their lineage, then to a clan-family that embraced 
several clans and ultimately to a confederacy of five clan-families – the Darod, 
Hawiye, Isaq, the Dir and Digil-Mirifleh – that comprised the nation.’7  
 
The arrival of Islam in the tenth Century brought ‘new and powerful values into 
the existing Somali cosmology,’8 and was a major but not exclusive link to the 
outside world. This brought new social hierarchies, including that of the Sheikh, 
an expert on Islamic practice and Shir, consensus-orientated community 
meetings. Whilst not united as a nation by the structures of state, Islam unified 
Somalis, regardless of clan or livelihood, influencing the Somali language by 
importing a number of Arabic words. Lewis notes; ‘Above all, Islam adds depth 
and coherence to those common elements of traditional culture, which over and 
                                            
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Meridith, M., The State of Africa – A history of the continent since independence, London, The 
Free Press, 2005, p 465. 
8 Ibid. 
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above their many sectional divisions, unite Somalis and provide the basis for 
their strong national consciousness.’9 
 
Colonial Somalia – The brutality of occupation (1862-1960) 
 
The colonisation of Somalia into five separate territories in the nineteenth 
century continues to have significant ramifications on security and statebuilding 
for the Horn of Africa to the present day. This would see the French occupying 
Djibouti (in various forms between 1862-1977), the British controlling both 
Somaliland (1888-1960) and a significant swathe of territory inhabited by ethnic 
Somalis incorporated into Kenya (also colonised by the British), and the Italians 
establishing a colony across the remainder of Somalia (1923-1960), including 
the capital Mogadishu and finally the Ethiopians controlling the Somali region of 
the Ogaden plateau.10 
 
In terms of assessing the impact of colonialism on the contemporary 
statebuilding discourse, it is important to understand the two distinct legacies 
left by the contrasting approaches of the British in Somaliland and the Italians in 
south central Somalia.   
 
The British perspective towards Somalia was purely pragmatic and driven by 
two principle factors.11 Firstly, there was the need to ensure a free trade flow to 
India which required the maintaining of a coaling station in Aden, Yemen which 
could be replenished easily from Somaliland. Secondly, from a geo-strategic 
perspective, there was the need to halt the advance of other European powers 
who had colonial aspirations in the region which prior to 1886 was secured in 
an arrangement with Egypt, which secured the Somaliland territory and thus 
minimised any direct British involvement. However, following the takeover of the 
                                            
9 Lewis, I. M., A Modern History of Somalia – Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, London, 
Westview Press, 1988, p 16. 
10 Prunier, G., ‘Benign Neglect versus La Grande Somalia - The colonial legacy and the post-
colonial Somali state’ in Hoehne. M., & Luling. V., Milk and Peace, Drought and War – Somali 
Culture, Society and Politics, London, Hurst & Company, 2010, p 36. 
11 Ibid. 
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coast by the Sudanese Mahiyya, the Somaliland coast was abandoned and, 
Britain, ‘reluctantly entered into a series of bilateral treaties with various Somali 
’chiefs’ who were willing to accept a light protectorate.’12 This was managed 
from Bombay with as little intervention in Somali affairs as possible.  
 
The Italian motives for colonisation in the late 19th Century, however, were very 
different. Italy, itself a country which had only existed for fifteen years in 1880, 
was desperate to prove itself as a rising power amongst its European 
neighbours and was driven by a yearning to recapture some of the previous 
stature of the Roman Empire.  More pragmatically, it also viewed colonialism as 
a means to redress its dire financial situation. Prunier notes, ‘La conquista 
dell’Impero’ became an ideology supposed to solve major problems of national 
consciousness and of practical economics, from a position both of no 
experience and of major emotional investment.’13  
 
These contrasting motives would correspond to very different approaches to the 
respective colonial territories on the ground. The British ensured that the cost of 
their operations was as minimal as possible as their ‘mission was fully 
compatible with a very limited level of imperial involvement and with a 
continuation of most of the social, judicial and even political practices of Somali 
culture – as long as these did not interfere with the core diplomatic and strategic 
role attributed to the territory.’14 This is not, however, to say that British 
colonialism could not be brutally applied if needs be, as Somalia’s Kenyan 
neighbours can attest, however that in this case, such an approach was 
unnecessary to meet  Britain’s foreign policy objectives. 
 
Conversely, Italy sought a much more ‘hands on’ approach, although struggled 
to both finance and implement such an ambitious agenda. A series of chartered 
companies, sanctioned by Rome to administer Somali territory on its behalf, 
were invariably linked to the slave trade, used violence to exhort funds from the 
population or paid off those who presented too much of a risk, despite Italy’s 
                                            
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, p 37. 
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‘civilising’ mission.15 The reality, given its limited resources, was that Italy only 
gained minimal control of the Somali population and this decreased further 
when Italy endured further financial hardship during World War One.  
 
However, with the arrival of fascism in Italy and the particularly ardent believer 
Cesare Maria De Vecchi Di Va Cismon appointed as the new Governor of 
Somalia Italiana, a more effective, yet brutal experience of Italian colonialism 
was realised from 1922. Italy was even able to hold on to its Somali colony after 
its defeat in World War II, despite initial efforts by the British Foreign Secretary, 
Earnest Bevin, to create a Greater Somalia which would reunite all five Somali 
territories, plans which were abandoned after Italy’s lobbying at the UN. This 
culminated in 1949, with Somalia being brought under Italian control via the 
Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia (AFIS) under a ten-year 
agreement that would prepare Somalia for independent rule, which it finally 
achieved on 1st July 1960, although little was done to this affect and Italy 
actively suppressed nationalist movements that arose during this period. 
  
The rise and fall of the irredentism (1960-1991) 
 
During the 1940’s and 50’s political parties did begin to form in south central 
Somalia despite Italian efforts to stifle this. The Somali Youth League, in 
particular, became prominent. Following a series of municipal elections, 
Somalia became independent in 1960 with Somaliland quickly joining the south 
to form the Republic of Somalia.  This reunification furthered a rise in Somali 
nationalism and a determination to reunite the Somali regions that had been 
annexed by the colonial powers. Accordingly, unification or irrenditism as it was 
termed, became the major political agenda and was ‘enshrined in the Somali 
constitution and emblazoned on the Somali flag, which bore its emblem a five-
point star representing the five star flag of the Somali people.’16   
 
                                            
15 Ibid, p 38. 
16 Op Cit, Martin, M., p 465. 
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As Martin Meridith notes, ‘For as long as the goal of a ‘Great Somalia’ seemed 
attainable, clan rivalries were held in check’ as they were unified by a common 
agenda.17 However the events of the 1970s would see this vision quickly 
dissipate and the broader clan settlement unravel.  
 
Following the assassination in 1969 of the second Somali President, Abdirashid 
Ali Sharmake, by a policeman related to a clan dispute, the resulting power 
vacuum enabled General Siad Barre to come to power in a bloodless military 
coup. Shortly proclaiming Somalia to be a Marxist state and, in return, securing 
significant military assistance from the USSR, Barre placed the country firmly 
within the arena of cold war politics.  
 
Siad Barre would remain in power for over two decades and his legacy, 
particularly of the later violent and self-destructive years of his tenure, looms 
large over Somalia to the present day. Whilst the first period of his rule until 
around 1974 was distinguished by a successful national literacy campaign, 
famine conditions between 1974-1975 precipitated the need for a political 
distraction.  Now with a sizeable military force, Somalia attempted to intervene 
militarily in Ethiopia to reclaim the ethnic ‘occupied’ Somali regions and create a 
broader Somalia. However, a dramatic switch in superpower backing saw the 
USSR alongside Cuba supporting Mengistu’s Marxist Ethiopia and led to a 
crushing defeat of the Somali’s military in their campaign to capture the Ogaden 
in March 1978.  
 
This event became the catalyst for the broader clan settlement achieved by 
Barre in the initial years of his presidency to breakdown and led to the 
emergence of a number of clan-based insurgencies to form. This included the 
formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) by an officer from 
the Majerteyn sub-clan of the Darod who led a campaign to initially but 
unsuccessfully overthrow Barre, which would then morph into the Somali 
National Movement (SNM). Although initially the movement was multi-clan, the 
SNM became quickly synonymous with the Isaaq clan who had long felt 
                                            
17 Ibid, p 466. 
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marginalised by the central government and, with support from Ethiopia, sought 
independence for Somaliland and undertook a ten-year insurgency campaign 
against them. 
 
Critical to the SNM’s formation were the events immediately following the peace 
agreement in 1988 between Ethiopia and Somalia that led the SNM to make the 
decision to capture key towns in Somaliland, including Hargeisa and Burco. 
Such was Barre’s determination to defeat the SNM that he signed peace 
agreements with his former enemy Ethiopia which allowed Mengistu to move to 
troops from the Somali border to address internal insecurity issues and in turn, 
allowed Barre the opportunity to crush the SNM in Somaliland. Mary Harper 
notes, ‘The authorities response was extraordinarily vicious; Siad Barre’s 
ground and air forces carried out such heavy bombardments of the regional 
capital Hargeisa, that it was known as the ‘Dresden of Africa.’18  The 
humanitarian situation was dire with over 60,000 killed and almost 500,000 
fleeing across the border to Ethiopia. These events would see a major boost in 
support for the SNM, particularly from the affected Isaaq population and many 
within the movement began to lobby for Somaliland’s independence.   
 
With the unification agenda in tatters, between 1989-1991, Barre was instead 
drawn into inter-clan warfare. Having been abandoned by the now collapsed 
USSR, Barre was however easily able to secure patronage of other clans 
through extensive Western aid, principally donated by the Americans and 
Italians, which ‘soared to $80 per person, equivalent to half the gross domestic 
product.’19 However, following the end of the Cold War, American military and 
economic assistance stopped and left the Barre government with no further 
funds to continue its counter-insurgency. As such, ‘Somalia began to 
disintegrate, fragmenting into a patchwork of rival fiefdoms controlled by the 
clan chiefs, all armed to the hilt.’20  Popularly demoted to the ‘Mayor of 
Mogadishu’, under increasing pressure from the leader of the United Somali 
                                            
18 Harper, M., Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State, London, Zed 
Books, 2012, p 56. 
19 Op Cit, Meridith, M., p 468. 
20 Ibid, p 469. 
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Congress, General Muhammed Farah ‘Aideed’, Barre finally fled Mogadishu in 
January 1991.    
 
In Somaliland, independence was finally declared in May 1991 following the 
collapse of the central Somalia government, and was ‘precipitated by the 
hurried installation of Ali Madhi as President of Somalia by one faction of the 
United Somali Congress (USC) without prior consultation with the SNM.’21  
 
During the very early days of independence, the sub-clans of Somaliland had 
been initially willing to join South Central Somalia - unifying on the 1st July with 
Italian Somaliland just five days after the latter became independent. Bradbury 
notes that ‘the Somaliland authorities assert that rather than being a 
secessionist state, the sovereign independence of Somaliland has been 
restored, a status it held for five days between 26 June and 1 July 1960.’22  
 
Between 1991-1993, numerous peace clan conferences were held amongst the 
sub-clans in Somaliland (shiir beeleed) that would seek to avoid Somaliland 
descending into its own internal civil war as well as negotiating the transition to 
civilian rule. This was finally achieved in 1993 at the Borama conference and 
most critically from a statebuilding perspective, ‘The structure of government 
agreed at Borama fused indigenous forms of social and political organisation 
with western-style institutions of government, in what would become known as 
the ‘beel system’ of government.’23 Over the next ten years a gradual but 
imperfect process of democratisation took place in Somaliland that gradually 
moved the country from clan politics to one of political parties and from 
‘selected representation to elected representation.’24 
 
 
                                            
21 Bradbury, B., & Hansen, S., ‘Somaliland: A New Democracy in the Horn of Africa?’,  Review 
of African Political Economy, 2007, Vol 34, No 113, p 463. 
22 Ibid, p 464. 
23 Op Cit, Meridith, M., p 464. 
24 Ibid, p 464.  
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 Warlordism & failed humanitarian intervention (1991-2001) 
 
With the central government having collapsed, between 1991-1995 Somalia 
was subject to an array of international humanitarian, military and statebuilding 
interventions which would respectively flounder in their attempt to rebuild the 
state. During this period, two new and important forms of authority emerged; 
firstly those of the warlords who controlled predatory clan-based militias that 
sought to maximise their own power and wealth by capturing state assets for 
their own ends and secondly, Islamist authorities, who in the absence of any 
functioning central government, opposed the warlords through the adoption of a 
local governance system based upon a particular interpretation of Islam.25 
 
Following Barre’s desertion of the capital, Mogadishu itself began to 
disintegrate into a power struggle between the Hawiye sub-clan warlords, 
Aideed from the Habar Gidir and Ali Mahdi of the Abgal with the latter 
controlling the southern area of Mogadishu and the former controlling the north 
with the resulting violence virtually destroying Mogadishu. Concurrently, Aideed 
and Siad competed for control of the Digil-Mirifleh region with the latter later 
defeated and pushed further into exile, ‘leaving behind a region wracked by 
famine and starvation.’26 Fleeing firstly to Kenya, a move which was met with 
public outcry, Barre lived in exile in Nigeria until his death in 1995. 
  
As famine emerged across Somalia in late 1991, the United Nations, under the 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had adopted a more interventionist 
mandate. Under its Agenda for Peace framework, a newly invigorated United 
Nations was eager to act, although arguably did not have the resources or 
mechanisms to engage in such a complex emergency. However, taking 
advantage of a brief ceasefire between Aideed and Madhi in March 1992, the 
UN Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) to ensure the protection of an observer force to monitor the 
ceasefire and to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian supplies.  However, 
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the post-cold war arena of humanitarian assistance set a new precedent in 
securing access with ‘various militias control[ing] access to the port and the 
international airport, demanding landing fees, holding supplies to ransom, 
running protection rackets, raiding warehouses and fighting among themselves. 
Relief agencies were obliged to negotiate a series of deals with them to enable 
food convoys to reach their destination.’27  
 
Under increasing pressure from humanitarian agencies such as CARE 
International to provide greater security to ensure humanitarian access, the 
Unified Task Force (Unitaf) was created in December 1992 which consisted of 
28,000 troops. This included a significant contingent of American personnel 
who would later launch ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in early 1993.  However, on 
the ground, there was much disagreement of whether Unitaf’s mandate should 
also include the disarmament of militias. After a number of incidents where 
Unitaf forces did not intervene, it was clear that the mission was purely 
humanitarian, leaving many Somalis to conclude that, ‘Operation Restore Hope 
was little more than a cynical deal between the US and the warlords to allow the 
US to withdraw with minimum difficulty once relief supplies were assured.’28 This 
position, however, would drastically change with the formation of UNOSOM II 
and one that would end with disastrous consequences. 
 
The UNOSOM II mission fell much more in-line with the United Nation’s newly 
invigorated mandate of interventionism and sought to establish ‘a new 
government, a new police force and a new justice system.’29 Critically, this 
would include the disarmament of militias – most significantly those belonging to 
Aideed and Madhi. However, Aideed’s militia began to perceive that it was 
being unfairly targeted and set-up ‘Radio Aideed’, essentially a vitriolic 
propaganda channel accusing UNOSOM II of colonial aspirations. A bungled 
Pakistani-led mission to inspect an Aideed arms cache was mistakenly 
perceived as an attempt to close-down Radio Aideed and ended in a heavy 
exchange of fire in which twenty-six Pakistani soldiers died.  This became a key 
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tipping point in the mission and led the Americans to push for Aideed’s capture 
and arrest and a significant militarization of the UN mission. Led by the 
American Admiral Jonathan Howe, UNOSOM II went on to pursue Aideed in a 
wild-west fashion, complete with ‘wanted posters’ with and a $25,000 bounty on 
his head which Aideed reciprocated for Admiral Howe.  
 
After many months of intense urban warfare, which completely consumed the 
UN mission, the results were fairly bleak with significant civilian causalities.  
However, on the 3rd October 1993, intelligence was received which led to the 
capture of two of Aideed’s closest advisors. The subsequent mission to capture 
Aideed, famously depicted in the Hollywood movie, Black Hawk Down, went 
disastrously wrong with two Black Hawk helicopters being shot down in urban 
Mogadishu and a drawn-out ground rescue mission which plunged American 
forces into unfamiliar urban warfare. In total, 18 American soldiers were killed 
with two bodies being dragged through the streets and seventy-three seriously 
injured. Several hundred Somalis are estimated to have also been killed.  
These events went on to send shockwaves through the American administration 
and led President Clinton to declare the search for Aideed over and the 
abandonment of the mission.  This effectively brought the UNOSOM II mission 
to a close, although it dragged on formally until March 1993. However, the 
withdrawal of American troops brought about a new period of global non-
interventionism amongst Western powers which would continue to have 
significant implications, most notably for the Rwandan Genocide a few years 
later, in which the international community had very little appetite to intervene.   
 
Between 1995-2001, Somalia was both stateless and no longer the focus of 
international statebuilding efforts. Whilst it did not descend back to the levels of 
violence seen in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the state, it did 
experience ‘a gradual demise of armed factions and the rise of a somewhat 
more secure but much more complex mosaic of localised systems of informal 
governance.’30  Most notably this period also the formation of Puntland as a 
federal state for the Harti-Darod following a series of clan conferences in which 
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the SSDF transitioned into a civilian government. Unlike Somaliland however, 
Puntland did not seek independence.31 This period marked a very difficult period 
for international aid organisations as they negotiated access and security with 
numerous actors often under challenging security conditions with the World 
Food Programme (WFP) coming under particular scrutiny as the levels of food 
diversion became increasingly clear.  
 
Kleptocracy & the rise of violent Islamism (2001-2017) 
 
The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror in the US however, 
refocused international attention back to Somalia as ‘concerns grew about the 
security threats that could emanate from Somalia’s ‘un-governed space’ 
generating new interest in the promotion of state revival.’32  
 
Between 2000 and 2004, there were a number of extensive and very expensive 
‘peace conferences’ often taking place in the comfort of regional capitals, all of 
which failed to achieve a significant breakthrough. For those invited, these 
provided refuge from the violence and poverty of Somalia with participants 
seeking to keep them going as long as possible. Harper notes, ‘the Kenyan 
authorities became so desperate during one marathon conference that lasted 
for more than two years that they organised a ‘farewell party’ for the delegates 
as a polite way of telling them to go home.’33 
 
During this period, two years of the Nairobi Peace Accords finally brokered an 
agreement that culminated in the formation of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in October 2004 which moved from exile in Kenya seven 
months later.  
 
Particular concern at this time was focussed on the emergence of the Union of 
Islamic Courts (UIC), which emerged in late 2004 under Hassan Dahir Aweys 
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and eventually became the defacto authority in Mogadishu between 2005-2006.  
Whilst enforcing a form of Sharia law, it is generally considered that this brief 
period was in stark contrast to the preceding anarchy, with a semblance of law, 
order and stability that allowed for some normality to return to Mogadishu.34  
 
However, such was the concern by both the US and regional states of an 
Islamist authority emerging, that the US sponsored local militias to form the 
Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT) as a force to 
combat the UIC, a grouping largely comprised of former warlords and the 
business community. However, to the surprise of the outside world, the ARPCT 
was convincingly defeated by the UIC. In doing so however, the UIC both 
overestimated its strength and rekindled earlier irredentist ideals. This led to 
territorial claims against Ethiopia which prompted the latter into a full-scale 
invasion of Somalia, in which it successfully defeated the UIC.  Many 
commentators have stressed that the opportunity to build upon the stability 
offered by the UIC and take advantage of a grassroots bottom-up approach was 
lost and in turn led to the formation of the more radical al Shabaab movement. 
The BBC journalist Mary Harper concludes, ‘Once again, the USA and its allies 
misjudged events in Somalia. They assumed too quickly that the Union of 
Islamic Courts constituted a threat. This misperception may well have 
inadvertently contributed to the rise of violent Islamism in the country.’35 
 
During this time, the government was unable to move to Mogadishu and was 
based initially in Jowhar and then later in Baidoa, until Ethiopia effectively 
installed the TFG in Mogadishu. The TFG, widely deemed as completely 
ineffective and motivated almost entirely by a combination of both personal and 
clan interests, did not live up to expectations.36 As Menkhaus notes of the TFG 
structure, the cabinet alone consisted of eighty-two ministers and deputy 
ministers, as a ‘minimalist state structure and non-patronage-based state fly in 
the face of the existing political culture among Somali elites and civil servants, 
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whose past experience of the state was as a bloated patronage machine fed by 
Cold War foreign aid.’37   
 
After a number of unpopular extensions, the TFG finally dissolved to make way 
for the Federal Government of Somalia in September 2012. Surprisingly, even 
to seasoned Somalia observers, the incumbent was defeated and Hassan 
Sheikh Mohamud, a veteran within civil society circles, was elected as the new 
President.  In the initial twelve months of his tenure, there was considerable 
optimism that the corrupt and ineffective government would be confined to 
Somalia’s history. However, by late 2013, difficult questions were being asked 
with Matt Bryden concluding, ‘whether Somalia progresses along the path to 
peace or relapses into fragmentation and conflict depends on whether the SFG 
continues [to] impose its own narrow, ideologically driven agenda or seizes the 
opportunity to enlarge its appeal by behaving as a government of national unity: 
a choice between Somalia redux or Somalia relapsed.’38 
 
Meanwhile, whilst the UIC had been successfully defeated, this was far from the 
end of Islamist movements in Somalia. Rising to power in 2006, under the 
persuasive leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Abdi Godane and the ‘spiritual’ guide of 
the former UIC leader, Hassen Dahir Aweys, a fundamentalist and brutal 
organisation emerged that would quickly take over large swathes of South 
Central Somalia. The motives of al Shabaab fluctuate although include at a 
minimum, the establishment of an Islamic caliphate within the boundaries of 
Somalia and at a maximum, ‘creating a giant Islamic state stretching down into 
East Africa and up towards Egypt.’39 Al Shabaab’s draconian Islamic 
interpretations led to extreme curtailing of freedoms including bans on music, 
sport and strict prescriptions on dress code, alongside a very violent application 
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of Sharia law. The latter includes summary executions, including beheadings 
and being buried and then stoned alive.40  
 
Up until 2010, al Shabaab controlled vast swathes of the country including the 
capital, however, AMISOM forces have gradually managed to take control of 
major cities and by 2014 included Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa.  Although 
al Shabaab has been defeated as a conventional fighting force and wracked by 
internal in-fighting, including the killing ordered by Godane of the second in 
command, Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee'aad (al Afghani), who supposedly opposed 
Godane’s affiliation with al Qaida, al Shabaab still retains significant asymmetric 
military capacity. Significant recent attacks have included complex attacks on 
the Supreme Court (April 2013), the Mogadishu UN Compound (June 2013), 
Villa Somalia (February 2014), attacks on numerous up-market hotels hosting 
MPs and international visitors and Mogadishu International Airport (February 
2014 & July 2016). Less newsworthy, but still deadly are the almost constant 
assassinations, mortars, attacks on AMISOM convoys and regular deployment 
of improvised explosive devises. Despite regular proclamations by the Federal 
Government of Somalia that they have successfully defeated al Shabaab, a 
total military victory is highly unlikely. Currently, any form of political settlement 
that includes al Shabaab, is currently unpalatable for the international 
community to seriously discuss. 
  
 
Historical implications on contemporary statebuilding discourse in 
Somalia & federalism 
 
The events outlined above continue to have a significant impact on the 
contemporary statebuilding discourse in Somalia and specifically that of 
federalism. Key areas to consider are as follows: 
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Strong suspicion of governance systems perceived to be externally imposed 
 
Somalia’s history from colonialism to the present day has been one of multiple 
interventions. Prior to the European colonisation of Somalia, no centralised 
formal state existed and the Somali regions functioned through a mosaic of 
local governance structures that were structured around the clan. Colonisation 
arbitrarily carved Somalia into geographically distinct regions that did not 
correlate with the homogenous Somali population living across them and, in the 
case of south central Somalia in particular (under Italian colonial rule), 
significantly dismantled indigenous forms of governance. Thus, any new 
governance system that Somalia adopts will have to contend with these artificial 
boundaries that still exist today. More contemporary interventions have not 
fared much better. Many of these, particularly those from the 1990s onwards, 
have been particularly crude in their implementation and some exceptionally 
violent.  
 
The implications for federalism are significant. The failed attempts to stabilise 
the country and the crude manner in which some of these interventions were 
undertaken, has again increased popular suspicion that contemporary 
statebuilding processes are being be externally driven or imported from abroad. 
For federalism to succeed, it will need to demonstrate wide-spread public and 
political support in order to counter such sentiments. 
 
Failure of the unitary state as a model for Somalia 
 
Somalia’s history of failed irredentism and the subsequent civil war means that 
the option of returning to a centralised unitary state – even one that is highly 
decentralised – is likely to face strong opposition. The rise of a deeply corrupt 
and inefficient government since 1991 has deeply weakened public confidence 
in government generally, and in particular reinforced the negative perceptions of 
the central government.  
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These concerns remain critical to the discourse on federalism for a number of 
key reasons. In a similar fashion to that of the colonialists, Barre attempted to 
override indigenous systems of governance by dismantling clan as the 
fundamental building block of society, whilst at the same time using the state to 
strengthen the power of his own kinsmen. The implementation of federalism 
thus has to balance the risks of encouraging highly politicised clan entities to 
emerge and, conversely, negating clan entirely by pushing non-clan based 
political parties, which may result in a backlash by those that perceive this to be 
‘non-Somali’.  
 
If successful, federalism has the potential to be a model which can effectively 
counter and hold in-check the power of the Federal Government whilst avoiding 
the need for federal member states to follow Somaliland and advocate for 
secession.  Ultimately, this may be federalism’s strongest appeal to the broader 
Somali population. However, the general aversion to a unitary state is likely to 
impact relations between the centre and the periphery as the latter will be keen 
to ensure the government does not exceed its powers. For instance, 
negotiations relating to the division of powers and responsibilities between new 
emerging federal states and the federal government are likely to be undertaken 
with deep suspicion by the latter. 
 
However, conversely, resistance to a unitary state means there remains a real 
risk that having created functional new entities that if the relationship between 
the centre and the periphery sours, secession will be easier to achieve. Indeed, 
Somaliland’s independence agenda has arguably been very effective and may 
appear an attractive option. Not only does the region receive separate aid flows 
from Mogadishu but it has achieved a reasonable degree of security and has 
successfully embedded a number of democratic norms having held multiple 
local, parliamentary and presidential elections. Again, this success might tempt 
newly emerging federal states to go alone, should they feel that the deal they 
have achieved under federalism has fallen short. 
 
Given that many Somalis have a deep distrust of the central government yet 
reluctance to secede, it would appear that federalism might indeed be a popular 
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choice. Given these dynamics it is likely, however, that significant trust building 
between the centre and the periphery will need to take place if a mutually 
acceptable agreement regarding the division of powers is going to be agreed. 
 
Norms of political violence & corruption  
 
Regardless of the governance system chosen, norms of political violence and 
corruption are likely to remain major hindrances. The legacy of warlordism in 
Somali politics remains strong and could indeed be strengthened by a federal 
agenda, as it remains likely that dominant clans and their associated militias are 
most likely to be installed as the leaders of local federal administrations. Indeed, 
as will be analysed in more detail in Chapter three, Ahmed Mohamed Islam 
(Madobe) and in effect, his Raskamboni militia, was selected through a clan 
conference in May 2013 as the leader of the Jubaland Interim Administration.  
 
Whilst levels of political accommodation are not unusual in post-conflict 
settlements, this risks setting a precedence that past historical injustices, of 
which there are many, are not addressed. In addition, the suitability of such 
individuals to take on the complex task of post-conflict statebuilding in the 
interests of the broader population and not just their own group, is of real 
concern. 
 
Any new statebuilding process in Somalia will need to work proactively to 
counter the winner-takes-all approach to Somali politics, whereby politicians use 
their power and influence to further their own agenda and that of their sub-clan. 
This will be critical to rebuilding public confidence. A careful balance needs to 
be struck in accommodating former warlords as part of the political 
reconciliation process versus supporting the rise of a new generation in politics 
that are committed to the rule of law, human rights and equitable development.  
 
 
 
38 
 
Islamism 
 
There are many Islamist groups, and not just al Shabaab, within Somalia who 
do not necessarily want to see the implementation of a new secular state. 
Somalia, as recently as the 1980s, practiced a Sufi and moderate Islam. Whilst 
this has become more conservative due to the influence of Saudi Wahhabism, 
the vast majority of Somalis remain strongly opposed to the dogma espoused 
by al Shabaab. Al Shabaab’s ideology rejects a number of characteristics 
usually fundamental to modern states including a secular justice system, gender 
equality and universal suffrage.  Whilst more moderate groups can be more 
easily accommodated, those with a more militant or Jihadi perspective are likely 
to remain outside of the mainstream polity, and are likely to pursue their 
resistance violently.  
 
The significant territory held by Islamist groups such as al Shabaab means that 
the reach of federalism will be nominal in large parts of the country. However, 
federalism may, depending on how it is implemented, be part of the solution to 
this insecurity, as newly formed federal states represent an opportunity for 
groups to present a common front to al Shabaab. In addition, federalism also 
presents an opportunity for broader security sector reform including the police 
and the integration of militias into the Somali National Army, both of which could 
lead to significant security dividends. 
 
Clan & tradition 
 
Lastly, there is a real need to consider how to integrate or accommodate 
traditional structures namely the clan and elders into a new modern governance 
system.  
 
The role of traditional elders has changed considerably throughout the Somali 
conflict from one of marginalisation under Barre to effectively replacing the state 
following the collapse of the government, albeit contending with other power 
actors such as warlords and Islamist groups. As a result of the civil war, clan 
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elders proliferated as the trust within groups began to breakdown resulting in 
each sub-sub clan requiring its own representation. This new generation of 
elders currently lacks the authority that their predecessors had and has been 
more easily corrupted by incumbent politicians or political candidates seeking 
nomination. 
 
Having currently lost the societal influence they once had there is a need to 
consider carefully the future role they may play in any new governance 
arrangement. Indeed, traditional Somali governance structures have never had 
the opportunity to evolve into a more formal system’ having simply been 
violently repressed by external forces and internal forces from colonialism 
onwards. 
 
In contemporary Somalia, the prominence of the clan significantly influences 
society and politics outside of the state, sometimes being in competition or even 
outright opposition to attempts to form modern state structures. For example, 
clannism continues to act as a major hurdle to forming political parties which are 
multi-clan and have a clear political ideology. 
 
Whether federalism can successfully be implemented whilst competing with the 
clan remains to be seen.  As will be illustrated in the next chapter, those 
sceptical of utilising federalism in post conflict countries would argue that this 
significantly risks the further politicising clan, perhaps to the detriment of 
minority groups residing within new federal member states. As to whether this 
will occur will depend on the manner in which federalism is introduced and 
whether the new political leadership within these entities is prepared to act 
outside of their own immediate political interests. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has outlined how key historical events and trends 
have shaped contemporary discourses on statebuilding and federalism in 
Somalia. Whilst in many ways federalism can begin afresh, given until very 
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recently the absence of any formal government institutions at the federal state 
level, it will still have to contend with these colonial legacies.      
 
These narratives – particularly the oppressive and violent practices of the 
Italians in south central Somalia; the suppression of clan and the brutality of the 
Barre’s government; the crudeness of military-humanitarian interventions in the 
1990s; the repeated occupation of Somalia by foreign forces; and the rise of 
warlordism and Islamist movements, all in turn, contribute to a visceral narrative 
regarding the future of the Somali state. 
 
The drive since 2012 to form federal states in Somalia is, in part, a reaction to 
this broader legacy but also the result of a new trend within post-conflict 
statebuilding processes globally that often sees federalism as an integral 
component in uniting highly divided societies. The Provisional Constitution lays 
the framework for the establishment of federal states as a means to 
accommodate some of the concerns regarding the dominance of one particular 
clan holding executive power across Somalia. However, this is not to say, that 
all groups within Somalia share this support for federalism and statebuilding in 
Somalia remains highly contested, as different groups, depending on their 
interpretation of the trends discussed above and their current access to power 
and political life, advocate for alternative models of governance. 
 
However, a historical analysis would suggest that federalism’s success in 
Somalia will depend in part on how it responds to these historical events. This 
will include the degree to which it is perceived to be externally imposed, 
whether it can offer constitutionally guaranteed protection to the periphery that a 
unitary state cannot and whether it can compete with the alternative offerings of 
Islamism and clannism without become mired by corruption and political 
violence. Taking into consideration, the significance of these historical events, 
the following chapter will assess from a theoretical perspective, whether 
federalism may indeed offer Somalia such a viable governance model. 
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Chapter Three - Prospective governance options for Somalia:  Federalism, 
Consociationalism & the Decentralised Unitary State  
 
This chapter provides a literature review and further seeks to answer the 
second  subsidiary question noted in chapter one; To what extent does the 
theoretical literature and evidence from other contexts support the proposition 
that federalism is likely to be an effective model of governance in Somalia and 
Somaliland?   
 
This chapter firstly defines three governance models, federalism, 
consociationalism and the decentralised unitary state, each of which are 
designed to distribute power and resources from the centre to the periphery in 
different ways. Secondly, the chapter outlines the contested advantages and 
disadvantages of each model at a theoretical level before assessing their 
respective relevance as a potential governance system for Somalia. This will 
provide the conceptual framework used to assess the success or failure of the 
introduction of federalism in Jubaland, which will be the focus of a detailed case 
study in Chapter four. 
 
Federalism 
 
The following section shall firstly define what is referred to as ‘classical 
federalism’ which is mainly derived from the literature relating to northern, stable 
and democratic countries such as the United States, Switzerland or Germany, 
which are often recognised as proto-type examples. Secondly, this section 
reviews more contemporary literatures on debates on ‘post-conflict federalism’ 
which explore the potential challenges and strengths of adopting federal 
governance as a post-conflict statebuilding option. Thirdly, this section reviews 
and analyses the relevance and viability of implementing federalism in Somalia. 
 
Classical federalism 
One of the most widely cited examples of so-called ‘classical federalism’, is that 
of Switzerland which adopted federalism in 1848 as a founding principle and as 
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a means to overcome societal divisions around religion and politics.41  In this 
instance, the authority of the central government is highly limited and 
considerable powers are invested to the cantons. Power at the executive level 
is constrained by a collective presidency and a rotating president. With popular 
representation in the Federal Assembly at canton and commune levels and a 
Federal Court to resolve disputes both between the cantons and amongst the 
cantons themselves, the Swiss model can be seen as something of an ideal.  In 
reality though, federal states exist in many different forms around the world.  
 
K.C. Wheare defined federal government as follows:  
 
‘An association of states so organised that powers are divided between a 
general government, which in certain matters – for example, the making of 
treaties and the coining of money – is independent of the government of the 
associated states, and on the other hand, state governments which in certain 
matters, are, in their turn, independent of the general government. This 
involves, as a necessary consequence, that general and regional governments 
both operate directly upon the people; each citizen is subject to two 
governments.’42     
 
Similarly, Lewis suggests three ways in which power can be shared within a 
federal system: 
 
‘1) the provinces have most of the powers of government, with the centre only 
exercising limited powers 2) the centre has most of the powers with the 
provinces having a limited amount; or 3) the provinces and the centre share 
                                            
41 Fleiner, T., Federalism: Basic Structure and Value of Switzerland Recent Developments In 
Swiss Federalism, 2000, p1 
http://www.thomasfleiner.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/Switzerland.pdf.  Accessed 13th 
December 2016. 
42 Wheare, K., Federal Government, Fourth Edition, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p 2 
quoted in  Adegehe, A., Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: a comparative study of the 
Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions, Doctoral Thesis, Department of Political Science, 
Faculty of Social & Behavioural Sciences, Leiden University, 2009, p 24-25. 
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powers of government with specific means of mediating disputes between 
them.’43   
 
Another important distinction of classical federalism is how federal states are 
formed. Typically, this involves a process of individual sovereign states ‘coming 
together’ as a result of identifying shared interests which could be better 
realised collectively. It is also useful to distinguish between federalism and 
confederalism. Confederalism refers to instances whereby states come together 
with the European Union being the most prominent example.44 In doing so  they 
‘retain their sovereignty – thus making it a weaker union than that of a 
federation – but are obliged, by terms of confederation to adhere to particular 
policies on, for example, trade, fiscal policy, immigration, defence and justice.’45  
Lister makes the important observation that in comparison to federalism, 
confederalism in ‘allowing each member state to keep its sovereignty, 
establishes a more clear cut and stable situation that can be altered only when 
the member states are agreed that they want to create a closer union.’46  Elazar 
reinforces this point, noting that confederal states are ‘primarily communities of 
polities, which place greater emphasis on the liberties of the constituent 
polities.’47 
 
However, beyond the mechanics of federalism, it is important to consider the 
underlying political theory underlying the classical from legal, constitutional, 
sociological, political and ideological perspectives. 
 
                                            
43  Lewis, I., A study of decentralised political structures for Somalia – A menu of options, 
European Union, EC Somalia Unit, London School of Economics and Political Science/UN 
Development Office for Somalia, August 1995, p xix. 
44 Golove., D., ‘The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial Authority’, Stanford Law Review, 2003, Vol. 55, No. 5, May, p 1697-1748.   
45 Elmi., A., Decentralisation Options for Somalia, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2014 
p 4. 
46 Rivlen, Benjamin, and Frederick K. Lister. European Union, the United Nations, and the 
Revival of Confederal Governance,  Greenwood Publishing Group Incorporated, 1996, p 24. 
47 Elazar, D., ‘Confederation and Federal Liberty’, Publius , Winter 1982, Vol. 12, No. 4, p 3. 
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A legal and constitutional approach, as the name would suggest, focuses on the 
primacy of the written constitution.  This school of thought is strongly focussed 
on the formal processes that delineate power at the central and regional levels 
and how, through the set-up of an independent constitutional court, disputes 
between the periphery and the centre are managed.48 Such approaches also 
often underline the importance of bicameralism as an important component of 
the federal model, whereby the ‘lower house of parliament provides proportional 
representation to all citizens, while the upper house (second chamber) provides 
equal or qualified representation for the federating units.’49  Elazar outlines how 
federal governments are structured from a constitutional perspective, 
‘Juridically, federal constitutions are distinctive in that they are not simply 
compacts between the rulers and the ruled but involved the people, the general 
government, and the polities constituting the federal union.  
 
Moreover, the constituent polities often retain constitution making rights of their 
own.’50 In a detailed analysis of different functions of national and state level 
constitutions in America, Donald Lutz concludes that the purpose of the latter is 
to ensure that, ‘each state would be left to define its own way of life, thus 
preserving local control over this critical aspect of politics and permitting 
diversity in constitutional morality to reflect the diversity of the nation.’51The main 
critique of this legalistic perspective is, however, that it is overly focussed on the 
mechanics of federalism rather than the broader social and political process that 
drive its formation or collapse.52 
 
Sociological approaches respond to the criticism above through an analysis of 
various drivers that lead to federal states forming or collapsing. One of its 
proponents, William S. Livingston, notes that, ‘the essential nature of federalism 
is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, 
                                            
48 Op cit, Adegehe, p 30. 
49 Ibid p 31-32. 
50 Elazar, D., Exploring Federalism, University of Alabama Press, 1991, p 157 
51 Lutz, D., ‘The Purposes of American State Constitutions’, Publius, Winter 1982, Vol. 12, No. 
1, p 16. 
52 Ibid p 30. 
45 
 
but in the forces – economic, social, political and cultural – that have made 
outward forms of federalism necessary.’53   
 
One additional contribution from the sociological approach are assessments of 
how the intersecting political, cultural and economic trends may enable a 
prediction as to whether a federal approach in a particular context will succeed 
or fail. Tarlton’s concept of symmetric and asymmetric federal systems is 
particularly useful in this regard. In symmetric systems, ‘units are of equal 
territory and population size and have similar cultural patterns, social groupings, 
political institutions and relationships with the political centre,’54 whereas 
asymmetric systems units are characterised by their differences and inequality. 
Tarlton posited that the more symmetrical a system, the more likely that a stable 
political system would form, whereas in an asymmetrical system, stronger 
political forces would be more likely to push regional units towards secession.   
 
Likewise a sociological approach can provide a useful analysis as to why a 
particular region or nation state would want to adopt a federal form of 
governance in the first place. A collective of pre-existing states coming together 
under a new federal structure, despite the loss of sovereignty that this entails, is 
often the result of a shrewd political calculation that such a formation will result 
in greater economic might or a greater deterrence to shared military threats. 
Alfred Stepan proposes that states that embark on federalism can be 
categorised as either ‘coming together’, ‘holding together’ or ‘putting together’.  
States such as America, Switzerland and Australia can be categorised as 
‘coming together’ whereas Belgium, India & Spain are better described as 
‘holding together’. States whereby there is an attempt by a strong autocratic 
centre to form a multinational state are best described as ‘putting together’ with 
the USSR the most notable example.55 
 
                                            
53  Livingstone, W., ‘A note on the nature of federalism’, Political Science Quarterly, 1952, Vol. 
67, No. 1, p 83-84.  
54 Op Cit. Adegehe , p 33. 
55 Stepan, A., ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model’, Journal of Democracy, 
1999, Vol. 10, No. 4, p 23. 
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Political and ideological approaches to federalism are more focussed on the 
philosophical framework in which a particular federal government is rooted. 
Malcolm Feeley’s contemporary perspective offers some important insights into 
the relationship between political identity and federalism, stating that the 
‘geographical organisation of government, the physical pattern into which 
governmental authorities are arranged, powerfully implicates peoples sense of 
self, in a way that cannot be duplicated by other issues or government 
organisation, at least in the modern world.’56   
 
The insight above in many ways clarifies why the issue of federalism is such a 
contested and impassioned subject. Federalism is not merely a technocratic 
governance arrangement to encourage more efficient and effective governance 
but ‘expands the range of psychopolitical resources available for the creation of 
a political regime. Without federalism, the citizen or subject confronts the 
dichotomous choices between identification with central regime and rebellion 
against it in the realm of action.’57  Federalism thus offers in some contexts a 
viable political response to managing multiple political identities in which 
‘subsidiary units possess rights against the central government,’58 providing a 
degree of political autonomy within agreed areas of jurisdiction.   
 
Lastly, it is worth clarifying five misunderstandings that apply equally to classical 
and post conflict-federalism, namely that federalism is falsely conflated with 
other, arguably desirable, political principles. These are, in reality, achieved as 
the result of separate processes.  
 
One common belief is that federal governments are likely to be more 
democratic. Elazar notes for example that since American federalism was 
inherently linked with democratisation, ‘no federal polity has been established in 
which the case for federalism has not been argued on democratic grounds.’59 . 
                                            
56 Feeley, Malcolm M., Political Identity and Tragic Compromise, University of Michigan Press, 
2011, p 14. 
57 Ibid, p 15. 
58 Ibid, p 16. 
59 Op Cit, Elazar. D., p 108. 
47 
 
In this instance, federalism is often mistakenly viewed as a mechanism for 
protecting political liberty and, as such, goes hand-in-hand with democratic 
principles.  However, as the examples of federally organised monarchies and 
dictatorships illustrate, this is not the case.  Indeed, Stepan makes the point that 
architecture required by federal states arguably makes them inherently less 
democratic. He notes, ‘Overrepresentation in the upper house, combined with 
constitutional provisions requiring a supermajority to pass certain kinds of 
legislation, could, in certain extreme cases, lead to a situation in which 
legislators representing less than 10 percent of the electorate are able to thwart 
the wishes of the vast majority.’60 
 
Federalism is often recognised as being limited to democratic regimes as ‘it 
depends on claims of the rights that political subdivisions can assert against the 
center,’61 which are viewed as incompatible with non-democratic politics. 
However, this ignores the fact that in some authoritarian regimes it is not 
completely impossible (whereas it would be for totalitarian regimes) for 
subsidiary units to have claims against the central authority. In such incidences 
then, the link between democracy and federalism despite occurring together in 
many contexts cannot be universally applied.  
 
Similarly, the literature includes widespread arguments that federalism can be a 
vehicle for promoting local democracy given the assumption that federal states 
will ensure the ‘practice of selecting the executive or legislative authorities of 
government subunits by means of free and fair elections.’62  However, this is not 
always the case. The fundamental difference between local democracy and 
federalism is that ‘federalism reserves particular issues to sub-national 
governmental units, regardless of the political process that exists between these 
units without granting these units any particular area of authority.’63  
 
                                            
60 Op Cit. Stepan A., p 22-23. 
61 Op Cit. Feeley M., p 33. 
62 Ibid, p 30. 
63 Ibid, p 31. 
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There is also an assumption that federalism can also secure liberty. Elazar 
comments, ‘one “given” of federalism is that humans are born free and that 
good government must be grounded in a framework of maximum human 
liberty.’64 However, as discussed  above, given that federalism is not necessarily 
democratic and ‘only democratic government, by definition, allows for 
unencumbered political participation, and only democratic governance, by 
experience, protects human rights.’65  
 
Advocates of federalism often cite one of the main advantages as increasing 
participation. Frey and Stutzer note, ‘A central aspect of federalism are the 
extended possibilities of democratic political decision-making. A decentralized 
country with small jurisdictions offers scope for participatory democracy.’66 
However, as the definition of federalism does not identify a democratic form of 
governance per se, then even if this does occur it is actually as a result 
additional efforts to promote democratisation and is not directly attributable to  
the introduction of a federal system. 
 
Federalism is also viewed by some as a mechanism to enable or promote 
greater accountability. However, this is again likely to be achieved through the 
holding of local elections which enable authorities to be held to account, which 
are not a required component of federal forms of governance. As Feeley 
summarises, ‘local democracy requires elections, whereas federalism involves 
an assignment of definitive authority to government subunits, whether 
democratic or not.’67 
 
 
 
 
                                            
64 Op Cit. Elazar, D., p 91. 
65 Ibid, p 35. 
66 Frey, B., & Stutzer, A., The role of direct democracy and federalism in local power, University 
of Zurich, 2004, p 6. 
67 Op Cit. Feeley, M., p 31. 
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Post conflict federalism 
 
In recent years, a new academic field of study focussing on post-conflict 
federalism has developed, driven by three principle factors.  Firstly, in a number 
of post-conflict states such as Iraq, Yemen or Sri Lanka, federalism has been 
widely advocated as one aspect of a broader statebuilding and reconstruction 
package.68 Secondly, much of the ‘classical’ literature on statebuilding is 
actually derived from the detailed study of federalism in stable, democratic and 
northern states and as such has limitations in its ability to offer an analysis 
framework which automatically relates to its application in conflict-affected 
states. Thirdly, given the break-up of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the 
USSR and the ongoing tensions within Belgium and Quebec, there are 
increased question marks as to the inherent stability of federal governments. 
Smith comments, ‘So while a perpetual state of crisis may be deemed as 
characteristic of certain multi-ethnic federations, it often becomes apparent 
following the break-up of federations that such a form of governance has over 
generations provided an important and effective means of regulating deep 
divisions within society and preventing their spill-over into inter-communal 
violence.’69 
 
In discussing post-conflict federalism, there are key characteristics which clearly 
distinguish it from classical federalism.  One of the most significant is the 
different motivation for state formation. Choudhry notes, ‘the very mission of 
[post-conflict] federalism is different, its principle goals are not to combat 
tyranny or to provide incentives to states to adopt policies that match their 
citizen’s preferences but rather to avoid civil war or secession.’70   
 
Given that federalism is increasingly being used as a post-conflict tool, arguably 
the motivation goes beyond the mere aversion of future conflict but to instil a 
                                            
68 Wolff, S., ‘Post Conflict Statebuidling: The debate on institutional choice’, Third World 
Quarterly,  2011, Vol. 32, No. 10, p 1784-1785. 
69 Graham, S., ‘Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice.’, 
in Federalism: The multi-ethnic challenge, London, Longman,  1995, p 9. 
70 Ibid. 
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framework in which a new political settlement can be agreed and a sustainable 
peace secured.  Whilst the incentives to form a new federal structure might be 
motivated by particular shared and concrete interests, given the painful legacy 
of political and violent conflict, federalism’s ability, as discussed earlier, to allow 
and nurture the emergence of new shared regional and national identities may 
also be a significant consideration.71 
 
Another characteristic of post-conflict federalism is the direction in which post-
conflict federal states emerge. Whereas, in classical federalism, as stated 
earlier, new federal states usually come together through an agreement with 
pre-existing states out of a shared realisation that there are economic or 
security gains in doing so. However, in post-conflict statebuilding the reverse is 
often the case as ‘internal boundaries are drawn to ensure that territorially 
concentrated national minorities constitute regional majorities.’72 
 
Beyond defining the term, a debate has formed within the literature regarding 
the nature of federalism as either a viable peacebuilding mechanism or the 
converse, that it may in fact drive ethnic conflict further. Choudry and Hume 
note, ‘One school holds that federalism can dampen secessionist sentiment; the 
other holds that federalism will in fact fuel it. In other words, federalism is either 
a solution or a catalyst for ethnic violence. Thus framed, these two positions are 
mutually exclusive.’73 Central to this discussion is the question of whether such 
a settlement is likely to succeed, given the many turbulent social, political and 
cultural trends that such a system of governance attempts to harness.  
Choudry’s definition of a ‘divided state’ is particularly helpful in this regard: 
 
                                            
71 Ibid, p 14. 
72 Choudhry, S., & Hume, N., Federalism, Secession & Devolution: From Classical to Post-
Conflict Federalism, Faculty of Law & Development of Political Science, University of Toronto, 
2010, p 2.  
73 Choudhry, S., & Hume N, ‘Federalism, Devolution & Secession - From Classical to post 
Conflict Federalism’, in Ginsburg, T., Dixon, R., & Elgar, E., Comparative Constitutional Law, 
Edited by Cheltenham, 2011, p 364. 
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‘As a category of political and constitutional analysis, a divided society is not 
merely a society that is ethnically, linguistically, religiously or culturally diverse. 
The age of the ethnoculturally homogenous state, if there ever was one, is long 
over. What marks a divided society is that these differences are politically 
salient.’74   The ‘salience’ of these differences, and federalism’s ability to either 
accentuate or bridge them, remains highly contested.   
 
For those that advocate federalism as part of a peacebuilding strategy for 
divided countries emerging from conflict, one of the principle arguments offered 
is its ability to ensure the containment of internal conflicts, which are usually 
ethnic in nature and prevent the breakup of countries into small states that will 
have limited viability.  Ted Gurr is one of the leading proponents of the rights of 
minority populations engaged in ethnopolitical conflict to be accommodated with 
greater autonomy, stating that, ‘the quest of disadvantaged peoples for greater 
autonomy or access to power does not necessarily lead to protracted and 
violent conflict.’75  
 
Gurr also highlights that accommodation of such groups is all the more 
important, given that the nature of ethnopolitical violent conflict, which, if left 
unaddressed, can be much harder to resolve than inter-state conflict. He 
identifies several possible reasons for this.  Firstly, Gurr underlines the ‘non-
negotiable’ demands of group identity and culture which if supressed by a state 
structure that refuses to accommodate them are unlikely to remain placated in 
the long term. Secondly, the tendency for ethnopolitical movements to have 
weak and splintering governance structures risks a proliferation of political and 
armed actors which may become increasingly challenging to unify any new post 
conflict federal state building process. Thirdly, a reluctance to intervene 
externally by other states given the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of sovereign states means that if states fail to provide a framework for 
                                            
74 Op Cit, Choudry, Federalism, Secession & Devolution: From Classical to Post-Conflict 
Federalism, p 16-17. 
75 Gurr, T., Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 
1994, Presidential Address, University of Maryland,  International Studies Quarterly, 1994, 
Volume 38, No. 3, p 365. 
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managing ethnopolitical conflict and identity, external intervention is only likely 
when the security situation has deteriorated to the point where there are 
broader regional implications.76  
 
Proponents of federalism in post-conflict states also argue that this can be a 
viable proposition for regions which are very ethnically diverse by creating a 
system that transforms ethnically heterogeneous regions into areas which are 
ethnically homogeneous such as the case of ethnofederalism in Ethiopia. In 
turn, the ‘creation of democratic self-government for minority ethnic groups 
through a federal arrangement is expected to increase their sense of security 
and positive identification with the multi-ethnic state and thereby reduce 
conflicts.’77   
 
To avoid outright calls for secession in ethnopolitical conflict, Michael Hechter 
has argued for accommodating the demands of minority groups, particularly 
through the provision of collective public goods at the sub-national level, such 
as formally instituting a particular language or allowing the practice of a minority 
religion in schools.78  Beyond its function as a means to manage conflict and 
identity between the centre and periphery, in such cases, an additional benefit 
is that federalism may act as a mechanism which can strengthen and protect 
minority cultures and languages, with India posited as a leading example. 
Hechter, however notes with caution, that the calculations of some minority 
groups to pursue a federal agenda are not always completely rational: 
 
‘Sometimes realism tempers desire: groups perceiving that demands for 
sovereignty will bring down the full force of repression from central rulers back 
off rather than publicly advertise their true political preferences. Sometimes 
desire tempers realism: even though secession is an unlikely outcome in the 
best of circumstances, certain groups pursue it anyway.’79 
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Lastly, federalism and in particular federalism that is intentionally cooperative by 
design can, via the linkages it creates between a central government and the 
periphery also establish a space for effective bargaining and compromise. If 
developed over a period of time, such an approach could even enable the 
normalisation of relationships between previously antagonistic groups. 
Furthermore, by creating a number of layers of power, there is the possibility 
that new alliances, based on mutual interests can be formed between regional 
identities, potentially transforming fractured relationships that previously sought 
to compete for limited resources from the centre.80 
 
Conversely, those that view the imposition of federalism in a post-conflict 
context as a potentially dangerous structure tend to draw on ethnofederalist 
arguments that argue that its imposition can in many contexts inflame further 
local ethnic tensions. Hechter notes, ‘federalism has the tendency to reify and 
solidify ethnic cleavages in multi-ethnic countries giving them political, legal, 
institutional and above all territorial status.’81 This, therefore, solidifies and 
makes permanent identities which may have been only a fleeting necessity 
given the particular political context and limits the possibility of creating a 
national sense of citizenship, potentially restricting freedom of movement across 
the country. 
 
Perhaps, the more damning criticism is that by enabling the re-enforcement or 
empowerment  of ethnonationalist forces the conditions for the emergence of a 
successful and potentially violent secessionist movement (arguably the most 
critical scenario which federalism sets out to avoid) are set in place.82 Philip 
Roeder summarises this perspective as follows: 
 
‘Ethnofederal and autonomy arrangements in ethnically divided societies 
structure politics inside ethnic communities, among ethnic communities and 
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between those ethnic communities and the central government in ways that 
bring political instability. These institutions privilege some identities and 
interests and distribute coercive and defensive capabilities in a way that 
increases the likelihood of escalation of conﬂict into acute nation-state crises.’83 
 
Roeder goes further to suggest several weaknesses of the ethnofederal model. 
These include concerns which focus on centre-periphery relations such as the 
tendency for short-term political compromises between the centre and the 
periphery that ignore longer term needs and that by undertaking negotiations 
between the centre and the periphery, a precedent has been set, whereby the 
demands of the latter will continue to rise in future negotiations.  Other concerns 
focus more on the emergence of zero-sum relations between the centre and the 
periphery such as the hardening of new sub-regional political identities, 
capabilities and opportunities which may escalate future conflict in regards to 
competing nation-state projects. This risks an undue focus on the threat of 
predation by the centre to renationalise rather than predation by newly formed 
subsidiary units against the centre. Lastly, at a more macro level, Roeder notes 
the tendency of the ethnofederal discourse to oscillate between two ‘perils’ of 
re-centralisation or dissolution, with reforms being solely focused on avoiding 
either option.84   
 
Kymlicka, another prominent critic of federalism, specifically in regards to 
accommodating the needs of minorities, including in states where violent 
conflict is absent, outlines additional concerns.  Federalism, per se, does not 
necessarily empower minority groups as this depends upon how boundaries are 
drawn which could even be done, somewhat maliciously, to actively 
disempower specific communities.  This raises the further practical challenge in 
instigating federalism in post-conflict contexts regarding the ‘impossibility of 
making ethnic and administrative boundaries congruent,’85 and the strong 
likelihood of future conflicts regarding where boundaries lie between ethnic 
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groups.  As a result, the ideal promoted by pro-federalists in attempting to 
transform an ethnically heterogeneous region into smaller homogenous 
groupings is arguably not viable and merely recreates, in a microcosm, the 
same tensions that appear at the national level between the centre and the 
periphery. 
 
Moreover, federalism has limited flexibility to adapt to the differing needs and 
sizes of populations within a specific country without developing asymmetric 
and thereby unequal power relations as a result. States which emerge with 
significant inequalities between federal units may risk further expanding centre-
periphery grievances by creating, in addition, new tensions between federal 
member states themselves. Furthermore, as noted above, federalism may 
increase the likelihood by which federal member states seek secession.86 
 
Federalism as an option for Somalia 
 
Given the broader debate surrounding the implementation of federalism in post-
conflict contexts, the following section reviews the specific debates regarding 
federalism as an option for Somalia. The section will examine in particular the 
arguments that suggest federalism in Somalia will either unite or lead to further 
fragmentation of the country. 
 
Federalism has been proposed for Somalia as a potential governance model 
that can successfully accommodate the vast number of often antagonistic sub-
clan groupings under a single state. Emerging initially out of the Arta peace 
conferences in 2000, federalism was formally adopted for the first time in the 
2004 Transitional Federal Charter and then later in the 2012 Provisional 
Constitution.87 
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Lewis was one of the first to explore the relevance of confederalism as a 
solution to address the Somalia-Somaliland issue as a way to both appease 
secessionist Somaliland and unionist South Central.  Noting that the driving 
force of confederalism in Europe was to prevent another major war, this model 
of governance has been primarily designed (and arguably with some success) 
as a conflict prevention mechanism. Lewis suggests that this example could 
also be relevant for Somalia as, ‘at some point in the future, [in] conformity with 
traditional values, it would be possible for the different Somali regions or states 
to create common institutions and policies. Somalis could then work together in 
central agencies, with representation from each state or region, protected by 
the sovereign status of each region and the right to veto, or opt out of 
unwelcome proposals.’88  
 
The Puntland Development and Research Centre undertook an analysis of the 
arguments for and against federalism in 2015. The authors note, ‘According to 
supporters of federalism, the traumas of previous governance and conflict 
experiences can only be remedied by the decentralization and devolution of 
power, which gives individual Somalis a direct route into the decision-making 
chambers of their government.’89  In addition they note, that it is federalism’s 
unique ability to begin bridging the trust deficit between clans and between 
certain regions and Mogadishu that explains why it enjoys strong support from 
particular groups.90 
 
The United Nations Special Representative to Somalia, Nicholas Kay (2013-
2015), who was one of the key architects of federalism in Somalia, emphasises 
that it will not yield automatic dividends. Speaking at a Chatham House event in 
2014 he commented, ‘It is how federalism occurs that is really the most 
important thing. Federalism should not be seen as structuring Somalia along 
strictly clan lines. There will always be minorities in each state and each state 
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must ensure that it is politically inclusive. Federalism is not a zero-sum clan 
domination exercise.’91 
 
However, on the contrary and echoing the caution of those opposed to 
federalism in post-conflict contexts more generally, Ken Menkhaus is 
particularly concerned about the tendency of federal experiments in Somalia to 
fall directly along clan lines. Forming what he terms ‘clanustans’, he cites the 
example of Puntland as a governance structure that has been carved 
specifically for the Harti sub-clans residing in the north-east. Whilst this may 
well be a pragmatic solution for a largely homogenous clan structure in the 
north (albeit highly divided at sub-clan level), in Somalia’s multi-clan South such 
an approach will be significantly more complex as political power must balance 
a much wider number of stakeholders. Concluding in 2004, Menkhaus 
summarizes what remains the key challenge of the current statebuilding 
process: 
 
‘Thanks to decades of migration and settlement, much of the ethnic topography 
of south Somalia is more like the patchwork quilt of Bosnia Herzegovina than 
the ethno-state of Puntland. The building block approach is only viable in South 
Central Somalia if regional politics are ethnically heterogeneous experiments in 
co-existence and power-sharing, rather than tools of ethnic hegemony.’92  The 
Puntland Development and Research Centre, extend this argument further 
noting, ‘In addition to the fears about internal incoherence, some see the idea of 
a dismembered Somalia as open to continued predation from international 
actors, multinational corporations, as well as corrupt politicians.’93 
 
Indeed, Abubakar’s assessment of the success of Somalia’s new federal 
system undertaken in 2016, highlights that some of the challenges the country 
faces in implementing such a system are equally practical in a country where 
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institutions have been so eroded by decades of conflict.  On the basis of an 
analysis of interviews with parliamentarians from the 2012-2016 parliament he 
concludes: ‘The findings indicate that there is an enormous need for reform, in 
terms of political inclusion through creation of a multi-party system, 
constitutional review, and a supportive atmosphere for political competition. In 
addition, the separation of powers between Parliament, the Executive and the 
Judiciary of the federal government must be made clear. The findings further 
showed that there is a need to define the exercisable powers between the 
states and central government and a fair and transparent process is necessary 
for the creation of federal member states.’94 
 
An additional consideration, which is somewhat unique to Somalia, is to 
consider to the scope of the federalism project given the self-declared 
independence of Somaliland, a status which is not recognised by the Federal 
Government of Somalia. Bockenforde asks in 2012, ‘Is the TFG [Transitional 
Federal Government] ready to dialogue with Somaliland and discuss the 
realities on the ground, even considering two independent countries, be it under 
one confederal roof or not?’95 
 
In summary, Somalia’s decision in 2012 to embark on implementing a federal 
government, thus places it at the heart of the post-conflict federalism debate. 
The stakes are extraordinarily high with the reconstruction of the country being 
dependent on federalism acting to reunite rather than to further antagonise 
conflicting clans and regions.  
 
Central to this political reengineering, as Chapter two demonstrated, is the fear 
of a centralised state, with federalism offering a solution; a bottom-up process 
where ‘free and independent states come together, and transfer a limited 
                                            
94 Abubakar M., ‘The patterns of state rebuilding and federalism  in Somalia’, African Journal of 
Political Science and International Relations,  2016, Vol. 10, Issue 6, p 94. 
95 Bökenfȯrde, M., ‘Beyond Federalism: Which concept of decentralisation best meets the 
needs of Somalia’, in Dahre, U., (ed.), Predicaments in the Horn of Africa – 10 years of SIRC 
Conferences in Lund on the Horn of Africa, Lund University, Lund, 2012, p 123. 
59 
 
amount of sovereignty to the federal institutions.’96  The potential advantage of 
federalism is that it proposes both a degree of local self-determination and a 
greater share of national resources, making federalism a popular choice for 
many clans in Somalia, particularly those not currently in the seat of power. 
However, given the fractious nature of clan relations in Somalia, the concerns of 
those that doubt federalism’s peacebuilding potential seem particularly relevant. 
With this in mind, the following section will review two alternative models, 
consociationalism and the unitary state, to assess whether they may be more 
applicable to Somalia’s needs. 
 
 
Consociationalism 
 
This section begins by clarifying what is referred to as a consociational form of 
governance and then proceeds to consider how applicable consociationalism is 
for Somalia, focussing in particular on the ‘4.5’ clan sharing model that has 
been used in recent years as a tool of political accommodation. 
 
Arend Lijphart is widely acknowledged to be a key figure in the concept and 
literatures on consociationalism as a means of managing power-sharing in 
highly diverse contexts. In particular, Lijphart’s work has been deemed 
particularly relevant to contexts where, ‘the participation of the representatives 
of all significant groups in political decision-making, especially at the executive 
level [and] group autonomy means that these groups have the authority to run 
their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture.’97    
 
Lijphart argues that the consociational model has four integral components; 
proportional representation to allow minority representation; government 
through a grand coalition; a ‘concurrent majority’ to ensure all groups have veto 
power and a robust judicial review process.  He argues that the distinct 
advantage of consociation over a federal model is that the needs of different 
groups can be met despite their geographical proximity. For instance in a region 
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with different religious groups, education and health care can be delivered 
differently to meet the needs of each respective community.98 
 
Lijphart notes that the defining characteristic of a consociational form of 
governance is ‘not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the 
deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilise the system.’99  This means 
therefore that whilst a grand coalition government may be the most common 
form of consociationalism, it could also include advisory councils that seek to 
influence rather than share executive power.  
 
Perhaps most fundamentally, ‘consociational democracy violates the principle of 
majority rule.’100 However, whilst this may initially appear radical, this happens 
too in non-consociational systems in periods of crisis, when political parties 
agree to drop their differences and form coalitions and act collectively to pursue 
an agreed public interest. In some instances, however, it can be difficult to 
make the distinction between federal and consociative approaches. Feeley 
reiterates, however, that often the latter approach does ‘not establish 
geographically defined subunits with definitive autonomy rights against the 
central government.’101 
 
Beyond the technical formulation of consociational systems, it is important to 
understand the underlying motives that drive its design, as it is often not from a 
principled position of needing to ensure universal representation.  In highly 
fragmented and volatile systems, the stakes in pursuing competitive politics 
may be too high, and potentially threaten the very existence of the state itself. 
Lijphart notes, for example, that the ‘cartel of elites may decide to extend the 
consociational principle to the electoral level in order to prevent the passions 
aroused by elections from upsetting the carefully constructed, and possibly 
fragile, system of cooperation.’102 In addition, consociational systems will often 
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fail to be completely representative of all groups with political actors only 
agreeing to form a coalition that is large enough to see them returned to power.  
 
In terms of understanding what can drive a consociational democracy to 
success, Lijphart identifies three main characteristics; external threats, a 
multiple balance of power among the subcultures and the relative low total load 
on the decision-making apparatus.103 In respect to the first factor, examples 
from across history, most notably from World War I & II, allude to fact that a 
national crisis can bring political elites together in response to a common threat.  
Secondly, whilst a consociational system could have representatives from all 
groups, this becomes far less effective if it is effectively dominated by one 
particular party or if there are two relatively equal groups which are constantly 
seeking to undermine each other. Lastly, given the difficulty in accommodating 
the interests of multiple groups and ensuring that the state is able to deliver 
services for its citizenry, the success of a consociational system is often 
proportionate to the challenges the government faces.   
 
As alternative factors for success, Lewis notes that under consociation ‘people 
need to be convinced that it is better to have a share of power than to risk the 
costs involved in trying to seek full control,’104 and continues to identify the 
following conditions for such a system to be viable:  
 
1. ‘Competing communities must not try to integrate other groups or 
establish their own separate sovereign state. 
2. Politicians must strive to maintain these beliefs, economic and political 
stability and be mindful of the negative consequences of returning to a 
state of war and  
3. The leaders of the communities must be able to act independently so 
that they are able to reach a compromise with other groups without being 
accused of betrayal by their own communities.’105 
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Consociationalism as an option for Somalia 
 
In order to consider the appropriateness of consociationalism for Somalia, it is 
interesting to reflect on how Lipjharts’ three conditions can be applied in the 
Somali context. Somalia has numerous external and, in addition, significant 
internal threats. History would suggest, however, that far from providing a more 
conducive environment for a grand coalition, it has served to create a much 
more Hobbesian reality, as different groups, through a combination of 
clientalism and rent-seeking behaviour, seek to form fragile and fast-changing 
alliances so as to maximise their individual interests.106  
 
A significant problem for south central Somalia has been how to best balance 
the numerous sub-clans. Whilst on a national level, it may be possible to 
balance clan representation using a consociational approach, at a regional level 
it is likely to be dominated by the most numerically populous clan meaning that 
smaller clans are likely to become quickly disenfranchised. Arguably, Somalia, 
for the federal elections in 2012 and 2016 used a national consociational model 
through the adoption of the ‘4.5’ system of sharing power between the four 
major and other minority clans. This was agreed during the reconciliation 
conferences held in Arta in 2000 prior to the formation of the Transitional 
Federal Government.107 However, in this attempt to ensure equal and genuine 
representation, the 4.5 model has been much maligned.   
 
Mohamed A. Eno and Omar A. Eno, in their emotive essay refer to 4.5 as 
creating ‘absolute discrimination and severe ethnic marginalization.’108 Their 
principle critique is that by elevating four clans to a certain status and setting 
aside a ‘half-clan’ status for all other groups, not only does this discriminate 
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against already marginalised groups but also reinforces ‘clan’ as the dominant 
political unit, further reducing any potential of a nascent meritocracy to emerge.  
A further critique is that the decision to determine who is granted full status and 
who is resigned to join other minorities within the 0.5 remains highly contested 
and is essentially an arbitrary decision made by the more powerful clans who 
again are accused of acting purely in their own interest in designing such a 
system.  
 
In relation to Lipjharts’ third factor, Somalia is often at, or very near the bottom 
of most international indexes on poverty or corruption and experienced 
widespread famine conditions in 2012. Starkly put, the ‘load’ on the government 
to address Somalia’s multiple developmental needs is perhaps one of the most 
extreme in the world.  To conclude, Lijphart’s conditions for the success of 
consociational system seem unlikely to be met in the Somali context. 
 
In regards to Lewis’ three factors of success, even two decades later, it seems 
that none of the conditions currently apply to Somalia. Competing groups have 
frequently tried to integrate or persuade other groups to form new federal states 
most notably during the formation of South West state. 109  Meanwhile Puntland 
repeatedly threatened to sever relations with the Federal Government if its 
demands were not addressed in regards to the 2016 Electoral Process.110 In 
addition, despite decades of violent conflict, politicians continue to use the 
threat or deployment of violence to achieve their goals.111 Lastly, the deeply 
embedded social norms that define the clan make independent concessions by 
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clan leaders very rare.112 However as Lewis notes, if deeper traditional cultures 
can be revitalised, ‘The Somali tradition of elders participating in consensual 
decision-making at the local level demonstrates that such principles could be 
appropriate here.’113  
 
Thus, between 2000-2016 Somalia can be said to have adopted a blunt form of 
consociational governance through its adoption of the 4.5 clan sharing model. 
However, whilst this may have provided a period of stability, it does not meet 
the aspirations of Somalis for greater democracy and accountability as the 
model tends to encourage political appointments being made on the basis of 
clan identity and accommodation rather than a demonstrated competence or 
compelling political vision.114    
 
A decentralised unitary state 
 
This section reviews the literature and debates concerning the option of a 
decentralised unitary state. It outlines the key characteristics of a decentralised 
unitary state and its inherent strengths and weaknesses prior to assessing its 
viability for the Somali context.   
 
Decentralisation, at least from a theoretical perspective, is different from either 
federalism or consociationalism as its motive is less to appease antagonistic 
political identities and more about developing effective and efficient government 
structures that are able to adjust to local realities. Feeley argues  
‘Decentralisation in contrast [to federalism] is a managerial strategy by which a 
centralised regime can achieve the results it desires in a more effective 
manner,’115 and making the further critical point, that ‘while federalism generally 
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results in a fairly high level of decentralisation, decentralisation does not 
necessarily lead to federalism.’116  
 
However, in practice we see decentralisation being utilised as an alternative to 
full federalism, whereby certain powers or areas of responsibility are given to 
regions as a concession, rather than purely in an attempt to increase efficiency 
of government.117 
 
Furthermore, once federated, it is not constitutionally possible for a central 
government to repeal the right of subsidiary entities unless each federal state 
would agree, which is unlikely unless there is a significant recalibration of 
political identities that would support constitutional amendments that would 
diminish their power. However, in a decentralised state, repealing levels of 
authority does not require any formal permission from regional levels of 
government, although, depending on the state in question, attempts to do so, 
may be met with political resistance.118  
 
Michiel S. de Vries, in his comparison of the relative merits and weaknesses of 
decentralised versus  centralised states, offers a numerous list of benefits for 
the former.  This includes the ability to delegate authority to officials and 
reducing bureaucracy and capitalising on local knowledge and access. In 
addition, decentralisation offers a modality in which to increase the penetration 
of national-level policies to the local level and to provide an overarching 
framework for the coordination of local service delivery which engages local 
elites who may be sceptical of centrally coordinated initiatives. As a result, such 
a model would reduce the decision-making demands on central government 
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whilst simultaneously countering over-regulation and ‘democratise’ the provision 
of local government by engaging communities more closely in their provision.119 
 
In contrast, he lists only  three arguments in favour of centralised states; firstly, 
that this would create inequalities in terms of regulations that apply in the 
different states (citing environmental law as an example); secondly that 
decentralisation has to reconcile the ‘tragedy of the commons’ whereby richer 
regions could free-ride on the resources of poorer regions; and thirdly, that 
smaller states may struggle to respond effectively to complex social needs.120 
The extent to which these arguments are in favour of a unitary state outweigh 
the benefits of a decentralised state are likely to be context specific. For 
example, states which have high disparities in wealth distribution may seek to 
correct this through a centralised state that can better manage redistribution 
efforts. Conversely, states which have strong regional identities or ethnic 
division may deploy decentralisation as a soft form of federalism to prevent the 
emergence of independence movements threatening the overall integrity of the 
country.  
 
A decentralised unitary state as an option for Somalia 
 
The discussion regarding the applicability of a decentralised unitary state for 
Somalia has two important historical considerations, both of which were 
discussed previously in Chapter two. The unitary ‘Westphalian’ state became 
the de facto model which was used by the European powers in establishing 
new colonies around the world, regardless of whether such a system would 
correlate with how indigenous authorities were structured and exercised their 
power. Langenhove notes, ‘The modern Westphalian state is certainly a 
European invention. But the European colonialism exported its model of state to 
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the world.’121 In respect to Somalia, Italy’s colonial legacy, which again utilized 
the unitary model, is mixed given its poor record of administration and the 
drawn-out process of independence.122  
 
Moreover, the legacy of the civil war following the collapse of Siad Barre’s 
regime, also a strong centralized unitary state, renders it impossible as a model 
for Somalia’s reconstruction.123 Such a system would require the presence of a 
strong government of which there is little or no devolution of power from the 
centre. In Somalia, such a government would likely to be dominated by one 
particular clan and thus would have total control over the entire territory of the 
country. Given the high-levels of distrust, a unitary state would struggle to 
achieve the cooperation needed from other clans, thus risking a mode of 
governance that was based entirely on the use or threat of force and one which 
would likely experience violent opposition in return. 
 
Lewis notes, in what he refers to as a ‘decentralised unitary state’ that two 
major aspects of such systems could be included in a future Somali constitution 
should a decision be made to adopt such a form of governance. Firstly, ‘the 
constitution could define the powers of local governments. These powers can 
always be subsequently transferred to the centre if a local government wishes 
and secondly, ‘guarantees should be included to ensure that larger units of 
governments (such as provinces or the centre) cannot abolish smaller units.’124  
 
Thus whilst a decentralised state may in principle be the most effective at 
overcoming the myriad developmental needs of the country, the historical 
legacy of Barre’s unitary  state and the fear of domination by one particular 
clan, means that decentralisation is also not a viable model for Somalia any 
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time soon. As, decentralisation lacks the constitutionally protected rights that 
federalism offers, it can only be effective in contexts in which there is sufficient 
trust of peripheral regions that the central government would uphold 
agreements to redistribute resources and delegate powers and 
responsibilities.125 Clearly this is a criteria which is  lacking in Somalia and it is 
likely that generations of both political and social reconciliation would needed 
before decentralisation could be considered.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on federalism in both its classical and 
post-conflict forms and compared this with two other governance models; 
consociationalism and decentralisation. In doing so, it has reviewed and 
assessed the main debates regarding the potential strengths and weaknesses 
of each model, in general, and in relation to potential usefulness and relevance 
to contemporary Somalia.  
 
From the analysis above, it would appear that decentralisation can be 
effectively ruled out as a governance framework for Somalia given the need of 
the peripheral regions for greater legal reassurances that their rights and 
powers will be upheld.  
 
Consociationalism to some extent has already been ‘piloted’ for Somalia via the 
4.5 clan sharing formula. Despite its successes in achieving a level of stability 
across the country and enabling new parliaments to form in 2012 and 2016, it is  
loathed by both minorities who feel discriminated against and by a broader 
majority. In addition, such a system risks perpetuating a political system which 
is based on clan identity rather than individual competence or political vision. 
 
This leaves us with federalism as the only remaining or untried governance 
model for Somalia. Its application remains a risk for all the issues that those 
sceptical of federalism as a post-conflict peacebuilding tool have outlined. To 
                                            
125 Op Cit. Tamaru N.,  Simkin, P., Mukhtar, A., Kirsti S., & Middleton R., p 49. 
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understand whether these arguments are well-founded, the following chapter 
will further assess whether the data from Jubaland and other federal member 
states supports the arguments to advocate or be cautious of federalism’s 
broader implementation. 
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Chapter Four: The Jubaland Case study 
 
Chapter four addresses the third subsidiary question; To what extent do the 
nascent efforts to engage in a federal model of governance in Jubaland 
demonstrate the likely peacebuilding and governance dividends of such an 
approach?  
 
This chapter firstly provides a detailed overview of the historical events that led 
up to the formation of the Jubaland. Secondly, following a detailed summary of 
the methodology used, this chapter provides an analysis of the field data that 
was obtained from the quantitative survey, focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews.126 
 
Gestation of the Jubaland State  
 
The modern origins of the Jubaland state date back to 2011 when the former 
Defence Minister of Somalia, Mohamed Abdi “Ghandi” attempted to form the 
Azania region, encompassing Middle Juba, Lower Juba and Gedo. Whilst this 
received broad support from a wide cross-section of society including civil 
society, the TFG and Kenya, a lack of support from Ethiopia and ASWJ and 
Azania’s own lack of military capacity led to the failure of these efforts to 
establish this state within Somalia. 
 
However, in 2012, those engaged in the processes of establishing Azania as a 
federal state within Somalia began discussions with IGAD regarding the 
                                            
126 A version of this chapter is also available in the April 2016 Saferworld publication entitled 
‘Forging Jubaland: Community perspectives on federalism & reconciliation.’ This publication 
was jointly written by Oliver Chevreau and Joanne Crouch, however all of the content presented 
in Chapter four of this thesis is solely the original work of the former. Datasets from the 
Saferworld implemented, EU-funded project, Building foundations for political reconciliation in 
Jubaland were utilised in order to be able to complete the necessary primary analysis for this 
thesis. 
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creation of a new federal state.   The so-called ‘Karen-meetings’ named after 
the up-market suburb of Nairobi, Kenya in which these took place were initiated 
in June 2012 and continued for a number of months. These meetings included 
representatives from Raskamboni, ASWJ, the Haarti group and the TFG.  After 
much discussion, the meeting resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding between a number of disparate stakeholders including Azania, 
Raskamboni, ASWJ, Haarti faction, the Marehan and the TFG. Despite holding 
very different views of how Jubaland should evolve, three key points were 
agreed; a unified opposition to al Shabaab; a commitment to form a new 
Jubaland state which would engage with the Federal Government; and political 
representation would be on a district basis as opposed to using the 4.5 sub-clan 
system. In September 2012, IGAD once again convened the original signatories 
who agreed to form a technical committee so that the state formation process 
could begin in earnest. At this point, it was also agreed to expand the original 
group to thirty members to include minority groups.  This technical committee 
was then further sub-divided into a number of working groups with specific 
tasks.127 
 
Concurrently, Kenyan and Raskamboni forces had managed to secure Kismayo 
having ousted al Shabaab from the city. This paved the way for visits by the 
technical committee to conduct a number of consultations at Kismayo 
University.  This included visits by smaller delegations of the technical 
committee to Mogadishu to discuss the state formation process with the newly 
formed Federal Government but faced a hostile reception, indicating the 
Federal Government’s reluctance to embark on the broader federalisation 
agenda.128  
 
Given the absence of resources to hold a referendum, both human and 
financial, on the formation of the Interim Jubaland Administration, a more 
pragmatic and arguably culturally relevant approach was taken, through the 
                                            
127 Key Informant Interview, Individual aligned to Azania, Kismayo, 28th September 2015 
128 Ibid 
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holding of large and extended clan conferences. Despite opposition from the 
Federal Government of Somalia, the technical committee pressed ahead with a 
large-scale conference in February 2013 inviting between 500-1000 participants 
who successfully negotiated and agreed an interim Charter, the founding 
document that constituted Jubaland as a federal member state. The same 
conference also elected Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) as the President of 
Jubaland on 15th May 2013 who was previously the leader of the Raskamboni 
militia. 
However, following his election, five other candidates also declared themselves 
as President. Most significantly, this included Barre Hirale, the previous leader 
of the Jubba Valley Alliance, a warlord who had violently ruled Kismayo 
between 1998-2006.  Despite a constitutional commitment to pursue a federal 
system, the Federal Government sought to capitalise on the opportunity that 
these divisions provided, given their intention at the time to prevent the 
emergence of new federal states and chose to resist militarily the formation of 
the Jubaland state. 
 
This was motivated by an attempt to realise an alternative two-state federal 
system based on previous colonial demarcations for British Somaliland and 
Italian Somalia, thus avoiding (from a Hawiye perspective) the emergence of 
two Darod strongholds in Puntland and Jubaland.129 Thus, the Federal 
Government backed Hirale militarily, who had also formed a shadowy alliance 
with al Shabaab. This led to a large outbreak of violence in Kismayo itself which 
resulted in the deaths of dozens of people between Raskamboni and Hirale 
militias with the former, the eventual victor.130  
 
With its proxy now defeated and Madobe’s Raskamboni forces fully in control of 
Kismayo, the Federal Government did not have any other option but to 
                                            
129 Op Cit. Bryden, M., p 22 
130 Op Cit. Bryden, M., p 22 
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recognise the newly formed authority in Kismayo.131 This paved the way for 
mediation efforts in Ethiopia which resulted in the ‘Addis Ababa Agreement’ 
signed on 27th August 2013. This would see Jubaland established as an interim 
authority for two years, prior to becoming a fully-fledged Federal Member State. 
The agreement also stipulated requirements for Jubaland to hand over assets 
to the Federal Government, including the seaports and airports, which are the 
major sources of state revenue and the integration of the Raskamboni militia 
into the National Somali Army. The Addis Ababa agreement allowed 
international actors, most notably the United Kingdom, to provide significant 
levels of aid via the Stability Fund to support the reconstruction of Kismayo and 
other key ministries.  
 
Following two years of an interim administration, in February 2015, an IGAD-
facilitated process oversaw the process of selecting parliamentarians for a new 
regional assembly for Jubaland. This saw a district-based selection process 
take place in Somalia for the first time and was carefully scrutinised to ensure 
no al Shabaab infiltration. The process began with a participatory clan mapping 
to understand which sub-clans inhabited particular areas, an exercise which 
appears to have won broad community support.  Each district was allocated 
four parliamentarians and seven for Kismayo (a further seven seats were later 
added to accommodate other actors), with three candidates for each post.  In 
addition, an ‘Arbitration Committee’ constituted by respected elders was 
mandated to lead discussions at the local level regarding possible candidates 
and resolve any disputes that emerged. Once resolved, three candidates were 
put forward for each seat for consideration by a ‘Selection Committee’ (again 
formed of respected elders) of which one was ultimately chosen. The Selection 
Committee also screened candidates on their educational background and 
verified that they had no linkages to al Shabaab.132  Whilst this was frequently 
                                            
131 Ibid 
132 This historical account of the 2015 Jubaland regional parliament process and the new 
governance structure was compiled on the basis of a series of key informant interviews between 
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referred to as an election by national and international actors, however, in 
reality it remained an inter-clan selection process. 
 
Communities in Jubaland widely saw this process as progress from the 4.5 clan 
sharing model. Firstly, by selecting on a district-basis, Members of Parliament 
that would have a closer geographical linkage to their constituents. Secondly, 
the requirement of three candidates per post made the process less likely to be 
corrupted as a candidate could not guarantee their selection even if they bribed 
local elders to ensure that they are one of the three that are put forward.133 
 
Critically, however, both the original state formation process and the formation 
of the regional assembly faced particular challenges resulting from the broad 
political divisions between the Marehan and Ogaden. Additionally, this was the 
first time that Gedo formed part of a regional authority, having previously 
existed as an autonomous region.  Furthermore, the Marehan population was 
itself split between those who were considered to be outsiders (referred to as 
Galti) originating from the Central Regions134 and those who originated from 
Gedo itself (referred to as Guri). All nineteen Marehan MPs are Guri, as was the 
IJA Vice President Abdullahi Ismail Fartaag. 
 
The new Jubaland Parliament was announced on 15th April 2015, comprising 
75 parliamentarians. An inauguration ceremony held on 7th May was well 
attended by the international community, including the Foreign Ministers of both 
Kenya and Ethiopia, IGAD and the President of Somalia. The Parliament 
subsequently went on to appoint the President Madobe for another four year 
term until 2019. 
 
                                                                                                                                
September-November 2015 that took place in Kismayo, Dollow and Mogadishu of stakeholders 
that were familiar to the process. 
133 Key Informant Intervew, Jubaland Authority Minister/ Regional Governor, 30th November.   
134 The Galti, who were formerly led by Barre Hirale, now reside largely in Garbaharey. 
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The new Jubaland Authority led a relatively rapid development of a complex 
formal governance structure. By mid-2016 Jubaland was now governed by a 
President, Vice President, Speaker and a Cabinet, consisting also of vice 
Ministers and Heads of Departments. In addition, there are also Regional 
Governors and District Commissioners. Moreover, under the 2016 Electoral 
Process, Jubaland were to appoint parliamentarians and representatives to the 
Upper House.135 This, as the field data will detail in subsequent sections of this 
chapter, created a confusing picture for citizens to understand, and has the 
potential to become problematic in terms of ensuring clear lines of 
accountability as the demarcation of responsibilities for each of these actors 
remains vague.  
 
The above historical examination examines the first attempts to initiate 
federalism in Somalia since Puntland was declared its semi-autonomous status 
in 1998. The struggle by Jubaland to assert itself as a new state set a 
precedent for the formation of new federal states. Between 2013-16, South 
West, Galmadug and HirShabelle were all formed.  
 
However, what clearly separates these later processes from that of Jubaland is 
that the latter was an inherently violent one, which the Federal Government 
sought to suppress. Once the Federal Government was defeated in Jubaland, 
the process of the federalisation of South Central Somalia had developed 
momentum and rather than aim to derail the process once more, the Federal 
Government began to play a much more active role in the political negotiations. 
However, even these later processes seemed to largely evolve independently 
of central control, with various factions aligning themselves at the local level to 
particular combinations of regional states. In early 2017, only the status of 
Benadir, the region which includes Mogadishu as the defacto national capital 
was unclear.  
 
                                            
135  Key Informant Interview, Regional Governor, 30th September 2015  
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Jubaland governance survey 
 
The remainder of this chapter presents and analyses the findings from primary 
field data. This was gathered not only for the purposes of this MPhil research 
project but also within the framework of an EU-funded project, Building 
foundations for political reconciliation in Jubaland, for which I was a Principal 
Investigator.  The project was delivered by a Project Team within the INGO 
Saferworld, of which I was a senior team member and was closely involved in 
all aspects of the research as it relates to the analysis in this present chapter.  
 
The principle research question for this project was similar to this thesis in 
assessing whether the introduction of federalism has met the governance and 
reconciliation needs of Jubaland. However, the purpose of the project was more 
strongly focussed on developing practical policy recommendations for those 
working to strengthen governance processes in Somalia.  
 
A secondary aim of the project was to build the capacity of civil society in 
political economy analysis. As such, Saferworld worked in partnership on this 
research with SOSCENSA (Somalia South Central Non State Actors), a 
membership organisation for civil society groups.  It was explicitly understood 
and agreed that relevant aspects of my work on this project would also form 
part of my research as a post-graduate research student at Bradford University.  
 
Methodology 
 
The Jubaland governance survey consisted of a mixture of quantitative 
perception surveys, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs). These took place in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Dollow 
between September-December 2015. 
 
One of the central aims of this Saferworld project was to include local civil 
society actors in the field research, not only because this is necessary in the 
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Jubaland context given access constraints but also to build the capacity in 
research skills and analysis. This was done primarily through the identification 
of nine focal points, three from each of the three regions of Jubaland who would 
collectively undertake data collection and analysis training. 
 
Following this, a three-day stakeholder analysis workshop of Jubaland was 
undertaken in Mogadishu to understand the key political actors and their 
respective relationships. Given the complexity of the political situation in 
Jubaland, such an exercise was not intended to be comprehensive but did 
provide the baseline understanding in order to design the analysis questions for 
the large-scale quantitative survey, FGDs and KIIs (see annex for quantitative 
questionnaire).   
 
Altai Consulting, a specialist data collection firm provided the necessary training 
to the nine focal points. The focal points subsequently carried out a cascade 
training to a further thirty enumerators. In total, 961 quantitative questionnaires 
were completed. The data collection itself took place in three districts per region 
each with five research locations (two urban and three local). The ‘Proportional 
to Size’ methodology was used based on the 2005 UN population survey. Given 
security concerns, the focal points assessed whether the locations initially 
selected were indeed accessible resulting in some initial research locations 
being discarded until five suitable ones were identified.  Having travelled to the 
research location, enumerators selected particular households based on a 
counting methodology. A breakdown by gender and region of the completed 
questionnaires is as follows: 
 
Figure 1 Breakdown of completed quantitative questionnaires by gender and region 
 
 Lower Juba Middle Juba Gedo Total 
Male 147 155 172 474 
Female 132 199 143 474 
Unknown    13 
Total 279 354 315 961 
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Following cleaning of the data by an external consultant, an initial analysis 
workshop was held with the Focal Points in Mogadishu to draw out initial 
findings from the data. This provided the basis for a series of FGDs and KIIs 
with a variety of groups and individuals including civil society, parliamentarians, 
elders and minorities in Kismayo, Dollow and Mogadishu by the author and 
other Saferworld colleagues. Prior to publication of the Saferworld version of the 
report entitled, ‘Forging Jubaland: Community perspectives on federalism and 
reconciliation, (which as noted above, I co-authored with Joanne Crouch) a 
draft was shared with the Jubaland authorities for comment and validation.  
 
Constraints & limitations 
 
During the course of the research, the data collection in the project faced a 
number of constraints and limitations: 
 
Due to the presence of al Shabaab in Middle Juba and the serious security 
threats that this presents, it was not possible to collect first hand data in this 
region as the risk to enumerators and participants was too high. However, 
participants from Middle Juba were interviewed in IDP camps in Kismayo and 
Mogadishu, although their opinions on the questions asked may have been 
altered by their experience as an IDP and it is possible that different responses 
would have been gathered had data collection taken place in the region. 
 
As a result of the security situation, data collection only took place in villages or 
towns that were under the control of the Federal Government of Somalia which 
could potentially result in a degree of bias. This means that the data does not 
reflect the opinions of those under al Shabaab control or those that openly 
sympathise with the views of the group. In addition, international staff (including 
the author) were only able to conduct KIIs and FGDs in major conurbations 
(Dollow, Kismayo and Mogadishu) due to the potential kidnap risk in rural areas. 
Again, this could result in a potential bias in the data as it captures data from 
people only residing in urban locations. 
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Every effort was made by the research team to reiterate to both individuals and 
groups that the data gathered over the course of the research programme 
would be kept confidential and that their names would not be attributed to the 
report. However, in some locations, in particular Dollow, the research team 
were aware that all participants were clearly vetted by the authorities prior to 
interviews. As such, given this environment, it is possible that the interviews do 
not always reflect the true perspectives of the individuals or groups concerned. 
 
Finally, both the quantitative survey and the subsequent FGDs and KIIs 
explored a number of statebuilding themes using terminology and concepts that 
are grounded in the Western liberal tradition. For instance, the terms, ‘good 
governance’, ‘civil service’ and ‘free and fair elections’ may be understood 
differently across Somalia. As some of these interpretations may be very 
different to how they are commonly used within political science, this poses a 
risk that respondents meant to convey a different understanding and opinion 
from the one recorded. For instance, it became clear during the analysis that in 
some instances the term ‘election’ was sometimes used to refer to a clan 
selection rather than a process which used a secret vote. 
 
The research attempted to partially mitigate some of these concerns. For 
example, participants were asked to provide their own definition of federalism. 
Furthermore, all of the interviews were conducted in Somali by staff that had a 
comprehensive understanding of how these terms are used generally in political 
science minimising risks of mistranslation. However, a more thorough analysis 
and comparison of key terms from both a linguistic and conceptual perspective 
lay outside of the scope of this study. 
 
The following sections present and examine the key results from the survey, 
KIIs and FGDs. The analysis focuses on whether the perspectives of a broad 
range of stakeholders indicate broad support or scepticism for the move to 
establish Jubaland as a federal states, and for the emergent governance 
systems for Jubaland that have been developed in association with this. This 
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section is structured into six sub-sections; federalism as a governance structure 
for Jubaland; the formation and consultation process of the Interim Jubaland 
Authority; the performance of the Interim Jubaland Authority/Jubaland Authority; 
the 2015 Regional Assembly selection process; the role of the Federal 
Government of Somalia in the federalisation process; and the role of the 
international community in the Jubaland federalisation process. 
 
 
Perspectives on federalism as a governance structure for Jubaland 
 
Overall, the survey data indicated overwhelming public and community-level 
support and awareness for federalism as it relates to Jubaland. The results 
indicate that the federalism process was very familiar to the vast majority of 
respondents that were surveyed across Jubaland, with little variation in 
response when disaggregated by gender, regional or rural/urban divides.  
 
Figure 2 Have you heard of the federalisation process 
 
 
 
In general, respondents also indicated near unanimous support for the process. 
The response was similar when disaggregated by gender and whether 
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respondents resided in rural or urban areas.136  This is significant as high levels 
of public awareness and support are likely to be indicators of federalism being a 
relatively successful political framework for improved governance in Jubaland, 
given the distrust of externally imposed agendas as discussed in detail in 
Chapter two.  
 
Figure 3 Is the federalisation process something that you want to see take place? 
 
 
 
When asked to articulate the benefits of a federalist structure of governance, 
issues regarding resource and power sharing and conflict mitigation scored 
notably higher than the need to ensure that decision-making structures are 
brought closer to the community level.  
 
This may reflect the fact that given the nascent nature of new governance 
structures, traditional elders are still the primary decision-makers at community 
level, although power may begin to shift as and when district councils form.  
However, a more immediate and significant benefit is that federalism was widely 
                                            
136 Similar results for the same question when were very similar when disaggregated by both 
rural/urban (Rural - Yes 89.87 % No 6.96% Urban: Yes 92.31%: No 5.13% & Male -Yes 89.55% 
No 6.82%). 
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perceived to be a means of successfully addressing tensions between major 
clan groups and has in effect worked as a peacebuilding mechanism. A 
member of the Jubaland parliament noted, ‘Somalis have a luck of trust so there 
is a need for each part of Somalia to stabilise, to build again a common house. 
We have to start from our respective regions and people to forget the 
grievances and pain. I’m sure that Somalis will unite again but for the time being 
let each state build its own institutions.’137 
 
As explored in Chapter three, federalism is not, however, an inherently ‘more 
democratic’ governance modality per se and the positive benefits attributed to it 
in Jubaland are likely to be a result of the efforts of the Jubaland authorities to 
pursue a consociational approach within federal structures, most notably 
through the division of ministries between sub-clans within the cabinet.  This is 
a significant consideration in how federalism may be consolidated in other 
federal member states. 
 
Federalism as a means of reducing conflict scored particularly highly in Middle 
Juba, the only remaining region still held by al Shabaab at the time of the 
survey. In some respects, this finding is somewhat unexpected as it unlikely that 
al Shabaab will recognise any of the new formal federal structures nor will the 
Jubaland authorities consider any effort to accommodate them politically. 
However, as the respondents for Middle Juba were living in IDP camps in 
Kismayo and Mogadishu, it is possible that responses to these questions 
indicated support for federalism on the basis that this it is viewed as a positive 
alternative to al Shabaab.  
 
Indeed, it should also be noted that previously, when districts have been 
‘liberated’ they have suddenly faced a plethora of inter-clan issues that had 
been dormant under al Shabaab rule who have tended to suppress and 
violently crackdown on any such tensions. It is possible then, given federalism’s 
                                            
137 Focus Group Discussion, Jubaland Regional Assembly parliamentarians, Kismayo, 29 th 
September 2015 
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visible success in managing clan-conflict across the Jubaland region, its 
potential to establish improved inter-clan relationships is another reason why 
Middle Juba respondents emphasised this factor so strongly. A governor 
commented, ‘By the time Jubaland was liberated from AS, there were five other 
self-appointed presidents in Kismayo. That forced Jubaland into a bad war – a 
serious war in Kismayo town, but after that Jubaland has become tolerant to 
those previous challengers – this is political accommodation.’138  
 
Figure 4 Is the federalisation process something that you want to see take place? If yes, 
why? 
 
 
 
In the key informant interviews, one of the other most common reasons given 
for support of a federal model of governance was that it has enabled closer 
service provision or is likely to do so in future. A representative of Lower Juba 
civil society commented, ‘We Jubalanders are very happy with federalism. 
Services are being decentralised; if anyone wants a passport or birth certificate 
we used to have to go to Mogadishu but we can get them from Kismayo too.’139 
 
                                            
138 Key Informant Interview, Jubaland Govenor, Kismayo, 30th September, 2015. 
139 Focus Group Discussion, Lower Juba Civil Society, Kismayo, 29th September, 2015. 
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As explored in detail in Chapter three, from a theoretical perspective, federalism 
and decentralisation are two separate process, in which the former does not 
inherently entail the closer provision of services. However, it seems clear that 
federalism’s acceptance and support has been strengthened in Jubaland by a 
degree of decentralisation, particularly in regards to receiving services which 
otherwise would have high transaction costs to access.  This is again another 
significant factor for other emerging federal states elsewhere in Somalia to 
consider in regards to how they may consolidate public opinion in favour of 
federalism. 
 
Proponents of federalism also frequently stated in the KIIs that this form of 
governance was suitable for Somalia given the negative legacy of a strong 
unitary state under Siad Barre. This echoes the analysis and conclusions in 
Chapter two and three that the historical legacies of the conflict in Somalia have 
important repercussions in how contemporary statebuilding processes and 
structures are designed.  A representative of a youth civil society group in 
Dollow noted: 
 
‘We are welcoming the adoption of federalism. Previously there was one centre 
of power. That government was an interim government and people had 
difficulties to access it as it was based in Mogadishu. The country has a long 
history of conflict and there are high levels of distrust and everyone is armed 
and it is not easy for the government to reach every corner, so federalism is the 
way to enable people to put their house in order and a way out of the chaos.’140  
 
In a similar vein, a senior Minister from the Jubaland authorities restated the 
commitment by the Jubaland authorities to a unified federal structure:  
 
                                            
140 Focus Group Discussion, Gedo Youth, Dollow, 6th October 2015. 
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‘We are not trying to create a separate country – we are not Somaliland. We are 
trying to create a peaceful Somalia… What we are trying to make is a 
government that belongs to the people.’141  
 
Such statements, particularly from those representing Jubaland state 
institutions are particularly significant in countering concerns that federalism 
may be a precursor to new secessionist movements emerging across Somalia. 
Whilst the current commitment to a federalised state is presumably dependent 
on the development of constructive relationships between the federal 
government and federal member states, there seemed to be little evidence of 
independence movements gaining ground in the near term. Again, this finding 
significantly strengthens the indications that federalism can contribute to good 
governance and peacebuilding in Jubaland and Somalia more broadly. 
 
Interestingly, when survey respondents were asked who should ideally have the 
most power, the strongest support for the Federal Government of Somalia was 
in Middle Juba. In Gedo, there was equal support for federal and regional power 
and balanced support for federal, regional, and local government in Lower 
Juba. These findings are somewhat unexpected, given the capital of Jubaland 
and seat of the administration is based in Kismayo in Lower Juba. This is 
possibly explained by the fact that the formation of a new federal member state 
will involve the division and redistribution of power away from the current centre 
– Lower Juba. Conversely, those respondents reflecting the perspectives of 
Middle Juba who are both current under al Shabaab occupation and therefore 
the most politically marginalised, have the most to gain from any political 
realignment of power. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
141 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Jubaland Authority, Kismayo, 30th November 2015. 
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Figure 5  In an ideal situation which level of government should have greater power? 
 
 
 
In addition, the varying levels of support for the Interim Jubaland Authority are 
broadly mirrored by support in principle for the existence of a regional authority, 
with Lower Juba respondents this time the most supportive of all the three 
regions. This may reflect the fact the reality that Kismayo will always be the 
defacto capital of any regional state and therefore has much to gain from the 
establishment of a regional authority. 
 
Figure 6 How important is the establishment of a regional authority? 
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In general, only a small proportion of respondents stated negative perspectives 
towards federalism. However, in relation to the preceding discussion, in terms of 
those that did, one common theme was a concern over the potential 
fragmentation of Somalia, echoing many of the concerns explored in Chapter 
three regarding the disadvantages of post conflict federalism. For example, 
despite widespread distain for strong central governance, a number of 
respondents saw federalism as merely a transitory phase to a unified Somalia, 
noting that in contrast to many other countries that have adopted federalism, 
Somalia is largely homogenous in respect to ethnicity, religion and language.  
An Elder from Middle Juba commented: 
 
‘As a nation I don’t believe we can be a federal nation. The name ‘Somali’ is 
one that you can’t talk about the separation and division of. This is just a 
transitional process until we can have a national government that represents all 
Somalis. This is what many believe.’142  
 
Another Middle Juba elder stated that ‘Federalism is not fit for Somalia. It’s only 
the protracted conflict which makes us think otherwise. Federalism is just a 
transitional solution - if this stage is passed then Somalis are one.’143  
 
However, whilst it may be true that Somalia has a more homogenous ethnic 
composition and demography that some other federal member states, this 
overlooks the reality that Somalis are strongly divided by clan and that these 
divisions have become extremely polarised as a result of the civil war. Whilst it 
may be true that federalism may act as bridge to reconcile these difficulties, it 
would seem unlikely that this would transform into a political movement calling 
for national unity anytime in the foreseeable future. 
 
                                            
142 Focus Group Discussion, Middle Juba Elders, Kismayo, 28th September 2015. 
143 Ibid. 
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Another related and predictable concern of those opposing federalism is that 
the introduction of such a system could lead to the fragmentation of the country. 
Some respondents also noted that this could be accelerated by a weak central 
government that fails to unite all the federal member states under a broader 
national structure. A youth civil society respondent in Dollow commented: ‘Yes, 
the negative of federalism for me is if there is are strong federal states and a 
weak centre then we can expect conflict and chaos. Unless there is a strong 
central government that can deal with them we can expect chaos amongst 
them.’144   These concerns were also reflected in the survey findings: 
 
Figure 7 Is the federalisation process something that you want to see take place? If no, 
why? [Graph below shows only data for those that answered no to the first part of the 
question] 
  
 
 
As stated above, whilst no evidence was found regarding any political ambitions 
for Jubaland to secede, the comment and survey findings above are insightful in 
that does illustrate a concern regarding the manner in which federalism has 
been implemented.  In the process of implementing federalism, federal member 
states have captured significant-levels of autonomy and power to the extent that 
they arguably have defacto sovereignty within their jurisdictions. Currently the 
                                            
144 Focus Group Discussion, Gedo Youth, Dollow, 6th October 2015. 
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Federal Government has little to no presence in Federal Member States living 
the latter to determine how the governance is structured and what policies are 
implemented. 
 
Whilst this situation has resulted from the manner by which federalism has 
organically evolved in Somalia (as will be explored in Chapter 5) the high level 
of autonomy that federal member states have gained is unlikely to represent an 
existential threat to the Somali state. For example, despite a high degree of 
political contestation, the degree of participation by federal member states to 
participate in the 2016 Electoral Process demonstrated a broader commitment 
to Somalia as a singular nation state. 
 
A further concern, reported by a few interviewees is that federalism was an 
imported system backed by external actors. One interviewee, who is politically 
opposed to the creation of the Jubaland Authority noted that: 
 
‘Federalism in Somalia. I believe that the idea did not originate from Somalis – it 
is an imported idea which has been taken in the Mbagathi conference in Kenya 
and has been pushed by Somalis there to take this system of foreign rules and 
countries.’145 
 
This is in line with the conclusions of Chapter three that argued that any 
statebuilding mechanism must be perceived to Somali-owned. However, given 
that this was a minority response (with the vast majority articulating a 
preference for federalism), at this stage, such a sentiment is unlikely to impact 
the viability of federalism in the near future.  
 
A final concern was the uncertainty of many people about what federalism 
means in Somalia.  A representative of the Azania movement commented: 
 
                                            
145 Key Informant Interview, Individual politically opposed to Jubaland, Mogadishu, 14th October 
2015. 
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‘Unity is my preferred option, federalism is my second option but it is not very 
clear what type of federalism we are using. Nobody has identified what type of 
federalism we are using.’146 
 
The population’s limited understanding of federalism at all levels was reiterated 
by a senior minister within the federal government, who commented that ‘people 
believe this is a foreign idea, something that comes from the outside, something 
that divides the people rather than a strong government.’147 Whilst, in general 
the survey found that awareness levels of federalism were very high, this lack of 
clarity among Somalis on the practical meaning of federalism may be an 
important factor in regards to its longer-term success or failure. 
 
It would appear that federalism’s introduction into Somalia has been largely 
articulated in terms of a system that can manage clan identity rather than by 
defining the governance dividends it can bring. Whilst this may account for its 
initial popularity, longer-term, for federalism to succeed, a much clear policy 
framework will need to be articulated, both for individual states and the country 
as a whole. This is likely to require large-scale consultations and civic education 
to transform what for many Somali citizens is a fairly ethereal concept into 
something more meaningful and tangible to their everyday lives.   
 
Summary: Perspectives on federalism as a governance structure for Jubaland 
 
These findings reinforce the discussion and conclusions in Chapter two and 
three. Firstly, the arguments expressed in the theoretical literature regarding the 
potential strengths and weaknesses of post-conflict federalism have very much 
come to the fore. It would appear at this stage, that the arguments for 
federalism are more persuasive. Notably  this particular system has allowed for 
two political identities to emerge at the national and sub-national level  
                                            
146 Key Informant Interview, Individual aligned to Azania, Kismayo, 28th September 2015. 
147 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Federal Government of Somalia, 2nd December 2015. 
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overriding concerns regarding fragmentation and the resurgence of ethnic 
conflict.  
 
Secondly, and somewhat critically, is that the manner in which federalism has 
been implemented has been particularly successful from the perspective of 
local communities. Arguably, this has been achieved by merging federalism with 
consociationalism, resulting in a power sharing agreement between most clans 
and, in addition, ensuring a degree of decentralisation through the provision of 
services that were previously only available in Mogadishu. As a result, 
federalism in Jubaland has arguably resulted in both a peace and governance 
dividend which has significant implications for how federalism may be 
successfully replicated in other federal member states. 
 
 
Perspectives on the formation and consultation process of the Interim 
Jubaland Authority 
 
The following section examines perspectives in Jubaland regarding the 
formation of the Interim Jubaland Authority (IJA). It is not possible completely to 
separate these from people’s perspectives on federalism in general, given that 
the IJA has been the conduit for federal governance in Somalia. However, 
because of the broader challenges the country has faced in regards to state 
formation processes, these issues are worth examining in more detail.  
 
Analysis of the survey data shows that awareness of the IJA is almost universal 
amongst the various people and communities in Jubaland, with little variation 
when disaggregated by gender or whether respondents lived in rural or urban 
areas. Most but not all respondents were able to correctly identify that the IJA 
was formed in 2013. These results are in line with the earlier data sets 
discussed in the preceding section that demonstrated high levels of awareness 
of federalism per se. 
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Figure 8 Which year was the authority set up? 
 
 
 
The results from the quantitative survey and the key informant interviews 
indicate that most people felt that they were sufficiently informed about the 
formation process of the IJA. In addition, most people reported strong support 
for the formation process stating that they were able to engage through their 
representatives, if not directly, in the consultation process.  
 
As noted earlier, given the historical legacy explored in Chapter two, evidence 
of strong public support for the state formation process is likely to counter 
claims that federalism is an externally imposed agenda and increases the 
likelihood that this is a viable governance modality at least in the near future.  
This is also a significant finding for other states which are currently still 
completing the state formation process in regards to how they can build public 
support for federal governance more generally. 
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Figure 9 Do you feel informed about the process? 
  
 
 
Reflecting on the large clan conferences that were held in February 2013 to 
agree the formation of Jubaland, a representative of one of the minority clans in 
Dollow concluded: ‘We are very happy with the district administration – when it 
comes to consultation – it’s not possible to involve everybody – so it is those 
representatives that are consulted and we have our representatives in those 
consultations.’148 Given that representation and participation are generally 
contentious issues in Somalia, particularly in relation to political processes given 
the lack of trust between groups, this finding was not expected. However, the 
fact that some groups were prepared to compromise their own direct 
participation on the pragmatic grounds that anything wider would be impossible 
to universally achieve, is arguably another indicator in their confidence of the 
state formation process in general.  
 
In contrast to the above analysis, only one youth group residing outside of 
Kismayo raised concerns regarding the level of consultations, stating particular 
dissatisfaction in their role in the review of the Jubaland Constitution. One 
respondent argued that, ‘Currently the Jubaland headquarters are in Kismayo 
                                            
148 Focus Group Discussion, Gedo Minority Elders, Dollow, 7th October 2015. 
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and the youth are not the priority. Our role in the Constitution process was very 
marginal.’149  Whilst this was not the majority view, as articulated in the 
preceding section, the concerns of such groups are an important reminder 
regarding the importance of deepening consultation with a wider range of 
groups over time, to ensure that grievances do not begin to emerge and 
consolidate. In addition, although supportive of the formation process for the IJA 
overall, responses were less definitive in Lower Juba. This is surprising given 
that this includes people from Kismayo, who had the greatest geographical 
proximity to the process. This may reflect a concern that the state formation 
process has resulted in the decentralisation of power from Kismayo, leaving 
some groups with less influence as a consequence this redistribution. 
 
Perhaps most significantly, whilst respondents articulated confidence in the 
process leading to the formation of the IJA, the quantitative survey data 
suggests that populations were not actually very well informed about the 
process. In Middle Juba and, in particular, Lower Juba, the majority stated 
incorrectly that the IJA’s establishment was achieved via elections rather than a 
selection process. This demonstrates the importance of international actors and 
authorities at all levels to refer to processes correctly, as often clan selections 
are incorrectly heralded as elections, which could contribute to further 
misinforming local populations who already have very low levels of 
understanding of electoral processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
149 Focus Group Discussion, Gedo Youth, Dollow, 6th October 2015. 
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Figure 10 How was this authority (IJA) established? 
 
 
 
Lastly, in regards to support for the manner in which the IJA was created, 
respondents were sharply divided along regional lines. In Lower Juba the 
survey found that the process had somewhat legitimate levels of support which 
was echoed albeit to a lesser degree in Middle Juba. However, the majority of 
respondents in Gedo viewed the process as illegitimate, reflecting broad 
political divisions between the Marehan and Ogaden. 
 
Figure 11 To what extent do you feel the process of establishment of the IJA was acceptable? 
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Summary: Perspectives on the formation and consultation process of the 
Interim Jubaland Authority 
 
These findings in relation to how the IJA was formed build on the positive 
perspectives of federalism in general and strengthen the case that federalism 
within Jubaland is a viable governance modality.  
 
It would appear this overall level of confidence has emerged from a widely 
shared perspective that the level of participation in the establishment of the IJA 
was sufficiently broad and participatory and is a significant finding for other 
states who are completing state formation processes. However, the data also 
concluded that the process of inclusive institution building is not yet complete, 
with a particular need to accommodate actors within Gedo into the broader 
political settlement. Indeed, following the data collection period (in early 2016), 
this was achieved following significant mediation efforts between the Ogaden 
and the Marehan. This finally concluded in an agreement whereby the latter 
secured the position of Vice President (with stronger clan affiliations to Gedo 
than his predecessor) and five ministerial positions.  
 
Perspectives on the performance of the Interim Jubaland 
Authority/Jubaland Authority 
 
The following section presents and examines perspectives of the Jubaland 
population in regards to the performance of the Interim and permanent 
Jubaland Administration. This is possible since the data collection survey took 
place during the transition between the two. In general, the degree to which 
respondents thought that the IJA/JA represented their interests varied sharply 
between the regions, with the survey-data showing high levels of confidence in 
Lower Juba where the Jubaland authorities are based, a moderate level in 
Middle Juba and a much less consistent picture in Gedo. 
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Figure 12 To what extent does the IJA represent your interests? (by region) 
 
 
 
It is interesting to note that rural communities were less likely to consider that 
the IJA represents their interests than urban communities. There are several 
possible reasons for this, the most likely being that it reflects the limited access 
and influence that the IJA has beyond more urban conurbations. This will affect 
the extent to which the IJA can provide services for rural communities. In 
addition, rural communities may also face challenges in regards to receiving 
information about the services offered by the IJA and their priorities as an 
administration given limited access to radio, television and internet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
%
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 
  
98 
 
Figure 13 To what extent does IJA represent your interests? (by urban/rural) 
 
 
  
The survey data demonstrated a clear divide between Gedo and the two Juba 
regions in regards to whether federalism had resulted in more localised 
decision-making. This again reflects the impact of how unresolved political 
tensions can impact citizens’ perceptions more generally in regards to how 
empowered their group is within the broader political landscape. Whilst these 
particular issues appear to have been later resolved in the case of the 
Marehan-Ogaden conflict, this reinforces the need for other emerging states to 
prioritise reaching inclusive political agreements, as a failure to do so can 
seriously weaken the viability of federal state formation processes. 
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Figure 14 Since the introduction of the IJA do you feel that the decision making 
authority has come closer to you? 
 
   
 
Another significant finding was support for the administration’s emphasis on 
being inclusive towards minority groups. A prominent member of the Jubaland 
Authority from the Bantu community noted that this inclusion has contributed to 
addressing the inequalities that marred previous systems stating that, 
‘historically the Bantu have been marginalized, but gradually now, we are ready 
as a community. There were no representatives; we paid taxes, but no 
representatives. Since the Barre government there were so many 
grievances.’150  
 
A senior minister within the federal government underlined the interconnection 
between reconciliation processes and state formation, noting that these ‘need to 
go hand in hand. If you want to form district councils without reconciliation you 
cannot form anything. That reconciliation was misunderstood – national 
reconciliation, regional reconciliation, but now we need grassroots 
                                            
150 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Jubaland Authorities, Kismayo, 28th November 2015. 
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reconciliation.’151  This again reinforces earlier conclusions regarding the 
particular manner in which federalism in Jubaland has been fused with 
consociationalism, resulting in both constitutional safeguards between the 
centre and the periphery but also security, inclusion and participation for 
minority clans within Jubaland. This process has resulted not only in a high-
level of political reconciliation but one that establishes an environment for 
deeper social reconciliation at community level. 
 
An additional and very significant result of pursing this combined approach has 
been the improved public perceptions of security across much of Jubaland, 
(with the exception of Middle Juba which remains under al Shabaab control). A 
civil society representative from Lower Juba commented, ‘On security, Jubaland 
security forces are present in all major areas, particularly in Kismayo town, so 
the reliability of security is much higher than before.’152  
 
Several respondents praised the administration’s approach to integration, with 
one noting that, ‘the Jubaland administration is becoming one - the security 
forces are being integrated. They have one policy as a whole.’153 This is notable, 
as increased internal security has not been necessarily identified as a possible 
benefit in either the literature on post-conflict federalism or the broader political 
discourse as a major reason for adopting a federal governance system, yet 
would appear to be a significant result in the Jubaland case.  
 
Furthermore, the perceived gains appear to be relatively sustainable, 
particularly when compared with more military focussed approaches which have 
previously struggled to retain territory once captured from al Shabaab and 
whereby military actors have frequently been accused of gross human rights 
                                            
151 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Federal Government of Somalia, Mogadishu, 2nd 
December 2015. 
152  Focus Group Discussion, Lower Juba Civil Society, Kismayo, 29th September 2015. 
153  Focus Group Discussion, Gedo Minority Elders, Dollow, 7th October 2015. 
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violations and have struggled to implement successful local governance 
strategies. 
 
Another area which received recognition from respondents were the efforts 
made to initiate public financial management in Jubaland. Supported by the 
Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), the IJA has achieved considerable progress in 
setting up an online public financial management system in conjunction with 
relevant legislative reforms that have enabled Jubaland to quickly generate 
revenues, engage in detailed budgeting and successfully monitor 
expenditures.154 This has led to Jubaland increasing its annual operating budget 
year-on-year and even running a small surplus of $300,000 in 2013-2014. The 
extent of progress has also attracted other actors to support Jubaland in this 
arena, notably the World Bank.155  
 
However, part of this success has been attributed to the fact that the 
governance system for the first two years of the IJA was considerably slimmer 
than at present, given the absence of a Regional Assembly, which enabled fast 
and streamlined decision-making, albeit with limited oversight. A representative 
of the Jubaland Finance Ministry commented: ‘There was no system in place 
previously. There was political will from the leadership. On a technical aspect, 
we started from scratch. Puntland is different – you are trying to reform a 
system which didn’t work but benefited some. Another thing that gave us space 
was that there was no parliament. The Council of Ministers could sign and pass 
things swiftly. For us it is very easy, if we want to create legislation and policies, 
we create it.’156 
 
These responses raise two important considerations in regards to assessing the 
significance of federalism for Jubaland and beyond. Firstly, federalism has been 
                                            
154 For further information on Somalia Stability Fund Priorities see http://stabilityfund.so/  
155 Focus Group Discussion, Representatives from Jubaland Finance Ministry, Kismayo, 29 th 
November 2015 
156 Ibid. 
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strengthened by incorporating broader elements of good governance – in this 
case, financial accountability. Secondly, and somewhat controversially, state 
institutions have been created quickly because Jubaland was ruled solely by an 
executive for two years. This arguably reduced the space for political 
contestation and allowed for basic institutions to be developed and established, 
albeit with limited oversight and external scrutiny.  
 
In Jubaland’s case this interim strategy appears to have been successful from a 
statebuilding perspective given that a period of temporary and arguably 
necessary executive rule was later balanced by the formation of a regional 
legislature. One explanation for this success is that the new administration led 
by Madobe enjoyed sufficient public support to allow for a period of executive 
rule on the proviso that certain milestones were met. However, without the 
checks and balances of a parliament and independent judiciary, the likelihood 
of such an outcome remains solely dependent on the benevolence of the 
leadership in question. As such, this raises important questions of when 
emerging federal entities should embark on broader democratisation efforts, 
particularly given the clear public demand to so or whether a period of 
temporary executive rule may be more effective in achieving an initial degree of 
stabilisation.  
 
In general, negative perceptions regarding the performance of the IJA were 
reported less frequently. Some respondents were more sceptical regarding the 
motivations of minority clans in working within the administration. A 
representative of the Gedo opposition commented, ‘They fear for their lives. 
They worry about what may happen if they oppose the administration. Or it 
could be that we have met with people who are pro-Madobe. There are a bunch 
of people from his group – it isn’t the real representation because they have a 
small interest in this administration.’157 Whilst it remains possible that minority 
participation was either coerced or self-interested, numerous interviews with 
                                            
157 Focus Group Discussion, Representatives of Gedo Opposition, Kismayo, 29th November 
2015. 
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minority groups suggested that this was not the case and that the approaches 
of the IJA had been genuine in their intention to broaden participation.  
 
In addition, some focus group discussion participants were quite open that they 
had benefited personally from the process. If true, this could undermine one of 
the principal achievements of the first two years of the IJA in reaching a fairly 
inclusive executive and raises the prospect of embedded patronage networks in 
the long-term. A Lower Juba Elder commented: ‘Previously we were looked 
down on but yesterday I was called by the President and I was given a brand 
new vehicle.’158 As mentioned previously, if new federal governance structures 
become associated with patronage networks and corruption, then this may 
tarnish by association the broader federalism project. 
 
However, whilst there is a high level of sub-clan inclusivity both within the IJA 
and the current Regional Assembly, this was not complete at the time of field 
research. Ahead of negotiations with the Jubaland Authorities in November 
2015, a representative of the Galti Marehan outlined their key demands: 
 
‘We want two outcomes from my perspective. One, we need to have confidence 
that Madobe will be the leader of Jubaland for the next four years. Two, he 
needs to give us confidence that he is a leader for all Jubaland and will serve us 
all equally. Two months ago there was a lot of fear, fear that a soldier could kill 
anyone he likes, and there is still intimidation that they can put you in jail in a 
cell.’159 
 
A number of respondents also raised serious concerns as to the extent to which 
parliamentarians actually represent communities or their interests. An elder 
from Middle Juba stated; ‘This is why Somalia is in anarchy today. Politicians 
don’t represent the community. Elders say that they need to be patient. This is a 
                                            
158 Focus Group Discussion, Lower Juba Elders, Kismayo, 28th September 2015. 
159 Focus Group Discussion, Representatives of Gedo Opposition, Kismayo, 29th November 
2015. 
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mechanism for politicians to get into power. It is a short-term phenomenon. 
Once a fake elder is selected and has completed his task, he is then 
discarded.’160 
 
A member of the Gedo opposition (Galti Marehan) alluded that representation 
was not genuine from his community’s perspective and that this weakened their 
ability to ensure access to resources, stating that: ‘One, there has never been a 
real discussion of how we get a piece of the pie. Two, there has never been a 
genuine discussion within those groups that select that representative – in 
terms of who represents who.’161 
 
Whilst the specific issue regarding splits within the Marehan has since been 
resolved, this raises important issues regarding how representation issues are 
managed within emergent federal systems. The decision to embark on a 
district-based selection process for the 2015 Regional Assembly, was a good 
first step in linking with representatives to specific geographical constituencies 
in which many clans are likely to reside rather than simply on a clan basis. At 
the time of writing, there were wide hopes that the planned move towards 
universal elections in 2019 could further cement this progress.  
 
The survey indicated varying confidence in the ability of the Jubaland 
authorities to effectively distribute resources. Once again, there was a notable 
divide between respondents in Gedo and the Jubas regarding confidence in the 
equitability of the Jubaland authorities’ distribution of resources. This again 
underlines the importance for Jubaland to ensure that federalism is and 
continues to be based on a broader political settlement. More broadly, 
federalism’s success will be in part dependent on ensuring that resources are 
well managed and distributed equally between clans. Given that Jubaland has 
                                            
160 Focus Group Discussion, Middle Juba Elders, Kismayo, 28th September 2015. 
161 Focus Group Discussion, Representatives of Gedo Opposition, Kismayo, 29th November 
2015. 
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invested heavily in a consociational approach to governance, there are at least 
some grounds for optimism that some of the foundations for such equitable 
resource management are coming into place. 
 
Figure 15 Do you think the IJA is currently able to distribute and manage resources to 
all of Jubaland region? 
 
 
 
 
Summary: Perspectives on the performance of the Interim Jubaland Authority 
 
The findings reviewed in this section have again demonstrated broad support 
regarding the performance of the Interim Jubaland Authority. Generally, the IJA 
is seen to represent the interests of its constituents and has brought decision 
making closer to the population. However, such support was not universal and 
was undermined by the conflict between the Marehan and the Ogaden that 
significantly reduced trust in the broader state formation project, particularly in 
Gedo. This reinforces the importance of a broader inclusive peacebuilding 
process that seeks to reach a political settlement with all key actors. When this 
is achieved not only can better governance be realised as an end in itself but 
such a transformative approach can have a significant impact on broader 
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security dynamics as a whole. However, one explanation for Jubaland’s early 
success is that the IJA was able to stabilise the region using executive powers 
that had the broad support of the population. This strategy was in many ways 
vindicated by the successful establishment of a regional parliament which will in 
future act as a balance against executive rule. 
  
However, some concerns were raised regarding the practices of the IJA. 
Reports that state resources have been used to secure political patronage and 
that IJA politicians were solely representing their own interests could serve to 
severely weaken broader confidence in the performance of state authorities.  
 
 
Perspectives on the 2015 Regional Assembly selection process 
 
Perspectives from the international community on the 2015 selection process 
were generally positive, albeit with a number of caveats. An advisor for the UK 
government described the process as ‘somewhere approaching reasonably 
good in a difficult situation.’162 A UN representative noted that the process was 
controversial given the resulting Marehan and Ogadeni domination, but praised 
the level of political will to see the process through.163  
 
A number of KII respondents raised concerns about possible corruption in the 
process recently used to select members of the Jubaland. Firstly, a number of 
interviewees noted that candidates needed access to considerable financial 
resources if they were to ensure their selection. A representative from a Dollow 
minority clan commented, ‘according to my estimation anyone who is to be an 
MP needs to raise $15-20,000.’164 However, these allegations were strongly 
refuted by the Jubaland authorities, with a senior minister noting that to prevent 
corruption, ‘Three candidates were presented for each position. I can use my 
                                            
162 Key Informant Interview, Advisor, UK Government, Mogadishu, 3rd December 2015. 
163 Key Informant Interview, UN Advisor, Kismayo, 30th November 2015 
164 Focus Group Discussion, Gedo Minority Elders, Dollow, 7th October 2015. 
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money but the probability of winning is much less. We declared that anyone 
trying to use corruption would be totally excluded from the process. We were 
told that in the election of the federal government the price has gone up to 
$50,000.’165 Whilst no concrete evidence was found to support these claims, 
public confidence in selection and election processes is a critical component for 
sustained public support for the federalisation process.   
 
In this context another issue raised regarding the selection process was the 
proliferation of clan elders, as well as prospective MPs’ financial backing for so-
called “copy chiefs” to ensure their own selection, was widely reported. A Lower 
Juba civil society representative illustrated the situation as follows:  
 
‘When I came back to Jubaland, the well-known elders used to be few in 
number, but now we are nearly 130! Just in Jubaland. There are no agreed 
criteria and these are not being respected. I think the Somali media has 
contributed to the inflation of the number of elders. Because every two people, 
they meet, give money and then they go to the media and announce a new 
traditional elder.’166 
 
Despite evidence that the system used in Jubaland to select MPs and elders 
was clearly benefiting elites, both the survey and KIIs demonstrated strong and 
encouraging political support for direct elections in future among the Jubaland 
authorities and Elders.  A prominent member of the authorities commented that 
he understood this to be the intention of the leadership:  
 
‘I think that one man, one vote, in less than a decade, by the end of the 
President’s second term, I think this is realistic. The President wants to make a 
positive legacy here. His milestones and thinking are good for Somalia.’167  
 
                                            
165 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Jubaland Authorities, Kismayo, 30th November 2015. 
166 Focus Group Discussion, Lower Juba Civil Society, Kismayo, 29th September 2015. 
167 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Jubaland Authorities, Kismayo, 28th November 2015. 
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Figure 16 When the IJA becomes a formal federal members state, how should be 
selected? 
 
 
 
Representatives of the Jubaland authorities also repeatedly stated their 
commitment to hold Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2019. The 
implications of these findings indicate that the international community will need 
to expedite any investment to ensure that the necessary administrative and 
legislative frameworks exist for elections to adhere to minimal international 
standards. If successful, this could not only strengthen public confidence in the 
Jubaland authorities but also catalyse similar processes in other Federal 
Member States. On the other hand, if this opportunity is not taken, Jubaland 
risks developing political norms that reinforce patronage networks and the 
emergence of an executive and parliament that are not held to account by the 
population, potentially undermining the federalism project as a whole.  
 
Summary: Perceptions on the 2015 Regional Assembly process 
 
The above analysis suggests that whilst some concerns were raised, the 
process for forming the 2015 Regional Assembly was broadly perceived by 
members of the emergent political authorities, elders and the wider populations 
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as acceptable. Holding a credible process for forming a regional parliament was 
critical in ensuring that Jubaland was able to transition from purely executive 
governance to one in which there is now parliamentary oversight. This 
significant strengthening of Jubaland’s accountability framework combined with 
the decision to utilise a district based system for appointing parliamentarians 
indicates that the process of improved public support for the Jubaland emergent 
authorities has some momentum and sustainability. This evidence suggests that 
federalism in Jubaland has been a viable mechanism for strengthening 
governance in the region.  
 
 
Perspectives on the role of the Federal Government of Somalia in the 
Jubaland federalisation process 
 
The following section presents and examines perceptions in Jubaland on the 
role of the Federal Government of Somalia in the federalisation process in 
Jubaland. Overall, the perceptions of the Federal Govenrment’s role were 
overwhelmingly negative. A senior minister within the federal government 
offered this analysis:  
 
‘The key problem was that people were not happy with the federal system. If 
Jubaland could have been prevented from becoming a state then federalism 
could be stopped and the hidden agenda was two federal states, north and 
south.’168  
 
The quantitative data demonstrates a complex relationship between the federal 
government and the three regions of Jubaland, although requires further 
primary data to understand the issues fully. When respondents were asked 
whether the relationship between Jubaland and the federal government should 
change, Lower Juba and Gedo were strongly in favour of this.  A slight majority 
                                            
168 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Federal Government of Somalia, Mogadishu, 2nd 
December 2015. 
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in Middle Juba said it should not, and may reflect  concerns that the region is 
still occupied by al Shabaab and would need the Somalia National Army and 
the support of AMISOM to liberate it.  
 
Figure 17 Would you say the relationship between regional and Federal government 
should change? 
 
 
 
These findings arguably suggest that the single largest threat to the 
implementation of federalism in Jubaland is the behaviour of and relationship 
with the Federal Government itself.  The FGS, which was effectively forced to 
accommodate the establishment of Jubaland, subsequently adopted a radically 
different approach of facilitating (albeit whilst pursuing its own interests) the 
broader federalisation process rather than attempting to prevent it. The 
implications of these findings suggest that significant confidence-building 
processes between Jubaland and the federal government will be required as 
the negative legacy of the early years of the federalisation process is gradually 
overcome. 
 
Related to this is the slow political and technical progress in Jubaland regarding 
the development of a policy framework for fiscal federalism. The technical 
progress in Jubaland in developing an effective public financial management 
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system, sharply contrasts with difficulties in reaching a broader political 
consensus on how resources will be shared between Jubaland and the federal 
government.  Although there has recently been a series of constructive initial 
meetings between the respective federal member state finance ministers and 
the federal government, the details of any agreements have yet to be outlined. 
A representative from the Minister of Finance in Jubaland commented:  
 
‘Resource sharing, fiscal federalisation, it was part of the Addis Agreement - 
there was an article stipulating that after six months, the Jubaland state would 
give ports and airports back to the federal government. So far, still those 
structures are under the control of the Jubaland state. There was a meeting 
between the Ministries of Finance for the federal member states and the federal 
government and the issues were on resource sharing; the debate is ongoing.’169 
 
Summary: The role of the Federal Government of Somalia in the Jubaland 
federalisation process 
 
The findings explored in this section outline a number of issues that threaten 
the success of federalism in Jubaland. This includes evidence suggesting the 
need for greater political agreement and cooperation between the federal 
government and Jubaland. This would enable the emergence of a clearer policy 
and legislative framework to regulate the process and the establishment of 
functioning institutions to facilitate the process and arbitrate on disputes.  
 
Without these in place, federalism in Jubaland risks remaining a largely political 
project rather than also being a governance mechanism which can deliver 
greater development dividends for its citizens. Federalism in this scenario risks 
losing public support which given the regions history, could threaten the political 
settlement that has been established in Jubaland. 
                                            
169 Focus Group Discussion, Representatives from Jubaland Finance Ministry, Kismayo, 29 th 
November 2015. 
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Perspectives on the role of the international community in Jubaland and 
the broader federalisation process 
 
The following section outlines perspectives that were shared on the role of the 
international community in the Jubaland state formation process. One of the 
most common concerns was that this was an elite-led process driven by the 
national interests of foreign states. From the UK perspective, support to the IJA 
presented something of a dilemma, as in their view, in 2013, the federal 
government acted as a spoiler and contravened the overarching federalism 
principles set out in the Provisional constitution. However, as regional powers 
increasingly backed Ras Kamboni, the decision ‘became easier for the West to 
side with this – going against IGAD would have been very difficult.’170 Eventually 
this led the UK to directly support the work of IGAD, to the extent that UK staff 
were directly seconded within IGAD. This was in direct contrast to other 
international actors such as the United Nations, which have taken a much more 
cautious and indirect role, albeit one that became more substantive after the 
Addis Ababa Agreement was signed in May 2013.  A United Nations staff 
member reflected:  
 
‘UN involvement in Jubaland’s state formation began post Addis Ababa. [There 
was a] sense that Jubaland was being created without the consent of the SFG. 
So only after the Addis Ababa agreement was the UN comfortable with 
engaging, as that agreement included the SFG.’171  
 
The interests of regional states were also key in the state formation process, 
particularly those of Kenya and Ethiopia. A senior federal government minister 
commented, ‘what I can say is that Ethiopia and Kenya - their current and long 
term interest is security.’172 In addition, regional interests were also undertaken 
                                            
170 Key Informant Interview, Advisor, UK Government, Mogadishu, 3rd December 2015. 
171 Key Informant Interview, Advisor, United Nations, Kismayo, 30th November 2015. 
172 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Federal Government of Somalia, Mogadishu, 2nd 
December 2015 
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through the auspices of IGAD, which was deeply involved in the process. A 
senior minister from the Jubaland authorities commented that:  
 
‘IGADs role was a facilitator. IGAD is a regional organisation and brings 
together all the states in the region. We are very grateful for the role of IGAD; if 
it was not for their role things would be very different. Economically they were 
helping us to attend those meetings. For example, the access of different 
regions was difficult because of al Shabaab, so IGAD provided flights so that 
people could reach each other.’173 
 
Other respondents were very critical of the role of the international community in 
leading the process without the broad participation of Somalis representing all 
clans and subclans. A Barre Hiraale supporter commented:  
 
‘There’s a joke –according to the power sharing of Somalia, we have 4.5, but 
now we are 5. There is another ’clan’ so we are now 6. 5 Somalis and Halane – 
the airport! We don’t know what is going on there. The international community 
are the 6th clan.’174 
 
It is unclear whether regional or other states were pursuing national interests 
beyond their own security. However, it is likely that this was also motivated by 
economic interests, such as access to a seaport for Ethiopia and securing off-
shore oil and gas reserves. Either way, as discussed in detail in Chapter two 
and three, for federalism to remain an effective governance mechanism for 
Jubaland, it is essential that this is perceived as a Somali-owned process in 
which governments at both federal and regional level have sovereignty over. 
However, given that these concerns were only raised by a minority of 
individuals, albeit those who may be in a better position to analyse such 
                                            
173 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Jubaland Authorities, Kismayo, 30th November 2015. 
174 Key Informant Interview, Individual politically opposed to Jubaland, Mogadishu, 14th October 
2015. 
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developments, the vast majority of the population is still strongly in favour of a 
federal system. As such it is unlikely that such sentiments pose a risk to the 
viability of federalism as a whole in the near future. 
 
Another concern raised by delivery partners regarding the role of the 
international community, was the narrow focus of donors on providing 
stabilisation programmes for Kismayo, despite this potentially exacerbating 
tensions between the centre and the periphery within Jubaland. A contractor 
involved in stabilization programmes commented: 
 
‘Two years ago we were barely in a position to work in Kismayo – even one 
year ago. There is no pressure from regional authorities or from donors to 
distribute across regions.’175 
 
Given that the success of federalism in Jubaland has been predicated on finely 
balanced political negotiations between the various clans, to avoid destabilising 
these, it is critical that donors move more quickly to consider the broader 
regional needs of Federal Member States. If this does not occur, this risks 
reinforcing norms of political life at the regional level whereby election 
processes result in ‘winner-takes-all’ and in the Jubaland example could 
seriously undermine the consociational approach that has utilised with some 
success.  
 
The final issue raised related to concerns regarding donor coordination in 
determining and overseeing development priorities in Jubaland which has been 
seen to be limited and somewhat constrained by the current mechanisms for aid 
coordination, most notably the New Deal. Currently the New Deal, via the five 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Working Groups, is coordinated thematically 
rather than geographically. An advisor working for the UK Government 
commented: ‘The New Deal is a very centralised approach – there is a sub-
working group on federalism but no structures around FMSs with security often 
                                            
175 Key Informant Interview, Contractor, Mogadishu, 14th October 2015. 
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a factor. Coordination is needed, there are many players and it is missing FMS 
representation. It requires a lot of bureaucracy, the politicians who attend are 
often very junior and it’s not the format for difficult political decisions – it is 
essentially for information sharing. These are the reasons that the SSF is not 
conducted through the New Deal.’176  Given that federalism’s success is 
dependent and very much associated with the broader statement agenda 
improved donor coordination will be essential to consider, otherwise 
development risks becoming fragmented and potentially being perceived to 
favour particular groups over others. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to explore whether the introduction of federalism in 
Jubaland has resulted in improved governance or peacebuilding outcomes for 
communities and what factors may risk or strengthen any progress in the years 
to come. The empirical evidence explored in each of the preceding sections has 
identified a number of important considerations. 
 
Evidence from the survey and key informant interviews demonstrates that 
federalism enjoys strong public support despite some anxiety regarding its 
potential to the precipitate secessionist movements or clan tensions.  The 
process of forming new administrations was widely seen as legitimate with 
sufficient representation and inclusion of all groups. In addition, the manner in 
which federalism has been implemented in Jubaland has benefited from being 
blended with consociationalism and decentralisation resulting in a fairly 
immediate peacebuilding, security and governance dividends for the population.  
 
More specifically, the 2015 Regional Assembly selection process was broadly 
successful in ensuring that Jubaland transferred from purely executive role to 
one which enjoys the checks and balances of a parliament, the role of the 
Federal government has largely been unhelpful in the state formation process 
                                            
176 Key Informant Interview, Advisor, UK Government, Mogadishu, 3rd December 2015. 
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having attempted to initially repress it with force and having largely failed to 
provide a coherent policy or legislative framework on federalism or create 
strong independent institutions to manage the process and arbitrate on 
disputes. Finally, the international community has been seen to use federalism 
as means of meeting its own interests and has taken risks by focusing its 
investment solely at the regional capital level without a broader donor 
coordination framework in place. 
 
The implications of these findings however, suggest a more significant 
conclusion; federalism in Jubaland is not perceived to be merely a governance 
modality, despite its more narrow definition in the theoretical literature. The data 
from Jubaland suggests that for much of the population, federalism represents 
a corruption free, democratic governance system that is able to meet the 
service delivery expectations of communities whilst simultaneously uniting the 
country after many decades of instability and conflict. This expanded definition 
may be both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, Jubaland has for many 
years sought to navigate a way out of seemingly eternal violence and poor 
governance and federalism may catalyse systemic change. However, on the 
other hand, the enormity of the task and the aspirations of the population may 
mean that a failure to deliver on elections, services, eradicate corruption and 
achieve political reconciliation may tarnish and discredit federalism in the 
process.  
 
In summary, whether federalism is an appropriate governance model for 
Jubaland is not in question; there seems little doubt that it is the region’s best 
option going forward. Its future success however is likely to be determined by 
how it continues to be delivered and the extent to which to it precipitates 
broader governance reform. The next chapter will analyse to what extent the 
findings in Jubaland have been replicated across Somalia in order to assess the 
extent to which federalism is likely to be an effective governance modality for 
the country as a whole. 
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Chapter five: Assessing the peacebuilding & governance dividends of 
federalism in Somalia 
 
This chapter will build upon the conclusions of Chapter four to answer the 
research question; To what extent has the federalism process in other federal 
member states more broadly contributed to improved governance and 
peacebuilding outcomes? The first section of this chapter will propose an 
analysis framework for assessing progress. The second section will then 
provide a brief overview of the federalism process in Puntland, South West and 
Galmadug as of April 2017 before using the analytical framework to assess 
whether the introduction of federal governance in each of these federal member 
states has delivered specific governance and peacebuilding dividends. The 
section will also analyse data from the Key Informant Interviews and the survey 
which relate to the opportunities and challenges of federalism at a national 
level. 
 
Analytical framework 
 
Based on the findings of the Jubaland case study, this chapter proposes to 
assess the extent to which the other federal member states have delivered 
tangible peacebuilding or governance dividends utilising three indicators. These 
indicators have been selected to determine; the status of the relations between 
a specific federal member state and the federal government; relations between 
a specific federal state and other federal member states (inter-federal state 
relations); and internal relations between various groupings within a federal 
member state (intra-federal state relations). 
 
Federal government-federal state relations (FGS-FMS) 
 
From a theoretical perspective, a state undergoing federalisation requires a 
detailed political agreement between the centre and the periphery in order to 
define the boundaries of federal entities and promote clarity on their respective 
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rights and responsibilities. However, as Chapter Four illustrated, the federalism 
process in Jubaland was a highly-decentralised process whereby the latter 
announced its federal member status unilaterally following attempted 
suppression from the Federal Government. However, despite this recent violent 
history, the field research did not report any strong sentiment for secession. 
However, if this pattern of poor centre-periphery relations was repeated across 
the country, this would indicate a higher risk of possible state fragmentation and 
would seriously put at risk the ability of new federal states to deliver tangible 
governance and peacebuilding dividends for the population.  
 
An implication of weak FMS-FGS relations is that the resulting governance 
structures and policies at FMS level are likely to be highly uneven across the 
country as a whole. Whilst there may be benefits in developing specific 
arrangements in response to local governance dynamics, this may reduce 
opportunities for more effective and efficient nation-wide systems. For example, 
a uniform FMS public financial management system or FMS electoral model 
across the country is likely to bring greater cost savings than each federal state 
developing their own.   
 
Interstate relations (FMS-FMS) 
 
For federalist approaches to deliver tangible governance or peacebuilding 
dividends for the population then political conflict between constituent states 
must be managed effectively to ensure that federal institutions can function and 
that violence does not emerge. This is particularly important for neighbouring 
federal member states who need to agree the demarcation of borders, the 
movement of goods and services and which populations are entitled to political 
representation. 
 
As explored in Chapter three, one of the major risks of a state transitioning to 
federalism is that it potentially increases the risk of conflict between federal 
entities defined by ethnicity. Whilst Jubaland has appeared to enjoy good 
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relationships with other neighbouring states, it will be important to assess 
whether this is a common trend across Somalia. 
 
Similarly, the Jubaland case study illustrated the tension within the Marehan of 
the political rights of Guri (‘indigenous) and Galti (‘outsider’) communities. Given 
the levels of internal migration and displacement in Somalia over the course of 
the conflict, this is likely to be a significant challenge as FMSs design their 
processes for political transitions and determine who and who cannot 
participate. 
 
Intra-state governance relations & degree of FMS governance reform 
 
As explored in Chapter Four, the early successes of federalism in Jubaland 
were largely due to the administration’s commitment to consociationalism which 
proved that federal governance has the potential to deliver both political and 
social reconciliation.  In addition, despite Jubaland’s brief existence, there is 
strong evidence that Jubaland’s commitment to a reform agenda including the 
transition from Executive to parliamentary rule and progress in regards to public 
financial management have strengthened intra-state relations. 
 
Federalism by itself will not, as the Jubaland case study also illustrated, deliver 
governance and peacebuilding dividends. This is likely to be only achieved if 
new administrations demonstrate a commitment to inclusive politics with other 
(most probably minority) groups. The status of these relations is also likely to be 
partly dependent on the extent to which the ruling party is committed to 
delivering governance reform. This includes at a minimum progress in providing 
basic health and educations services, job creation (particularly for youth), and 
security. In addition, an agreed framework (i.e. universal elections or a clan 
selection process) that allows political power to be periodically and non-violently 
contested will be essential in maintaining peaceful intra-state relations.   
 
  
120 
 
However, if this ambition for change is uneven across Somalia, this may 
prevent federalism from replicating the same results at a national level. It will be 
important to assess whether this has been the case in other federal member 
states before concluding whether federalism can play a more transformative 
role at a national level. 
 
Assessing the progress of federalism at federal state level 
 
The following section will outline the historical development of the federalisation 
process as it relates to other states, particularly in Puntland, South West and 
Galmadug, all of which are now either formal Federal Member States such as 
Puntland or, as is the case of South West and Galmadug, are classed as 
‘Interim Regional Authorities’.  This will be followed by an analysis of the how 
federalism has impacted governance and peacebuilding dynamics using the 
proposed analytical framework above. 
 
Of course, these three states and Jubaland do not form the entirety of Somalia. 
In addition, HirShabelle, which formed in October 2016, consists of Middle 
Shabelle and Hiraan.177  There is also the unresolved legal status of Benadir, 
the defacto national (and ideally shared) capital of Somalia.  An analysis of 
these two regions is not possible to include as their inaccessibility has meant 
that no secondary political-economy analysis is yet in the public domain. 
 
However, by extending the analysis to include Somaliland, this also allows for 
an analysis of how regions embarking on secession compare to those who opt 
for federalism. The chapter will include a brief historical account of Somaliland 
                                            
177 On 9th October 2016, the new HirShabelle Interim State was announced with Jawhar agreed 
as the new capital. Subsequently a state assembly was established which elected a President, 
Vice President, Vice President and Speaker. The process of forming the HirShabelle 
administration was highly contested  and the leader of the Habar Gidir-Hawadle refused to 
recognize the legitimacy of the interim administration. See United Nations, Report of the 
Secretary General on Somalia, S/2017/21, 9th January 2017 
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before assessing the impact that this has had on its own peacebuilding and 
governance dynamics using the same analytical framework described above. 
 
Puntland 
History of federalism in Puntland 
 
Arguably, it was Puntland that began the federalism experiment in Somalia by 
forming as a Federal Member State in 1998. Encompassing the north-east of 
the country, Puntland is significant in size, totalling about a third of Somalia’s 
territory and ethnically dominated by the Harti group of the Darod. Puntland, in 
response to the broader civil war, which began in 1991, was formed in Garowe 
following a three-month clan conference. However, unlike its Somaliland 
neighbours to the West, Puntland’s leadership never seriously considered a 
secessionist agenda, preferring to be recognised as a federal member state 
within the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, the precursor to 
the current Provisional Constitution. Dill states that the principle reasons for this 
include the fact that the Darod community in Puntland were not deliberately 
targeted by the Siad Barre regime during the civil war and also the presence of 
significant Darod population in Jubaland meant that Puntland was not able to 
disconnect itself fully from wider Somalia.178 
 
Puntland’s political formation since the late 1990s took place under somewhat 
different conditions to other federal states. This was largely as a result of having 
been relatively untouched by the civil war, with the exception of Galkayo, in 
which the SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Front) and USC troops clashed 
                                            
178 Dill, J., ‘Puntland’s declaration of autonomy and Somaliland’s Secession: Two Quests for 
Self Governance in a failed state’ in Weller, M., & Nobbs, K., Asymmetric Autonomy and the 
Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, University of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania, 2010, p 282. 
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as part of the broader Darod-Hawiye conflict and clashes with Al Ittihat Al Islami 
(AIAI) in Bossaso.179  
 
Between May and August 1998, a large-scale clan conference took place in 
Garowe, partly emulating those which had  previously took place in Somaliland, 
with the objective of transitioning from military rule by the SSDF to a civilian 
administration. However, unlike Somaliland, Puntland did not choose to 
institutionalise the role of the elders through the formation of a ‘Guurti’ or an 
Upper House, relying solely on a single House of Representatives. However, in 
practice, elders continue to have a prominent role in political affairs, particularly 
on issues relating to dispute resolution. 
 
Puntland’s transition to an effective civilian administration was hindered by the 
authoritarian leadership of President Cabaduallahi Yusuf. In his detailed 
analysis, Markus Hoehne concludes that, ‘After three years in office, his 
leadership had failed to accomplish the constitutional provisions to draft a new 
constitution, conduct a population census, organise a constitutional referendum 
and hold multi-party elections.’180   
 
Hoehne goes on to note that this was in part at least to the changing external 
dynamics when Djibouti hosted a larger peace and reconciliation conference for 
Somalia which favoured a power-sharing mechanism between all the clans of 
the Somali regions as opposed to recognising the emerging territories of 
Somaliland and Puntland. As a result, both entities subsequently boycotted the 
conference which paved the way for other groups in attendance to gain 
prominence.  Most notably, the Puntland opposition, led by Jaamac Cali 
Jaamac, used the event to gain international support and later, back in 
Puntland, went on to lead an armed campaign against the Yusuf administration. 
 
                                            
179 Hoehne M., ‘Mimesis & Mimicry in Dynamics of State Identity Formation - Northern Somalia 
in Africa’, Journal of the International African Institute, 2009, Vol. 79, No. 2, p 261.  
180 Ibid, p 263. 
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Jaamac was later elected President by his own sub-clan, a claim strongly 
refuted by the Yusuf administration. Jaamac was finally defeated by Puntland 
government forces 2002. Yusuf went on to complete a second term before 
being elected as the Transitional National Government President (i.e. at Federal 
level) in October 2004 with Mohamed Hashi taking over as a caretaker 
president of Puntland until he lost a clan election to Mohamed Muse Hersi in 
January 2005. Hersi, stayed in power until 2009, but did little to reform Puntland 
with the exception of pushing through a draft constitution.  
 
In 2009, Farole was elected as president of Puntland, again through a clan 
conference. An International Crisis Group report noted that whilst ‘he inherited a 
fractured and impoverished state, [he also] has attracted growing criticism and 
is accused in particular of hoarding power for himself and his family.’181 Whilst 
attempts were made by Farole’s administration to undertake democratic 
elections in Puntland, a combination of poor administration and a lack of 
political consensus led to increasing violence ahead of the 2013 elections which 
ultimately led to their cancellation on the eve of polling day. Once again, 
Puntland fell back to a clan-based selection process, in which President Farole 
narrowly lost to Abdiweli Mohamed Ali by a single vote.  
 
Theoretically, local council elections are scheduled in Puntland in 2017 followed 
by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019, although all are likely to be 
delayed given funding constraints and insufficient preparation. When they do 
take place, elections are likely to emulate the model used in Somaliland, 
whereby local elections will determine the three political parties that can 
compete in national elections. This is an attempt to reduce the likelihood of an 
emergence of a myriad of very small political parties all representing specific  
sub-sub clans and  instead encouraging the emergence of three larger 
groupings which are multi-clanic in nature. 
 
                                            
181International Crisis Group, Somalia: Puntland’s Punted Polls, Africa Briefing No.97, 
December 2013, p 3.  
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Puntland’s relationship with the Federal government 
 
Puntland’s formation in 1998 pre-dates the existence of a national government, 
which places it in very different circumstances that characterise the wider shift 
to federalisation between 2013-16.  However, at times, Puntland’s longevity and 
significant geographical size, have resulted in the state adopting highly 
confrontational politics with the federal government. For example, in 
preparations for the 2016 electoral process, Puntland threatened to boycott the 
election until a number of its demands were met, principally that the 4.5 model 
be dropped in favour of electing MPs by district.182 Whilst its demands were only 
partly met, in that the Federal Government agreed to drop 4.5 in future elections 
in return for Puntland’s participation in 2016, this intransigence towards 
Mogadishu has been an effective counter-weight to the centre. However, on 
occasion its behaviour arguably also risks stability as it seeks to prioritise its 
own interests over national considerations, particularly in terms of its relations 
with Galmadug to the south and Somaliland to the east.  
  
Puntland’s inter-state relations 
 
In addition to an often-turbulent relationship with the Federal Government, 
Puntland also has a number of on-going territorial disputes with its immediate 
neighbours. To the west, Puntland has a longstanding dispute with Somaliland 
regarding the status of Sool and Sanaag. The  area is dominated by the 
Dhulbahante, some of whom are active within the movement to create the so-
called Khatumo state, an area between Somaliland and Puntland, centred on 
the town of Talex.  
 
                                            
182 United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia, Briefing to the UN Secretary General, by the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr Michael Keating, New York, 19th April 
2016.  https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/160419_srsg_briefing_to_secco.pdf 
Accessed 23rd April 2017. 
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To the south, Puntland also has regular disputes with its southern neighbour 
Galmadug, some of which have become particularly violent, with clashes in 
Kismayo between December 2015-January 2016 leading to over forty 
deaths.183 This is largely centred on a dispute regarding the status of Mudug 
which is currently split between Puntland and Galmadug.  This leaves 
Galmadug formed of one-and-a-half states, a fact which many Somalis believe 
to be unconstitutional, given the clause within the Provisional Constitution that 
the minimum required should be two.  
 
Puntland’s intra-state relations & internal governance reform  
 
In terms of the extent of governance reform, Puntland’s lack of progress is 
notable, particularly given its duration in comparison to the other federal states. 
As result of largely authoritarian leadership over extended periods, efforts to 
prioritise internal governance and democratic reform within Puntland have 
largely stalled and there appears little political will to synergise initiatives with 
other federal member states. A 2015 Interpeace report concluded with the 
following assessment: 
 
‘Inadequate institutional capacity and continued reliance on clan politics hamper 
decentralization efforts and the institutionalization of a fully democratic system 
of governance in Puntland. In addition, low public awareness and 
understanding of democratization and electoral processes, the lack of clear 
boundaries between Puntland’s districts and regions, the absence of voter 
identification and registration mechanisms, and the absence of a Constitutional 
                                            
183International Crisis Group, Galkayo and Somalia’s dangerous fault lines, 10th December 
2015, http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/somalia/2015/12/10/galkayo-and-somalias-dangerous-
faultlines. Accessed  1st June 2016. 
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Court provide further obstacles to the full realization of the democratic 
process.’184 
 
Saferworld, in their research into the primary causes of the postponement of the 
election in 2013 identified seven key issues including; a lack of consultation and 
consensus building, a disputed constitution and electoral laws, an electoral 
body lacking trust and confidence, restrictions on freedom of expression, 
limitations to genuine participation, the failure to carry out voter registration, and 
a lack of dispute resolution mechanisms.185 The Saferworld report goes further 
to conclude, that, ‘the election was seen by many as a means by which the 
authorities could extend its time in office rather than as a genuine move towards 
democratic governance.’186 
 
Summary: Federalism in Puntland 
 
In summary, whilst Puntland has experienced long periods of stability, its early 
adoption of federalism has not yielded either a governance or peacebuilding 
transformation. As a state that formed independently and in the absence of any 
central authority from the centre, it stills appears reluctant sometimes to 
recognise the executive powers of the Federal Government. In addition, 
Puntland has ongoing political and military conflicts with its neighbours and has 
only made tokenistic efforts at governance reform.   
 
However, an important consideration when assessing federalism in other states 
across Somalia is that Puntland’s creation has, in-effect, established loose 
norms for the other federal member states. This includes the creation of federal 
                                            
184 Interpeace & Puntland Research & Development Centre, Peace in Puntland: Mapping the 
Progress Democratization, Decentralization, and Security and Rule of Law, Garowe, November 
2015, p 64. 
185 Saferworld, Puntland at the Polls, April 2014. 
186 Ibid, p 10.  
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state presidents, cabinets and parliaments, although their exact configuration is 
not uniform across the country.  
 
 
 
SouthWest State 
 
History of federalism in Southwest 
 
The process regarding the formation of the Interim Southwest Administration 
(ISWA), an area largely dominated by the Digil Mirifle, was also contentious. 
Beginning in December 2013 with two competing clan conferences, both held in 
Baidoa, these rival groups outlined two competing visions regarding the 
jurisdiction of the new Southwest state. One group, headed by the former 
Speaker, Aden Madobe, advocated for ‘South West Six’ which would consist of 
Bay, Bakool, Lower Shabelle, and, controversially, the three regions already 
under the Interim Jubaland Administration; Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo. 
The other group, headed by Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, a former Minister of 
Finance and Speaker of Parliament, advocated instead for ‘South West three’ 
consisting of Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle. Both of these groups elected 
‘Presidents’ with Madobe Nunnow representing South West Six and Mohamed 
Haji Abdinur representing South West Three.187  
 
The existence of these two groupings placed the Federal Government in a 
difficult position. Its attempts to outright stifle and suppress federalism across 
Somalia had failed, as evidenced by the emergence of the Interim Jubaland 
Authority and the relatively autonomous Puntland government. In addition, by 
having earlier adopted an anti-federalist stance, the Federal government had 
also severely weakened its credibility from the perspective of neighbouring 
                                            
187 Bryden, M., & Thomas, T., Somalia’s Troubled Transition: Vision 2016 Revisited, Sahan 
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states and the international community. Having reluctantly accepted the 
existence of Jubaland under the Addis Ababa agreement, the Federal 
Government understood that it must respond differently to the emergence of a 
South West administration.  
 
Since the ‘South West Six’ (SW6) agenda conflicted with the territorial 
jurisdiction of Jubaland, Federal Government support quickly aligned to that of 
the rival ‘South West Three’ (SW3) group. This was despite reported divisions 
within the top echelons of the Somalia Federal Government. For example, 
Bryden noted that, ‘Parliamentary Speaker Mohamed Osman Jawari was widely 
perceived as being sympathetic to the SW6 group, which enjoyed significant 
local support.’188 
 
Given this need to reinstate both Federal government legitimacy and in order to 
demonstrate its political influence, President Hassan Sheikh personally visited 
Baidoa, ostensibly to ‘mediate’ between the two groups but in reality to try to 
ensure that the SW3 grouping was ultimately victorious. This eventually led to 
the merging of the SW3 and SW6 conferences in June 2014 and ultimately, the 
election of Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden as President of the Interim South West 
Administration.189 
 
Southwest’s relations with the Federal Government  
 
Following the violence that occurred in the formation of Jubaland in 2013, the 
federalism process in Southwest marked a turning point whereby the Federal 
Government began to constructively engage in the future shape of the new 
federal member state, albeit in pursuit of its own interests. As a result of this 
new strategy, the process was considerably less violent in South West than in 
Jubaland and arguably prevented further conflict with the Jubaland authorities, 
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had the ‘South West Six’ grouping prevailed over the ‘South West Three’. Since 
forming, relations with the Federal Government have appeared strong and have 
likely been strengthened by the re-election in February 2017 of Federal 
Speaker, Mohamed Osman Jawari, a prominent Digil Mirifle politician.  
 
Southwest’s inter-state relations 
 
Since the state formation process was complete, no major confrontations have 
been reported with neighbouring states and Southwest appears to enjoy good 
relations with both Jubaland to the south and HirShabelle to the east. Arguably 
it was the partial re-engagement (or more centralised role) of the Federal 
Government that prevented these tensions from becoming violent. 
 
Southwest’s intrastate state relations & governance reform 
 
During the state formation process, internal relations between different factions 
were frayed as the two opposing clan conferences competed for dominance, 
although tensions appear to have since reduced. However, the process of 
political accommodation appears not yet complete, with a January 2016 
Security Council report noting, ‘Continued grievances over representation by 
members of the Ogaden clan led to the declaration of a breakaway “Upper 
Bakool” administration on 28 December.’190 Some media analysis has 
suggested that economic blockades targeting al Shabaab have also 
inadvertently hit the Upper Bakool region particularly hard, resulting in a  
perception amongst some communities that reside there that they are being 
marginalised by the ISWA administration.191  
                                            
190United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, S/2016/27,  8th 
January 2016, p 3. 
191 Somalia Newsroom, New breakaway administration forms in Somalia in latest federalism 
dispute, December 29th, 2016   https://somalianewsroom.com/2015/12/29/new-breakaway-
administration-forms-in-somalia-in-latest-federalism-dispute/. Accessed on 23rd April 2017. 
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An analysis of the degree of governance reform must inevitably be limited at 
this stage, given the nascent nature of the Interim Southwest Administration, 
and the limited public data by which to assess progress to date. However, the 
formation of the new 146-member regional assembly has achieved some 
progress in uniting the clans of the region, and, somewhat significantly, included 
the appointment of thirty women parliamentarians.  
 
Summary: Federalism in Southwest 
 
In summary, the federal state formation process in Southwest appears to be a 
marked improvement in comparison to that of Jubaland. The process was 
strengthened by greater engagement of the Federal Government to 
constructively engage in the process thereby creating a stronger relationship 
between the centre and the periphery. The involvement of the Federal 
Government was also a significant contributing factor in the broadly peaceful 
state formation process despite considerable political contestation. There are 
some initial indications that South West is undertaking some efforts at 
implementing governance reforms. With the exception of tensions in the Upper 
Bakool region, Southwest appears to be managing internal tensions reasonably 
successfully. 
 
 
Galmadug 
 
History of federalism in Galmadug 
 
The origins of Galmadug as an emergent state within Somalia begin as far back 
as 2006, when on 14th August, the regions of Galgudud and Mudug merged.  
Subsequently, Mohamed Warsame Ali 'Kiimiko' was elected as President on a 
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three-year term.192  Between 2009 to 2012, Galmadug MPs elected President 
Mohamed Ahmed Aalin and between 2012 to 2014, General Abdi Hasan Awale 
(Qaybdiid). On 4th July, 2015, Abdikarim Hussein Guled was elected as the new 
President by the regional parliament.193 Following pressure from MPs regarding 
the competency of his administration, Guled resigned in February 2017 citing 
health reasons. A Presidential election for Galmadug is scheduled for April 
2017. 
 
The process in forming the Galmadug state falls somewhere in-between the 
relatively peaceful approach in South West and the fairly violent one in 
Jubaland largely due to disputes between the moderate Islamist group, Ahlu 
Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) who have a strong presence in Galmadug and the 
Galmadug authorities themselves. 
 
Despite a broad allegiance between the Federal Government and ASWJ in their 
joint fight against al Shabaab, ASWJ and the Galmadug authorities have 
repeatedly competed for dominance. Mosely notes that ASWJ, ‘consider 
themselves marginalized within the federal framework,’194  and as result have 
rejected the Interim Galmadug Administration (IGA) led by Guled. This 
eventually led to the military takeover by ASWJ of Dhusamareb and the 
surrounding environs and the appointment of Sheikh Mohamed Shakur as its 
president.195 With the IGA relocated in Adado, Galmadug remains effectively 
split between two separate spheres of influence.  
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Galmadug’s relations with the Federal Government 
   
During the state formation process, the Federal Government considerably 
increased its involvement in the state formation process, building on its relative 
success in Southwest.  However, the SFG’s failure to ensure a political 
settlement between the IGA and ASWJ has had significant implications for 
Galmadug as a whole. The October 2015 report by the Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea notes, ‘The FGS’ loss of a key military ally and the 
emergence of a new, well-armed opposition group in central Somalia may prove 
to have significant consequences for the region. ASWJ’s initiation of a parallel 
state formation process, and the election of their own president 3 days before 
Abdikarim Guled won the presidency of Galmadug IRA, indicate an 
entrenchment of their position in the region.’196 
 
Galmadug’s inter-state relations 
 
Galmadug’s new constitution is in direct conflict with Puntland’s, as they both 
claim the territory of northern Mudug within their respective jurisdictions. The 
division is most marked in Galkayo where the city is divided between the 
Majerteen dominated north and the Habir Gedir dominated south. Outside of 
Galkayo, the ‘extent of Puntland territory east and west of Galkayo is poorly 
demarcated and remains a potential flashpoint for conflict between the two 
traditionally strongest clan families in Somalia, the Hawiye and the Darod.’197 
Central to this conflict is the tension between the agreement outlined in the 
1993 Mudug Peace Agreement – an agreement between General Aideed of the 
United Somali Congress (Habir Gedir) and President Abdullahi Yusuf of the 
Transitional Federal Government, also representing the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front (Majerteen). 
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Forming a new regional state based on one and half regions may be a more 
pragmatic approach in maintaining the stability achieved under the Mudug 
Peace Agreement. However, such an arrangement would defy the specific 
requirements outlined in the Provisional Constitution which is clear  that a new 
federal member state should be formed from two regions. Indeed, by making an 
exception in this instance, the Federal Government risks re-opening the state 
formation processes across the country, as other new entities emerge with 
claims as to why their particular unconstitutional arrangements should be 
permitted. This issue, as the UN Monitoring Group report notes, is further 
complicated by the lack of a functioning Boundaries and Federation 
Commission or a Constitutional Court, the bodies mandated to make rulings on 
such issues.198 
 
Galmadug’s intra-state relations & governance reform 
 
Following the state formation process, the state remains highly divided between 
the area held by the Interim Galmadug Administration (Adado) and that held by 
ASWJ (Dhusamareb).  However, the resignation of President Guled may 
present opportunities to break the impasse between the two groups and will be 
dependent on whether ASWJ is permitted and is willing to vote in the election. 
 
Once more, the lack of existing literature on Galmadug, significantly hampers 
the ability in which an assessment can be made regarding the commitment to 
governance reform within this regional state. On a positive note, a UN report 
notes that in the last year, ‘Efforts were made to reach out to communities in 
accessible districts, disarm clan militias, train security forces and improve an 
airstrip in south Gaalkacyo,’199 but also refers to fact that IGAD has needed to 
be engaged to support mediation efforts between ASWJ and the Galmadug 
authorities. 
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Summary: Federalism in Galmadug 
 
In summary, whilst the formation of Galmadug included active participation by 
the Federal Government, the decision to ignore and omit a major local actor has 
significantly weakened the prospects for it becoming an effective federal 
member state. In addition, the presence of significant external tensions with 
Puntland may further limit the delivery of tangible development and 
peacebuilding dividends in the near future. 
 
 
Somaliland 
 
History of secession in Somaliland 
 
In contrast to the federal member states outlined above, Somaliland, which 
recently celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary, undertook a very different path 
by choosing outright secession as opposed to federalism.200  
 
The Somaliland ‘state’ emerged from the civil war however was the product of 
longstanding grievances of marginalisation in the north that built up throughout 
the 1980s. The Isaaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) formed in 
1982 to fight against Siad Barre’s forces. However, it was the large-scale 
destruction of Hargeisa and Burao in 1988 which served to unify many of the 
other northern clans, namely the Dulbahante and the Gadabursi, to switch 
allegiance to the SNM cause. These agreements paved the way for the talks in 
Berbera in 1991 involving all of the northern clans. This was then subsequently 
followed by a larger conference in Burao in which six main resolutions were 
discussed, including that of independence from the South. Walls notes, ‘This 
declaration needs to be placed in context. It had never been SNM policy to 
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establish an independent state in the north, and many members of the 
leadership were against the idea, believing the northern regions too war 
ravaged and weak to survive on their own.’201    
 
The motivation for the secessionist agenda within the SNM was driven by a 
cumulative grievance that the Mogadishu-based government had repeatedly 
side-lined the interests of north, with the Isaaq poorly represented in senior 
level positions. This frustration was furthered by the unilateral decision in 
January 1991 by Ali Mahdi’s USC to form a national government for the whole 
of Somalia, contravening earlier agreements with the SNM. Walls notes that, 
‘By the time of the Burao Conference at the end of April, public sentiment in the 
north had consolidated overwhelmingly in favour of independence.’202 This 
would persuade the Central Committee of the SNM to declare outright 
independence from the rest of Somalia, as per the brief five-day status as a 
sovereign state that it held in 1960, following the granting of independence from 
the British.       
 
Between 1991 and 1993, the Somaliland state struggled to gain much 
coherence with regular infighting within the SNM and between the SNM and 
opposition groups. Arguably, the most significant development during this 
period was the request by the interim Somaliland President Tuur for the Guurti 
to mediate between the government and the opposition. Walls notes, ‘this 
unilateral move did not strengthen his position, but it did ultimately enable a 
peaceful transfer of power, and it had the effect of hastening the 
institutionalisation of the guurti as an organ of government.’203 
 
The next significant clan conference took place in 1993 in Borama, hosted this 
time by the Gadabuursi rather than Issaq-dominated SNM. The objectives of 
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this conference were two-fold; firstly to provide a security framework for 
Somaliland and secondly to formalise the transition from a military to a civilian 
government. The first objective resulted in the creation of the ‘Somaliland 
Communities Security and Peace Charter’ and the second resulted in the 
election of Haji Ibrahim Egal as President by an overwhelming majority. The 
new governance system retained the Guurti as the upper house with the 
addition of a Lower House of Representatives. Bradbury notes that this 
arrangement, ‘fused indigenous forms of social and political organisation with 
Western-style institutions of government, in what became known as the ‘beel 
system’ of government.’204  This new arrangement provided a level of stability 
for eight years, with the exception of a return to fighting between 1994 to 1996. 
This was then followed by another national conference in Hargeisa in 1997 
which re-elected President Egal and also approved a draft Constitution, 
ushering in a new era of stability for Somaliland.205   Bradbury notes that the 
proceeding years would see the transfer from selected to elected representation 
in four stages; 
 
‘In May 2001, a plebiscite approved a constitution which provides the framework 
for a democratic system. This was followed by elections to 23 district councils in 
December 2002, the formation of three political parties, presidential elections in 
April 2003 and finally elections to the Lower House of Parliament in September 
2005.’206   
 
Through this process, Somaliland began to develop the beginnings of 
democratic norms which would lead to Presidential Elections in 2010 and local 
council elections in 2012. Preparations are currently underway for Presidential 
elections in 2017, with biometric voter registration complete. Parliamentary 
elections are delayed until 2019 following disagreement as to how seats should 
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be allocated between Somalland’s six regions. If completed on time, this will 
mean that parliamentarians will have served fourteen years without an election. 
 
Since Somaliland chose to take an alternative route of secession, the 
assessment of whether this decision has resulted in tangible governance and 
peacebuilding needs to be adjusted accordingly. However, to some extent the 
three indicators used earlier may still provide the basis for useful analysis.  
 
Somaliland’s relations with the Federal Government 
 
Whilst the relationship with Somalia is no longer violent, Somaliland’s 
unrecognised claims of secession continue to be strongly refuted by Somalia 
who continue to actively strive for reunification. In recent years, Turkey has 
become the defacto mediator although, ‘Somaliland suspects Turkey’s 
mediation is ultimately pro-union, given its investment in the Mogadishu 
government; its attempts at track two diplomacy have caused suspicions.’207  
Currently, it is unclear how the results of the 2016 electoral process will impact 
relationships between Somaliland and Somalia in the long-run. As the process 
used the 4.5 power sharing mechanism, the Isaac were allocated seats in both 
the Lower and Upper houses. Officially, candidates running for these seats 
were all opposed to unification and in turn, Somaliland did not recognise the 
process or the inferred jurisdiction of Federal Government representation. 
However, unofficially, it is recognised that the process was underpinned by 
extensive back-channel discussions between the two entities. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, such was the devastation and 
oppression by the Federal Government, it  provided those in the northern 
regions with the basis for a new and defiant political identity. However, 
somewhat ironically, Somaliland’s continued existence as an independent state 
is likely be determined by the success of federalism in Somalia. Should Somalia 
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emerge over the next ten years as a viable federal state, one that is able to 
secure its borders, resolve its internal political disputes, create jobs and provide 
basic services, then Somaliland’s case for self-determination is likely to weaken. 
In such a scenario, domestic pressures within Somaliland to access these 
resources and livelihood opportunities will rise, particularly if its own internal 
government reforms are not realised. However, should progress in Somalia 
falter, leading to the development of an ineffective federal model this may 
reduce donor willingness to invest. In this instance, then Somaliland may well 
continue to be seen as an island of stability which the international community 
will actively seek to support.  
 
Somaliland inter-state relations 
 
To the east, Somaliland’s formation had initially managed to actively engage 
and incorporate the Dulbahante. However, following Puntland’s formation in 
1998, both Puntland and Somaliland proactively sought to gain Dulbahante 
support. In the early 2000s, this included various attempts by both 
administrations to ensure their influence in the Sool and Sanaag regions. 
However, Isaaq-Dulbahante relations soured following grievances by the latter 
over access and ownership over natural resources within Somaliland, 
particularly given the presence of natural gas and oil reserves that are present 
across these disputed regions, which the Government of Somaliland declares 
as its own. A sense of economic and political marginalisation has led some 
within the Dulbahante to push for the creation of a new ‘Khatumo’ federal state, 
with Talex as its capital. Puntland has done much to try to weaken the attempt 
to create Khatumo through the promotion of Dulbahante politicians, including 
the position of vice President, into its own administration. The Dulbahante is 
thus split into three groups between those with an allegiance to either Puntland, 
Khatumo or Somaliland. 
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Somaliland’s intra-state relations & internal governance reforms 
 
To some extent the internal challenges Somaliland faces with the peripheral 
regions in the west and east are similar to the challenges that Somalia faces 
between Mogadishu and the emerging federal member states. Arguably in the 
early years of Somaliland’s history, the Isaaq dominated SNM made strong 
concessions to other clans, namely the Dulbahante in the hope that they could 
be sufficiently accommodated to join the broader independence movement.  
 
However, in more recent years, such engagement has waned due to increasing 
grievances by minority clans that Somaliland is the sole-preserve of one ethnic 
sub-clan, the Issac. For example, in the west, the Awdal region, dominated by 
the Gadabursi and the Cisse, have managed to maintain both close relations 
with their more immediate neighbours, Djibouti and Ethiopia and Isaaq-
dominated Hargeisa. Under Somaliland President Egal and continuing under 
Somaliland President Silyano, the Gadabursi had also secured the post of vice 
President alongside thirteen MPs. However, more recently this settlement has 
soured over frustrations as to whether the local council elections in 2012 were 
adequately free and fair.208 These grievances in Awdal has been further 
compounded by the closure of the Ethiopian and Djibouti borders following al 
Shabaab claimed attacks in 2014, thus depriving the region of the revenue 
flows it had previously enjoyed.   
 
In terms of assessing the degree of governance reform, Somaliland has 
achieved a number of successes over its 25 years in terms of improved 
governance and security, which is all the more notable given that the region 
remains unrecognised by the international community as a sovereign state. 
From a democratic standpoint, Somaliland has successfully administered 
multiple elections at the local, parliamentary and presidential levels, which have, 
despite some short-comings, been generally considered to be free and fair. 
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Most notably, a number of these elections have had extremely close results but 
have, after some legal wrangling, been finally accepted by all parties. The 
combined history of regular elections and the peaceful transition of power has 
done much to solidify democratic norms.  
 
In some respects, Somaliland’s success has been partly due to the successful 
merging of modern and traditional systems, in particular through the 
establishment of the Guurti. However, the lack of recent reform of the upper 
house is now seriously impacting public confidence. With most Guurti members 
holding office since 1997, there is an increasing need to address how the 
institution will in future appoint members and for how long. In reference to the 
decision by the Guurti made on 11th May 2015 to postpone the election for 21 
months, International Crisis Group notes, ‘Though its resolutions can be 
overturned or amended by the other house or an appeal to the Supreme Court, 
there is a reluctance to challenge a Guurti decision. Somaliland’s institutions 
incline toward preserving stability rather than upholding the rule of law or 
constitutionality, and the public, for the most part, seems to support this.’209   
 
On a related note, electoral legislation in Somaliland is also in urgent need of 
reform. One of the most contentious issues is the decision on upcoming seat 
allocations for parliamentary elections scheduled in 2019 which are fiercely 
contested between the six regions. The last parliamentary elections were held 
in 2005 meaning that MPs are currently serving at least twice their mandated 
term. Previously, a political compromise had been struck, which allowed seat 
allocations to be decided on the basis of legislation passed in 1960, albeit with 
a Constitutional Court ruling that stipulated that future parliamentary elections 
would need to reach a new agreement. 
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Summary: Secession in Somaliland   
 
In summary, there have been both clear benefits and costs for Somaliland to 
seek secession as opposed to federalism. The Somaliland case study thus 
demonstrates that it would appear that states that secede may face similar risks 
in regards to external and internal conflict management as those that federate. 
To some degree, declaring independence has seen the emergence of the same 
centre-periphery dynamics within Somaliland that exist across Somalia as a 
whole.  
 
Somaliland, particularly in its earlier years, actively sought a political settlement 
between the major clans. However, recent dissent in the eastern and western 
peripheral regions in addition to an unresolved dispute regarding the allocation 
of parliamentary seats across the six regions present possible existential issues 
regarding Somaliland’s territorial jurisdiction.  
 
In terms of governance reform, Somaliland’s determination to achieve 
international recognition has catalysed a level of democratic reform unseen 
elsewhere across the Somali regions and, arguably, further afield. This latter 
point is particularly poignant given the extensive aid flows that have propped up 
the Federal Government of Somalia, despite the fact that successive 
administrations have achieved little of note.  
 
 
Overall analysis 
 
The above analysis has aimed to examine recent historical processes of 
federalisation in Somalia and assess the extent to which federalism has 
contributed to peacebuilding and governance outcomes – both within each state 
and more widely across Somalia. The Somalia/Somaliland case study has also 
contrasted the strengths and weaknesses of federalism versus secession. The 
main conclusions are as follows: 
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Relations with the Federal Government  
 
The analysis above shows that the relationship between specific federal 
member states and the federal government during and after federal state 
formation has been highly variable. 
 
Whilst federalism does not necessarily need to be uniformly applied across 
Somalia and may indeed benefit from an approach that seeks to adapt 
arrangements to local circumstances, poor relations with the centre has the 
potential to weaken federalism’s ability to provide a comprehensive governance 
framework for Somalia as a whole. Balthazar notes, ‘In today’s Somalia, 
centrifugal tendencies persist and questions surrounding the nature of 
federalism remain the point of contention. While Federal President Mohamud 
has lobbied for strengthening the central government, (aspiring) federal member 
states have pushed for a greater devolution of powers.’210  
 
In practice, federalism in Somalia has been an unplanned and uncoordinated 
project which in the short-term has significantly benefited the periphery, with the 
Federal Member States gaining effective sovereign control over their respective 
territories.  As a result of this inconsistent approach to engaging with federal 
states, opportunities to imbed early norms of cooperation and dialogue have 
been lost. Without strong political partnerships between the centre and the 
periphery, technical discussions regarding how to manage and regulate 
federalism are likely to be harder. As a result, federalism’s opportunity to 
provide a vehicle for better service delivery, greater security and a more 
resilient community may not be realised. 
 
Inconsistent or poor federal government - federal state relations were also partly 
a result of a broader lack of policy coherence in regards to federalism by the 
Federal Government. In the absence of detail within the Provisional 
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Constitution, one initiative which aims to provide greater policy adherence to the 
broader statebuilding agenda is the development of the Wadajir framework, led 
by the Ministry of Interior. The framework itself has four pillars, social healing, 
peace dividends, civic dialogues and local governance, which means that its 
focus is broader than federalisation. However, there remains work to be done if 
Wadajir is to unite key actors around a common agenda. A UK government 
advisor noted that:  
 
‘Wadajir has had limited consultation and its linkage with JPLG [Joint 
Programme on Local Governance) is not very clear. JPLG is leading the 
process of creating district councils and has the ability to grant with conditions 
to the District Council directly. JPLG’s focus is to work with FMS rather than the 
federal Ministry of Interior. This mirrors the process in Somaliland and Puntland 
where they take the lead.  However, Wadajir can be the overarching 
chapeau.’211   
 
For federalism in Somalia to effectively transition from an agenda dominated 
almost entirely by political identity and accommodation, it will need to be 
supported by a parallel policy framework which articulates and harmonises the 
roles and responsibilities between the federal government and the federal 
member states. If this is not quickly put in place, then public support for 
federalism may weaken as citizens’ demands are not met. 
 
Related to this, the legislative agenda of the Federal Government for facilitating 
the emergence of federalism appears to be somewhat under-ambitious. The 
only identified legislation seen as a priority by the federal government was an 
upcoming bill by the Ministry of Finance on taxation. A senior minister 
commented: ‘That is the only one. There are a lot of ministries that are 
supposed to have a federalization acts such as the Ministries for Security and 
Justice, how courts work together, taxation, etc. But as the Ministry of Interior 
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and Federal Government we don’t have anything new that needs to be passed. 
But we have broader items such as citizenship and political parties.’212  
 
Again, the reality is that a whole raft of new legislation is required at both 
federal and federal state levels. Currently, the system is effectively ‘regulated’ 
by the National Leadership Forum, an unconstitutional body representing the 
executives of the federal member states and the federal government. Whilst this 
may be effective from a stabilisation perspective, very quickly this needs to 
move towards a model based on the rule of law, overseen by parliament and a 
functional Constitutional Court. 
 
Interstate relations  
 
The degree of political contestation between federal member states, outlines 
the potential fragility of these arrangements and the unpredictability of their 
resolution. Whilst the process of political accommodation has been particularly 
successful in Jubaland, this is not an inherent and inevitable outcome of 
federalism per se and is best attributed in the latter case to a more politically 
astute leadership.  Indeed, even in those states where a temporary settlement 
has been achieved, the political calculations of those groups are likely to be 
based on an assessment of future dividends for themselves and their 
communities. On a tangential note, Somaliland has also struggled to maintain 
internal cohesion, providing some albeit very limited evidence that secessionist 
states face the same challenges as federal ones. 
 
The tensions between the federal government and federal member states are 
partly constitutional with considerable confusion over the provisions for new 
federal states within the Provisional Constitution. Clause 1 of Article 49, 
stipulates that federal states will be formed by the House of the People, 
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however Clause 6 stipulates that a federal state may form if two regions, on the 
basis of those that existed in 1991, agree to merge. However, as the details of 
how these processes are supposed to be enacted remain vague and 
contradictory, Bryden and Thomas note that ‘the result has been confusion, 
acrimony, and occasionally violent contestation both between the emerging 
states and the SFG, and within the emerging states themselves.’213 In addition, 
a further clause within the Constitution, permits the Federal Government to rule 
directly those regions that are yet to join a state. As Mosley notes, ‘with many 
parts of southern and central Somalia still under the control of al-Shabaab in 
2012, this interpretation gave the government in Mogadishu significant leeway 
to attempt to influence local events.’214 Work to address such anomalies within 
the Constitution has yet to be finalised, due to years of political infighting within 
the Federal Government regarding the mandate of the three responsible bodies 
– the parliamentary Oversight Committee, the Independent Constitutional 
Review & Implementation Commission and the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs. 
 
Another prominent issue raised was the perception that the formation of 
Galmadug is unconstitutional. A number of interviewees commented that they 
had a number of concerns regarding how federalism was being undertaken and 
how, in their view, this contradicted certain articles in the Provisional 
Constitution. A Barre Hirale supporter noted,  ‘According to the Constitution, the 
states could be formed only of a minimum of two regions. The three people 
[Nicholas Kay, former UN SRSG, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, President of the 
Republic of Somalia & IGAD Special Envoy Mohamed Abdi Affey] they have 
violated that article, when they were establishing Galmudug – This is one region 
and two districts.’215  
 
                                            
213 Op Cit, Bryden, M., & Tres, T., 2015, p 9. 
214 Op Cit, Mosely, J., 2015, p 9. 
215 Key Informant Interview, Individual politically opposed to Jubaland, Mogadishu, 14th October 
2015. 
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This contrasted with a senior civil servant within the federal Ministry of Interior 
who concluded that, ‘There are always lessons to be learned whenever you 
form a state. Galmudug has been the best model – it has had the most 
competitive election for their process of selection. The process for Galmudug 
was watertight – we are now applying those lessons learnt to Middle Shabelle 
and Hiraan.’216 
 
At the time of writing, the situation between Galmadug and Puntland remains 
unresolved and led to the outbreak of severe clashes in November and 
December 2015 with serious implications for the viability of federalism in 
Somalia. The use of ad hoc arrangements to accommodate political 
peculiarities in certain regions risks developing a system which is not governed 
by agreed principles or rules. Setting such precedents may give other groups 
who are dissatisfied with the deal that has been reached in their region the 
basis on which to agitate for change. Should this occur, this may prove very 
difficult to resolve as refusing to renegotiate might increase the likelihood of 
violent rebellion whilst reopening discussions may precipitate a larger 
unravelling of federalism more widely.  
 
The apparent ineffectiveness of institutions to manage and regulate federalism 
also provides some explanation of why inter-state relations have frequently 
been poor or violent.  The absence of a Constitutional Court, the limited and 
unclear mandate of the Boundaries and Federalism Commission whose primary 
function was to address situations such as that described above in Galmadug, 
is clearly problematic. The Commission, whose formation within 90 days was a 
constitutional requirement, finally commenced its work three years late in mid-
2015. However, the mandate, workplan, capacity and financing of the 
Commission are still unclear. One of the Commissioners admitted that political 
events have somewhat overtaken the Commission’s role, ‘The Commission has 
just started and is going back to the parliament every two months to present the 
                                            
216 Key Informant Interview, Permanent Secretary, Federal Government of Somalia, Mogadishu, 
15th October 2015. 
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way forward. The process, however, has pulled the cart before the horse and 
the challenges are that the federal states have already been formed – the 
challenges are very huge.’217 
 
Confidence in the Commission remains weak, even within the Ministry of 
Interior, with a senior minister commenting: ‘In fact, these people in the 
Commission have limited information on fiscal federalization and federalism. 
They need training themselves, they need technocrats. What they can do right 
now is very limited.’218 
 
Central to ensuring that the Commission can play a more meaningful role is to 
understand whether the Commission is a primarily political or technical body 
and how it fits amongst the myriad of other actors engaged in similar issues. 
One Commissioner noted, ‘The whole issue is still new – there are a lot of 
overlapping issues between the functions of the Commission and the ICRIC. 
The six line Ministries plus the commission are still debating the type of 
federalism that the country should adopt and each one is going on its own. We 
are still speaking to other countries that adopted federalism, including Germany 
and the USA, and agreeing upon which form Somalia should adopt.’219 
 
For federalism to function effectively, it is essential that there are formal 
mechanisms in place that can manage and oversee the state formation 
process. As such, it is imperative that the role and mandate of the Commission 
is urgently reviewed as it currently does not appear to have a clearly defined 
role in forthcoming political and technical processes. 
 
                                            
217 Focus Group Discussion, Boundaries & Federalism Commission, Mogadishu, 2nd December 
2015. 
218 Key Informant Interview, Minister, Federal Government of Somalia, Mogadishu, 2nd 
December 2015 
219 Focus Group Discussion, Boundaries & Federalism Commission, Mogadishu, 2nd December 
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Between 2012-2016, key issues regarding the evolution of federalism tended to 
be resolved politically, rather than via an independent official body. Many key 
decisions were brokered between the Federal Government and the Presidents 
of the Federal states which evolved into an ad hoc institution known as the 
National Leadership Forum (NLF). Whilst the NLF has been an effective 
mechanism for resolving a series of critical issues, it was a body with no 
constitutional mandate and one which risks completely usurping that of the 
Commission. In the short-term, this narrowing of political authority shifts 
responsibility away from a national parliament to a small political elite and could 
legitimately be assessed as a negative democratic development.  
 
However, in the long-term, and on a more positive note, it could also be argued 
that politics in modern Somalia is now no longer solely the affairs of the Federal 
Government with federal member states being able to wield significant 
influence. This perhaps finally addresses the deep antagonism towards central 
government that has underpinned Somali politics since the fall of Siad Barre’s 
government.  
 
Intra-state relations & internal governance reforms  
 
The varying levels of governance reform across Somalia also present a risk to 
federalism’s wider success. Currently there is considerable inconsistency 
between federal member states in regards to how core state functions are or 
will be implemented including public financial management systems, security 
and justice, basic health and education and support to legislative institutions 
and democratic processes. Such reform agendas also face considerable 
challenges of being implemented in an insecure, resource-scarce and corrupt 
environment. 
 
In addition, each federal member state in Somalia has a slightly different 
timeline for the implementation of democratic processes over the next five 
years. It remains to be seen whether incumbent administrations will also be 
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prepared to relinquish power peacefully, particularly given the current state of 
relations between some sub-clans. Balthazar speaks to some of these concerns 
when he notes that, ‘Recent quarrels at the sub-national level suggest that the 
country, long considered a quintessential ‘failed state’, may be moving from 
fragility to fragmentation.’220 Given that such transitions would take place within 
a context in which political power has for many decades been won through the 
deployment or threat of violence, significant support will be needed to create 
strong enough institutions and political norms to manage this level of 
contestation. To avoid these tensions escalating and the existing federal 
arrangements unravelling, extensive engagement by the SFG, donors, IGAD, 
African Union and UN will be needed to ensure a broader and deeper political 
settlement is put in place. 
 
This is also significantly compounded by the non-uniformity of federal state 
structures, with the Federal Government facing a choice of either negotiating 
the realignment of these systems under one common national development 
plan or instead tailoring its support to each individual federal state. The latter 
may become more challenging when trying to determine federal laws and reach 
agreements on taxation and spending but could also reduce the opportunities 
for cost savings that could be made in implementing systems uniformly across 
Somalia. A recent UN report echoed this concern noting that, ‘Despite 
significant progress in the establishment of state structures at the regional level, 
considerable challenges remain. State formation processes have not yet led to 
broadly supported and sufficiently detailed arrangements for federal state 
structures. Interim regional administrations are still struggling to establish 
authority, being faced with an absence of revenue, a lack of government 
infrastructure and insufficient staff levels.’221 
 
 
                                            
220 Ibid, p 1.  
221 Op Cit, United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, p 5. 
  
150 
 
Chapter Six - Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to answer one fundamental overarching question; To 
what extent has the introduction of federalism in Somalia led to improved 
governance and peacebuilding dividends? The answer to this, is that the 
manner in which federalism has been implemented has led to highly 
inconsistent governance and peacebuilding outcomes. Contrary to the generally 
positive findings for Jubaland, the inconsistent implementation of federalism in 
the other federal states risks delegitimising this model of governance as a 
longer-term solution for the country. 
Inconsistency, in and of itself, is not necessarily problematic, as a more tailored 
approach to federalism to each federal state may lead the adoption of local 
solutions to local problems. However, in the case of Somalia, this approach to 
federalism has resulted in regular instances of poor relations between the 
Federal Government and Federal Member States and weak and sometimes 
conflictual inter-state and intra-state relations. The effectiveness of federalism 
has also been limited in some federal states by a reluctance to prioritise internal 
governance reforms. 
Galmadug, in particular, has failed to achieve the level of broad political 
consensus that would enable ASWJ to be successfully accommodated, despite 
the fact that both parties are closely aligned to the Federal Government.  
Similarly, Puntland, despite its significantly longer history, seems to have failed 
to embark on an internal reform programme to ensure popular elections, despite 
public support to do so and continues to have significant conflicts with 
neighbouring states. ISWA, however, appears to be the closest to replicating 
the success of Jubaland, following a peaceful resolution of SW3 and SW6 
groups during the state formation process and relatively strong relations with 
the Federal Government. Considerable political tensions continue in relation to 
the formation of HirShabelle state and an agreement on the status of the capital 
Benadir has yet to be reached. 
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Similarly, whilst it would appear that some states have enjoyed significant 
governance and peacebuilding gains, others appear to have simply stagnated. 
This would support the overall hypothesis of this thesis, that federalism is 
neither inherently a model of governance that will automatically deliver 
sustainable peace and good governance or, conversely, inevitably lead to 
fragmentation and conflict. As such, the difference in the sustainability of 
peacebuilding or governance results achieved through implementing a federal 
approach, whether positive or negative, is better explained by the varying 
quality of leadership at the federal state level. In short, it is the ability of newly 
appointed local elites to manage external and internal conflict dynamics and 
instil governance reform that matters more than the particular strengths and 
weaknesses of federalism as a theoretical model of governance.  
 
On the basis of this conclusion, the final chapter will outline in more detail the 
key findings of the research and then reflect on the likely implications for 
Somalia as it continues to embark on federalism over the coming years. The 
chapter will conclude with reflections on the existing literature for Somalia and 
federalism in addition to suggesting areas for future research. 
 
 
Key research findings 
 
In order to begin answering the overarching research question of whether 
federalism has led to improved peacebuilding and governance dividends, this 
research thesis has taken two approaches. Firstly, the theoretical and historical 
basis for Somalia adopting federalism was assessed in Chapters two and three. 
Secondly, Chapters four and five undertook a comparative case-study analysis 
of Jubaland, Southwest, Galmadug and Somaliland to assess public 
perceptions towards federalism and evidence of any tangible progress achieved 
to date. 
 
 
  
152 
 
Chapter two explored how historical events have shaped the broader discourse 
on statebuilding in Somalia in order to better understand how federalism has 
emerged as the dominant governance model and what might be important 
historical considerations for future statebuilding processes. Key research 
findings included the need to demonstrate broad public support for federalism to 
counter allegations that this is an externally imposed system. Given that 
Somaliland represents a strong example of secession, in order to avoid similar 
movements emerging in the other federal states, new authorities would need to 
quickly demonstrate governance and peacebuilding dividends from a federal 
system.  To echo a concern raised in Chapter two, given Somalia’s history and 
the broader critique that federalism can potentially increase the risk of ethnic 
conflict, new authorities would also need to proactively demonstrate a 
commitment to consociationalism at the federal state level alongside the 
development of constructive centre-periphery relations. However, these 
concerns withstanding, federalism, at least from a theoretical and historical 
perspective, remained the only viable (but untested) model for Somalia which 
could address the country’s particular governance needs and history.  
 
Chapter three, following an assessment of the relative merits of federalism 
versus consociationalism and decentralisation concluded that there was a 
strong basis for federal governance in Somalia. This was based on its potential 
to provide constitutionally protected rights to the periphery whilst also enabling 
citizens to reconcile two competing political identities; that of their region and 
the nation as a whole.  
 
Chapter four assessed specifically how the implementation of federalism in 
Jubaland had impacted peacebuilding and governance dynamics.  Critically, the 
introduction of federalism led to poor and at times violent relations with the 
Federal Government. On the contrary, however, Jubaland appears to have 
strong intra-state relations with its neighbours.  
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Most significantly, Jubaland has strong inter-state relations and a particular 
commitment to managing and resolving historic tensions between groups by 
embarking on a consociational model of governance. This is strengthened by 
data demonstrating that federalism enjoys strong public support. This has 
allowed minority groups to join political life in the first time thus reducing 
tensions around exclusion and marginalisation. A successful power-sharing 
agreement to share ministerial positions and seats in the regional assembly has 
also been reached with all major clans resulting in significant gains to local 
security. 
 
In addition, the new authority in Jubaland has shown particular willingness to 
engage in meaningful governance reform and has delivered tangible benefits 
for the population. For example, there are promising signs that investment into 
core state functions such as public financial management has yielded tangible 
results. At a more tangible level, respondents spoke enthusiastically about the 
fact that they could now obtain passports and birth certificates in Kismayo rather 
than having to travel long distances to Mogadishu. However, the research also 
demonstrated that a lack of planning appeared to be restricting investment to 
regional capitals, risking the emergence of unhealthy centre-periphery dynamics 
within federal member states. Significantly, the chapter also concluded that 
federalism in Jubaland has become synonymous with broader reform including 
good governance, democratisation and improved service delivery. This 
potentially allows federalism to become a conduit for broader and more 
ambitious governance transformation. However, should these additional 
aspirations not be delivered, then public support for federalism more generally 
may begin to wane. 
 
Chapter five, in its comparative assessment of federalism in Puntland, 
Galmadug and Southwest set out to assess whether the governance and 
peacebuilding dividends seen in Jubaland have been replicated elsewhere.  
Drawing on the key findings from Chapter four, an analytical framework 
assessed the quality of federal-federal state, intra-state and inter-state relations 
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and the degree of internal governance reform at federal state level. The chapter 
concluded that developments across these indicators had been highly uneven.  
 
In general, relations between the Federal Government and Federal Member 
States were mixed. Puntland, generally had a fairly antagonistic relationship 
with the Federal Government, mirroring to some extent the dynamics in 
Jubaland.  However, relations between Southwest and Galmadug with the 
Federal Government appear to be markedly better. The varying strengths of 
these relations between the centre and the periphery are likely to have been 
impeded by the absence of a Federal Government policy framework or position 
on federalism more broadly. Initially, the Federal Government violently opposed 
the formation of Jubaland in the first year of its term, despite the commitment to 
federalism outlined within the Provisional Constitution. In doing so, it lost both 
control and credibility in shaping the federal agenda at a national level both in 
terms of setting out a political vision and its subsequent technical 
implementation.  
 
This lack of a coherent policy position from the centre resulted in poor progress 
in establishing independent institutions or policy frameworks that could regulate 
and manage federalism. Between 2012-17, little progress was made in regards 
to the ratification of a final Somalia Constitution, the establishment of a 
Constitutional Court or ensuring that Boundaries and Federalism Commission 
could effectively function. Subsequently, the process of determining new states 
became determined instead by clan-based, strong-man politics, an environment 
which  is not conducive to constructive centre-periphery relations. Thus, even in 
adopting a governance model that by definition provides constitutionally 
protected rights for the newly emerging federal states, such is the legacy of the 
civil war  that contemporary politics in Somalia is still struggling to reconcile how 
power is distributed between the centre and the periphery. Given that 
determining this relationship is essential to any functional federal system, 
reconciling this tension in the coming years will be paramount if federalism is 
going to succeed in Somalia.  
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Another key implementation challenge for federalism, is whether conflict can be 
effectively managed within federal member states. For example, the clan 
settlement was eventually successful in Jubaland, given Madobe’s efforts to 
eventually incorporate other clans including the Marehan within its 
administration. More generally, however, these processes have been fraught 
and at times violent both within and between states and between emerging 
entities and the Federal Government.  
 
As explored in Chapter Five, Southwest saw prolonged political deadlock 
between the two major groupings, until ultimately the ‘South West Three’ group 
prevailed. In other emerging states, a political settlement has not been possible 
to achieve, given the effective division of Galmadug in two between the IGA and 
ASWJ. This is in addition to ongoing internal tensions regarding both the 
formation of HirShabelle and the status of Benadir, the national capital.  
 
Whilst the research in Chapter four identified high levels of public support for 
federalism in Jubaland, more generally, emerging federal states should not be 
seen as political entities formed on the basis of strong shared identities and 
good relations as the ideal of ‘classical federalism’ would suggest. Rather, 
calculations are being made by particular groups out of political necessity often 
with a begrudging acceptance that such settlements provide their sub-sub clan 
with the best overall outcome.  
 
As a result, Somalia’s new Federal Member States should be viewed as highly 
fragile and whose existence and stability is based on upon the careful 
management of a number of challenging internal and external political 
dynamics. Indeed, the Jubaland case study demonstrated the very real level of 
external influence from both neighbouring states and the role of the 
international community, which, in their support for Madobe, were  also clearly 
making decisions based on their own national interests, rather than in support 
of a particular ‘ideal’ form of governance for Somalia. 
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Lastly, federalism’s success to date has been impacted considerably by varying 
degrees of progress on governance reform. There seems clear evidence that 
Jubaland has made significant strides in quickly moving from executive rule to a 
parliamentary system, with aspirations to hold universal elections in 2019. 
However, in the other federal member states, particularly Puntland, progress 
towards democratisation has largely stagnated following protracted political 
conflicts in regards to constitutional reform and implementing universal 
elections. 
 
In summary, federalism has been neither a panacea nor the cause of Somalia’s 
governance problems and that its success, or lack thereof, has been more 
determined more by the manner of its implication, than the model itself. The 
following section will consider the implications of this conclusion for future 
statebuilding processes in the country. 
 
 
Future implications for statebuilding in Somalia 
 
This section will outline a number of likely scenarios that may develop over time 
depending on how the three indicators utilised in Chapter Five (Federal 
Government-Federal State, inter-state and intra-state relations and the extent of 
state-level governance reform) are addressed in the coming years.  
 
Federal Government-Federal State relations  
 
The state of centre-periphery relations is likely to be one of the most significant 
factors in determining whether federalism unfolds successfully across Somalia. 
As such, scenarios for Somalia’s future will very much depend on how this 
national debate continues to evolve. Given the nature of Somali politics, in the 
short-term this is likely to depend on whether the new executive appointed 
through the 2016 electoral process adopts a truly national perspective or 
whether they continue to neglect the wider national interest in favour of narrow 
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personal or sub-clan advantage.  However, if, in the coming years, a political 
consensus is reached which manages to meaningfully reconcile these 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, then federalism in Somalia may also become 
tamed. This may allow politicians and the civil service to refocus instead on 
overcoming the technical challenges in developing an effective federal system.  
 
Despite its somewhat unconstitutional nature, the apparent success of the 
National Leadership Forum as a space where centre-periphery tensions can be 
managed offers some encouragement on this issue. Consisting of the Executive 
of the Federal Government and the Presidents of the other Federal Member 
States, the NLF has seemingly established a level of political trust between the 
centre and the periphery. However, the closed-door nature of its machinations 
and its tendency to usurp parliament, poses serious questions regarding the 
accountability and transparency of such a structure. Whilst arguably justifiable 
given the challenges that Somalia faces and the lack of a parliamentary culture 
that can govern in the country’s national interest, power in the hands of so few 
is unlikely to continue to be successful in the long-term. In short, for federalism 
to become a truly national project, Somalia’s parliament must regain control of 
the overarching agenda and be both representative of all the federal states and 
become meaningfully involved in the significant legislative agenda that is 
required for its successful implementation. 
 
Inter-state relations 
 
Looking ahead, for federalism to contribute more positively to broader state 
building processes, this level of contestation between federal member states 
needs to substantively reduce. Critical to this will be the need to strengthen 
independent institutions such as a Constitutional Court and the Boundaries and 
Federalism Commission and ratify a final version of the Constitution. 
Functioning independent judicial institutions will be essential if conflict between 
states is going to be effectively managed but will need a clear constitutional 
mandate to operate effectively. The development of such institutions will also 
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reduce the tendency in which inter-state conflicts are resolved solely by regional 
politicians. Managing disputes independently through a judicial system offers a 
non-violent alternative to inter-state grievances which are otherwise likely to 
quickly escalate. 
 
Intra-state relations & internal governance reform 
 
The instigation of new democratic processes and reforms at federal state level 
could be the most meaningful way to mitigate both political violence and 
deadlock, particularly given that many of the federal states have upcoming 
council, parliamentary and presidential elections in the coming years. Evidence 
from this research has found that Jubaland has gained recognition for its 
achievements in forming a regional parliament based for the first time on 
district-representation, as opposed to the 4.5 power-sharing formula. This gives 
credibility to its claims that it will hold universal elections by 2019, an aspiration 
which again has been found to enjoy strong public support.  
 
However, reasons for such optimism in the instigation of democratic processes 
are not universal across Somalia. Progress in Puntland, despite the longevity of 
its existence, has remained painfully slow, although the appointment in early 
2016 of new Commissioners to the Transitional Puntland Election Commission 
to oversee local council elections does offer some renewed hope. The 
effectiveness of any democratisation initiative to mitigate political tension is 
likely to be most effective if the Federal Government has a role in centralising 
and making uniform such processes. Not only could this strengthen federal and 
federal state relations but could assist in the institutional development of the 
National Independent Election Commission (NIEC), which will have sole 
responsibility for running the proposed universal national elections in 2020 but 
whose role in the federal state elections is unclear.  
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At a national level, such efforts at state-level could contribute to the 
development of democratic norms in the country in the run-up to 2020, 
particularly by enabling citizens to participate directly in an election process 
which is geographically proximate and thus presumably one which will have a 
degree of relevance to their everyday lives. From a conflict management 
perspective, if political competition at the regional level is seen by the majority 
of political actors to be  free and fair, this may reduce the sense that national 
elections are ‘winner takes all’, as there are opportunities to compete for 
political positions at the state level too. 
 
For Somalia to be become an effective federal state, it also requires a strong 
commitment to governance reform. If efforts are not made to formulate a 
broader uniform technical framework for federalism in Somalia, this is likely to 
increase the tendency for some states to progress more quickly than others. A 
failure to establish any resource redistribution mechanism across the country, in 
addition to high implementation costs resulting from each federal member state 
pursing its own governance and service delivery systems, may also place new 
strains on an already fragile and resource-scarce system. 
 
Looking ahead, the likelihood of such uniform governance reform emerging is 
again very much linked to the extent to which the federalism agenda is 
stabilised by constructive centre-periphery relations. If so, then the existing 
investments made in some federal states can be viewed as pilots which if 
successful can be quickly expanded and replicated to other emerging states.  If 
this is achieved in parallel to implementing a policy framework on fiscal 
federalism that promotes interstate trade, then development dividends are likely 
to emerge more quickly.  Indeed, such efforts at harmonising federal systems 
and approaches are likely to formalise and ideally strengthen relationships both 
between federal member states and the federal government, likely resulting in a 
broader peacebuilding dividend as the economic costs to severing such 
relationships increase.   
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Recent political developments offer some optimism that a more uniform state 
can be created when there is a shared ambition for governance reform.  The 
delivery of the 2016 electoral process, for example, demonstrated a level of 
commitment across all the federal member states regarding the establishment 
of a uniform electoral system. After many months of planning, an agreement 
was reached whereby the overall election will be overseen by a ‘Federal 
Election Implementation Team’ and delivered locally by individual ‘State 
Electoral Implementation Teams.’ Whilst not perfect, the 2016 Electoral Process 
does set a precedent in demonstrating that a federal Somalia can deliver 
complex processes when political elites have sufficient interests at stake.222 
 
 
Implications for existing literature on federalisation and peacebuilding in 
Somalia 
 
Given the security constraints, which have only eased in recent years, much of 
the existing literature has focussed its analysis of the statebuilding discourse in 
Somalia at the national level but  has rarely had the resources or access to 
undertake widespread citizen perception surveys to inform its conclusions. As 
such, analysis of the success or failure of contemporary statebuilding processes 
has largely been from a broader political-economy perspective (Balthazar, 
Harper, Samatar). 
 
As a result, the perspectives of ordinary citizens towards these processes have 
been largely unknown. In particular, scant evidence existed as to whether there 
was  public support for federalism and democratisation or whether such reforms 
were viewed as compatible with Somali cultural norms. Whilst recognising the 
datasets are very limited, the analysis undertaken in this research points to 
clear evidence that Somalis want both and, as such, are actually broadly 
                                            
222 For background and an assessment of the 2016 Electoral Process, Saferworld, Somalia’s 
2016 Electoral Process: Preliminary report of the Domestic Election Observer Mission, March 
2017 
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aligned to the current statebuilding trajectory of the country. This is significant, 
as the related literature on contemporary processes is often highly critical of 
international statebuilding efforts and in doing so, has arguably understated the 
degree to which citizens aspire for elements of a modern state. 
 
Specifically on federalism in Somalia (Menkhaus, Bryden, Mosely), much of the 
existing literature is again highly critical and laden with warnings of state 
fragmentation or increased ethnic conflict. However, these concerns have not 
been based on an analysis of public opinion. As a result, this research directly 
challenges earlier conclusions that federalism is a risk-laden option for Somalia 
by providing evidence that if implemented effectively, it could  act as a catalyst 
for broader reform. 
 
Implications for the wider literature on federalism 
 
As explored in Chapter two, much of the existing literature on federalism is 
highly divided between those that see wider autonomy for ethnic groups as 
beneficial for peace and stability and those that do not (Choudry, Feeley, Gurr, 
Kymlikica). Both camps have utilised comparative data sets to argue their case, 
often focussing on whether the introduction of federalism increased the 
frequency of violent conflict. However, widespread analysis of public opinion 
towards federalism in post-conflict contexts does not appear to have been 
previously undertaken. As a result, the existing debate in the literature is again 
generally  informed by an assessment of the likely political-economy 
implications of federalism rather than an analysis of what the general public 
desire from a national governance framework. 
 
By basing the conclusions of whether a particular country should or should not 
undertake federalism by assessing public support, the approach used in this 
research lies outside the two existing camps in the literature which are either 
definitively for or against federalism in post-conflict contexts. In the case of 
Somalia, there is clear evidence that the majority of Somalis want a federal 
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governance system, however for this to be successful, as the research has 
explored, there are a number of implementation challenges to be overcome. 
However, in other contexts, should public support be reversed, then a similar 
research approach would conclude that federalism is unlikely to be appropriate.  
 
Fundamental to this stance, is the view that federalism is inherently a political 
rather technical concept, in the sense that it offers citizens an option to balance 
regional and national political identities. From this perspective, federalism will 
only work when the majority of the population desire it. Once that is established 
its success is likely to be determined by the extent to which a particular country 
is able to successfully manage centre-periphery, inter-state and intra state 
relations and the degree to which federal units are willing to undertake 
meaningful  governance reform. In summary, federalism may (if implemented 
well) work in some post-conflict countries but fail in others.    
 
 
Areas for further research 
 
This thesis has been able to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the 
extent to which federalism can bring broader governance and peacebuilding 
benefits to Somalia. For these findings to become more grounded in empirical 
data, further data analysis would be required from the other federal member 
states. Ideally, data collection would need to be repeated over intervals to track 
how public perception regarding federalism changed over time. In addition, the 
lack of publicly accessible data in regards to the status of governance reform 
efforts at the federal member state represents a considerable gap in the 
literature. In terms of broader research on post-conflict federalism, in order to 
further overcome the divide in the literature between those that advocate and 
oppose its use, any future studies may benefit from also utilising public 
perception studies across different contexts to inform their conclusions. Over 
the long-term, such an approach may be able to distinguish factors that 
determine whether populations are more likely to be pro-federalist or not and 
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under what circumstances post-conflict federalism has been an effective or 
ineffective statebuilding tool.  
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Annex: Quantitative Questionnaire 
Questionnaire ID 
 
Region Code 
GEDO (1) 
MID JUBA (2) 
LOWER JUBA (3) 
 
Dist. Code: 
GARB (1) 
BELT H (2) 
DOLOW (3) 
BUA’LE (4) 
JILIB (5) 
SAAKOW (6) 
KISMAYO (7) 
AFMADOW (8) 
BADHAADHE (9) 
 
Village Code: 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
 
Quest. ID: 
01     11 
02     12 
03     13 
04     14 
05     15 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
 
Interviewer Code 
 
Dist. Code: 
GARB (1) 
BELT H (2) 
DOLOW (3) 
BUA’LE (4) 
JILIB (5) 
SAAKOW (6) 
KISMAYO (7) 
AFMADOW (8) 
BADHAADHE (9) 
 
Interviewer ID: 
01     11     21 
02     12     22 
03     13     23 
04     14     24 
05     15     25 
06     16     26 
07     17     27 
08     18     28 
09     19     29 
10     20     30 
31     32     33 
34     35     36 
37     38     39 
40     41     42 
43     44     45 
 
 
Introduction: 
Dear Sir/madam, 
My name is ______ and I work for a Somali organization that is interested in understanding the nature of services within your 
village the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction among the population, and the reasons for it.  As part of this survey 
we would like to interview members of the community and understand their perceptions and experiences.  The interview will 
take a maximum of 45 minutes and is completely anonymous. Your name will not be mentioned in any report or 
publication. You are not obliged to answer any question, and you can stop at any moment you like.  Regardless of 
your decision, I thank you for your time. 
Q1 
 
Would you be willing to take this 
survey? 
 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip to End 
of Survey 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Section 1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Could you share some information regarding your age and educational status and other such details 
Q2 Gender 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
Q3 What is your marital status? 
 
 Single (1) 
 Engaged (2) 
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Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Married (3) 
 Divorced (4) 
 Widower (5) 
 No response (100) 
Q4 What is your age? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 
 Below 18yrs (1) 
 18-27yrs (2) 
 28-37yrs (3) 
 38-47yrs (4) 
 48-57yrs (5) 
 Above 57yrs (6) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q5 What is your highest level of 
education? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 No education (1) 
 Primary education (2) 
 Secondary education (3) 
 High school education (4) 
 Undergraduate (5) 
 Post graduate (6) 
 Alternative education programme (7) 
 Religious (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Others (Please specify) (98) 
_______________________________________________________ 
 No response (100) 
Q6 What is your primary occupation? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
 
 
 Agriculturalist (1) 
 Pastoralist (2) 
 Government (3) 
 NGO (4) 
 Trade (5) 
 Services (6) 
 Manufacturing (7) 
 Student (8) 
 Unemployed (9) 
 Retired (10) 
 Housewife (11) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
________________________________________________________ 
 No response (100) 
Q7 What are the total number of 
people within your household? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 
(A household is described as 
people who eat from the same 
pot and live either under the 
same roof or then in the same 
compound) 
 1-3 (1) 
 4-7 (2) 
 8-11 (3) 
 11-14 (4) 
 14+ (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q8 How long have you lived in this 
particular village/town? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Less than 1yr (1) 
 1-5yrs (2) 
 6-10yrs (3) 
 11-15yrs (4) 
 16-20yrs (5) 
 More than 20yrs (6) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Section 2.1  DECISION MAKING STRUCTURES- VILLAGE 
To begin with we would like to understand the main decision makers within your particular village 
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Q9 Which person/group makes decisions in your village regarding the following? 
 
Please ask for each type of issue 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response No limit 
Type of issue Decision Maker 
Resolving disputes (1)  Clan elders (1) 
 Federal Government (SFG) (2) 
 Jubaland Interim Administration (3) 
 Regional administration (4) 
 District administration (5) 
 Religious leader (6) 
 Business leaders (7) 
 Village committee (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
_________________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Providing access to services- 
water, health, education, etc. (2) 
 Clan elders (1) 
 Federal Government (SFG) (2) 
 Jubaland Interim Administration (3) 
 Regional administration (4) 
 District administration (5) 
 Religious leader (6) 
 Business leaders (7) 
 Village committee (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
_________________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Regulating the use of natural 
resources (3) 
 Clan elders (1) 
 Federal Government (SFG) (2) 
 Jubaland Interim Administration (3) 
 Regional administration (4) 
 District administration (5) 
 Religious leader (6) 
 Business leaders (7) 
 Village committee (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
_________________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Security of the community from 
external actors (4) 
 Clan elders (1) 
 Federal Government (SFG) (2) 
 Jubaland Interim Administration (3) 
 Regional administration (4) 
 District administration (5) 
 Religious leader (6) 
 Business leaders (7) 
 Village committee (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
_________________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Setting law and ensuring order  Clan elders (1) 
  
167 
 
within the community (5)  Federal Government (SFG) (2) 
 Jubaland Interim Administration (3) 
 Regional administration (4) 
 District administration (5) 
 Religious leader (6) 
 Business leaders (7) 
 Village committee (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
_________________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Negotiating with development 
actors (6) 
 Clan elders (1) 
 Federal Government (SFG) (2) 
 Jubaland Interim Administration (3) 
 Regional administration (4) 
 District administration (5) 
 Religious leader (6) 
 Business leaders (7) 
 Village committee (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
_________________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Other (Please specify) (98) 
 
____________________________
________________ 
 Clan elders (1) 
 Federal Government (SFG) (2) 
 Jubaland Interim Administration (3) 
 Regional administration (4) 
 District administration (5) 
 Religious leader (6) 
 Business leaders (7) 
 Village committee (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
_________________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Q10 
Overall, who would you describe 
as the primary decision makers 
within your village? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response max.  
3 
 
If Don’t know or No response Skip 
to Q15 
 Clan elders (1) 
 Federal Government (SFG) (2) 
 Jubaland Interim Administration (3) 
 Regional administration (4) 
 District administration (5) 
 Religious leader (6) 
 Business leaders (7) 
 Village committee (8) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
_________________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Q11 How did the primary decision makers come to that position? 
 
Only for the three primary decision makers identified in question Q10 
 
Prompt: for each decision maker a max 3 responses 
Response 
Circle Q10 answers 
DM (1) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
DM (2) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
DM (3) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
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Through elections (1)       
Through choice of majority clan  
(2) 
  
    
Military power and control (3)       
Seniority and age (4)       
Control over natural resources 
(specify which type of resource)  
(5) _________________________ 
  
    
Through service to the community 
(6) 
  
    
Don’t know (97)       
Other (Please Specify) (98) 
________________________ 
  
   
No response (100)   
Q12 Is the manner in which the decision maker has come to hold power acceptable to you? 
 
Only for the three primary decision makers identified in question Q10 
 
No Prompt: One Answer per decision maker 
Response 
 
Circle Q10 answers 
DM (1) 
 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
DM (2) 
 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
DM (3) 
 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
Yes (1)       
No (2)       
Don’t know (97)       
No response (100)   
Q13 Do you think that persons/groups who hold decision making authority within your village, represent your interests? 
 
Only for the three primary decision makers identified in question Q11 
 
No Prompt: One Answer per decision maker 
 
If Completely Is Selected, Then Skip to Q15 
Response 
 
Circle Q11 answers 
DM (1) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
DM (2) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
DM (3) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
 
Completely  (1)       
Somewhat (2)       
Not at all (3)       
Don’t know (97)       
No response (100)   
Q14 Whose interest do you think persons who hold decision making power represent? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response No limit 
Response 
 
Circle Q10 answers 
DM (1) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
DM (2) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
DM (3) 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7– 
8 – 98 
Their own interest (1)       
The interest of their clan/sub clan 
(2) 
  
    
The interest of their financial 
supporter (3) 
  
    
Don't know (97) 
 
  
    
Other (Please Specify) (98)       
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_________________________ 
 
No response (100)   
Q15 Are community grievances heard 
and addressed by decision 
makers? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Every time (1) 
 Sometimes (2) 
 Not at all (3) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q16 In cases where decision makers 
are seen to make decisions that do 
not serve the interest of the 
community as a whole, is there 
any way/mechanism of taking 
action against them? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
If No or Don’t know Is Selected, 
Then Skip to Section 2.2 
 Yes (1) 
 Sometimes (2) 
 No (3) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q17 If yes or Sometimes, Please 
provide an example 
 
Text response 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________
___________________________ 
 
 No response (100) 
Q18 Do you consider this process to be 
simple? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Very simple (1) 
 Somewhat Simple (2) 
 Not at all simple (3) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q19 What are the potential 
consequences of removing a 
decision maker? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response No 
limit 
 
 
 Building consensus between clans (1) 
 Inter-clan conflict (2) 
 Sub-clan disintegration (3) 
 Don't know (97) 
 Other (Please Specify) (98)_________________________ 
 No response (100) 
Section 2. 2. NEED ASSESSMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY- VILLAGE 
We would now like to understand the availability and quality of services in your village 
Q20 What would you say are the most 
pressing needs of your village? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response No 
limit 
 
 Health (lack of (nearby) 
access/equipment/treatment/medicine/staff/drinking water) (1) 
 Education (lack of (nearby) access/supplies/staff; school closed) (2) 
 Economic (joblessness; poverty; debt; high prices) (3) 
 Agriculture/Livestock (drought; flood; disease; lack of improved 
seeds/fertilizer) (4) 
 Security (military operations/bombardments; restricted movement) 
(5) 
 Justice (violation of rights; adjudication too long; compensation claim 
unpaid) (6) 
 Infrastructure (lack of roads/bridges/electricity/dams/buildings 
(schools, clinics) (7) 
 Corruption (bribery/unfair aid distribution/misappropriation of 
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development funds) (8) 
 Land (no/not enough land/land dispute/destruction of land) (9) 
 Housing (do not own home/cannot afford to build/repair/expand 
home (10) 
 Electricity (no access/ no money to afford (11) 
 Irrigation (lack of water/water dispute/no irrigation system/system 
damaged) (12) 
 Lack of Govt. Staff Capacity (Teachers, Police, DG Officials not 
“Professional”) (13) 
 Money transfer services (mobile/ Bakaal services) (14) 
 Don't know (97) 
 Other  (Specify) 
(98)______________________________________________________
_______ 
 No response (100) 
Q21 Who currently provides the following services? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response max.  2 for each type of service 
Response 
Village 
DMs 
(1) 
District 
DM (2) 
IJA 
(3) 
Business
es 
(4) 
SFG 
(5) 
NGOS 
(6) 
D/K 
(97) 
N/A 
(0) 
Health (1)                 
Education (2)                 
Security (3)                 
Water and Sanitation Facilities (4)                 
Other Public Infrastructure-street 
lights and roads (5) 
                
Other (Please Specify) (98) 
_________________________ 
                
No response (100)   
Q22 Who should be responsible for providing the following services? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response max.  2 for each type of service 
Response 
Village 
DMs 
(1) 
 
District 
DM (2) 
 
IJA 
(3) 
Business
es 
(4) 
SFG 
(5) 
NGOS 
(6) 
D/K 
(97) 
N/A 
(0) 
Health (1)                 
Education (2)                 
Security (3)                 
Water and Sanitation Facilities (4)                 
Other Public Infrastructure-street 
lights and roads (5) 
                
Other (Please Specify) (98) 
_________________________ 
                
No response (100)                 
Q23 Has the provision of services changed since 2013? 
 
Prompt: One Answer for each type of service 
Response 
Improve
d A lot 
(1) 
 
Improve
d a little 
(2) 
No  
change 
(3) 
Worsen
ed a 
little 
(4) 
Worsen
ed a lot 
(5) 
D/K 
 
(97) 
N/A 
 
(0) 
Health (1)               
Education (2)               
Security (3)               
Water and Sanitation Facilities (4)               
Other Public Infrastructure-street               
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lights and roads (5) 
Other (Please Specify) (98) 
_________________________ 
              
No response (100)   
Q24 Who do you attribute this change to? 
 
Prompt: One Answer for each type of service 
Response 
IJA 
(1) 
SFG 
(2) 
NGOs 
(3) 
Business 
(4) 
Diaspora 
(5) 
D/K 
(97) 
N/ A 
(0) 
Health (1)               
Education (2)               
Security (3)               
Water and Sanitation Facilities (4)               
Other Public Infrastructure-street 
lights and roads (5) 
              
Other (Please Specify) (98) 
_________________________ 
              
No response (100)   
Q25 Are taxes or similar payments 
collected in this area? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
If No or Don’t know Is Selected, 
Then Skip to Q28 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q26 Who or what is taxed? 
 
No Prompt: Multiple/Response 
No limit 
 
 
 Charcoal trade (1) 
 Roads (2) 
 Ports (3) 
 Traders/businessmen (4) 
 Other (Please Specify) 
(98)______________________________________________ 
 No response (100) 
Q27 Do you believe that taxes collected 
are spent on community services? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q28 How does your local authority 
generate income? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response No 
limit 
 
 Local taxes (1) 
 Business donations (2) 
 Funding from SFG (3) 
 Support from IJA (4) 
 Support from UN (5) 
 Support from other international actors  (6) 
 Not Applicable  (0) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q29 Are public services accessed equally by all groups/clans? 
 
Prompt: One Answer for each type of service 
Response Equal 
(1) 
Somewhat 
equal 
(2) 
Unequal 
(97) 
D/K 
(97) 
N/A 
(0) 
Health (1)           
Education (2)           
Land (3)           
Water points for grazing lands (4)           
Use of ports (5)           
Use of markets (6)           
Water and Sanitation Facilities (7)           
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Other Public Infrastructure-street 
lights and roads (8) 
          
Other (Please Specify) (98) 
____________________________
___________ 
          
No response (100) 
 
  
Section 2.3. SOCIAL STRUCTURE-VILLAGE 
We would now like to understand a little bit better the types of social groups in your village. 
 
Q30 How would you describe the 
overall relationship between the 
different clan/groups within your 
village? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
If very/good Is Selected, Then Skip 
To Q33 
 Very good (1) 
 Good (2) 
 Fair (3) 
 Poor (4) 
 Very Poor (5) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q31 If Poor/Very poor, what are some the reasons for such relations and how long have they persisted? 
 
No Prompt: Multiple/Response No limit however only mark one time period per response 
Response 0-5yr (1) 10yrs (2) 20yrs (3) 20+yrs  (4) D/K (97) 
 
Differences arising from 
ownership and use of resources 
(1) 
          
Differences over job and economic 
opportunities (2) 
          
Differences over land and grazing 
(3) 
          
Differences over lack of access to 
basic services (4) 
          
Differences over control of 
political power at local level (5) 
          
Differences over control of power 
at the national level (6) 
          
Differences in ideology-religious 
(7) 
          
Differences in military strength (8)           
Involvement of foreign actors (9)           
Youth violence (10)           
Don’t know (97)           
Other (Please specify) (98) 
____________________________
________________ 
          
No response (100)   
Q32 What is the primary reason why such issues have not been resolved? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response No limit for responses and for factors that have contributed to the situation 
Response Factors that have contributed to the situation 
Differences arising from 
ownership and use of resources 
(1) 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
  
173 
 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Differences over job and economic 
opportunities (2) 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Differences over land and grazing 
(3) 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Differences over lack of access to 
basic services (4) 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Differences over control of 
political power at local level (5) 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Differences over control of power 
at the national level (6) 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Control over political power at 
national level government (8) 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Differences in ideology-religious 
(7) 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
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 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Differences in military strength (8)  No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Involvement of foreign actors (9) 
 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Youth violence (10)  No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
 No response (100) 
Don't know (97)   
Other (Please specify) 
(98) 
____________________________
_________________ 
 No attempts made at resolving conflict by the various groups (1) 
 No institutions to facilitate the resolution of issues (2) 
 Lack of effective leadership (3) 
 Lack of trust between communities (4) 
 Role of external actors (5) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) ____________________ 
 Other (Please specify) (99) ____________________ 
No response (100)   
Q33 Have there been grievances or 
conflicts that have been resolved? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
If Yes Is not Selected,  Then Skip to 
section 3.1 
 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q34 What were the issues? 
 
 
No Prompt: Multiple/Responses 
up to 3 
 
 
 Inter-clan conflict (1) 
 Conflict over natural resources-water, charcoal,  (2) 
 Conflict over natural resources- land and grazing land (3) 
 Conflict over jobs and economic opportunities (4) 
 Lack of access to basic services (5) 
 Lack of effective government- law and order (6) 
 Competition over political power -local level (7) 
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 Competition over political power -national level (8) 
 Involvement of foreign actors (9) 
 Youth violence (10) 
 Banditry (11) 
 Don't know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) 
(98)______________________________________________________
__ 
 No response (100) 
Q35 What was the primary mode of reaching a conclusion? 
 
Prompt: One Answer per type of conflict 
Response 
Circle Q34 answers 
Conflict 1 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-
98 
Conflict 2 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-
98 
Conflict 3 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-
98 
 
Intervention by IJA (1)       
Intervention by SFG (2)       
Local system of resolution  (Please 
specify) (3) 
____________________________ 
      
Resolution by formal courts (4)       
Military / violent defeat of one 
group by another (5) 
      
External Intervention (6)       
Don't know (97) 
 
      
Other (Please specify) 
(98)________________________
____ 
      
No response (100)   
Q36 Do you feel the solution was fair? 
 
Prompt: One Answer per type of Conflict 
Conflict 1 
 
Circle  Q34 answers 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-98 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (3) 
 No response (100) 
Conflict 2 
 
Circle  Q34 answers 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-98 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (3) 
 No response (100) 
Conflict 3 
 
Circle  Q34 answers 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-98 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (3) 
 No response (100) 
Q37 Was the solution enforced? 
 
Prompt: One Answer per type of Conflict 
Conflict 1 
 
Circle  Q34 answers 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-98 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (3) 
 No response (100) 
Conflict 2 
 
Circle  Q34 answers 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-98 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (3) 
 No response (100) 
Conflict 3  Yes (1) 
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Circle  Q34 answers 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-98 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (3) 
 No response (100) 
Q38 Which actor is best suited to resolve grievances? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response No limit for either type of conflict or type of actor 
Ask for all response options 
 
Response 
 
Village 
DMs 
 
(1) 
 
District 
DMs 
 
(2) 
Regional 
DMs 
 
(3) 
SFG 
 
 
(4) 
Internati
onal 
Actors 
 
(5) 
Other 
(Please 
Specify) 
(98) 
_______
__ 
D/K 
 
 
(97) 
 
Inter-clan conflict (1)               
Conflict over natural resources- 
water, charcoal  (2) 
              
Lack of access to basic services (3)               
Lack of an effective government- 
law and order   (4) 
              
Banditry (5)               
Don't know (97)               
Other (Please specify) 
(98) 
____________________________
_______________ 
              
No response (100)   
Section 3. 1.  DECISION MAKING STRUCTURES-REGION 
We would now like to ask you some questions about who/which group makes decisions at the regional level 
Q39 Who are the decision makers/ 
political authority within your 
particular region? 
 
 
Rank the decision making 
authorities 1-5 
 
If Don’t know or No response Is 
Selected, Then Skip To Q45 
 
_______ Federal Government (SFG) (1) 
_______ Jubaland Interim Authority (JIA) (2) 
_______ District Authority- Affiliated to Federal Government (SFG) (3) 
_______ District Authority-Affiliated to Jubaland Interim Authority (JIA) (4) 
_______ District Authority- Independent of SFG and IJA (Specify)  
(5)__________________________ 
_______Regional Actor (Specify) 
(6)____________________________________________________________ 
_______ Kenyan Actors (7) 
_______ Ethiopian Actors (8) 
_______Other International actors (Specify) 
(9)_______________________________________________ 
 Don't know (97) 
_______ Other (Please specify) (98) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 No response (100) Q40 For the top three decision makers, what are the primary functions? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response No limit 
 
Only ask for the top three ranked decision makers 
Response 
Refer to Ranks in Q39 
DM (1) 
Rank 1 
DM (2) 
Rank 2 
DM (3) 
Rank 3 
 
Resolving disputes (1)       
Providing access to services- 
water, health, education, etc. (2) 
      
Regulating the use of natural 
resources (3) 
      
Safety of the community from       
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external actors (4) 
Setting law and ensuring order 
within the community (5) 
      
Negotiating with development 
actors (6) 
      
Don’t know (97)       
Other (Please specify) (98) 
____________________________
_________________ 
      
No response (100)   
Q41 For the top three decision makers, how did they come to hold that position? 
 
Prompt: One Answer per type of authority 
Response 
Refer to Ranks in  Q39 
DM (1) 
Rank 1 
DM (2) 
Rank 2 
DM (3) 
Rank 3 
 
Through elections (1)       
Through selection by majority clan 
(2) 
      
Military power and control (3)       
Appointment by SFG (4)       
Appointment by IJA (5)       
Support by foreign Actors (6)       
Don’t know (97)       
Others please specify (98) 
____________________________
_______________ 
      
No response (100)   
Q42 Is the manner in which decision makers came to hold elections acceptable to you? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer per type of decision maker 
Response 
Refer to Ranks in  Q39 
DM (1) 
Rank 1 
DM (2) 
Rank 2 
DM (3) 
Rank 3 
 
Yes (1)       
No (2)       
Don’t know (97)       
No response (100)   
Q43 To what extent would you say that persons/groups who hold decision making authority within your district, represent 
your interests? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer per type of decision maker 
 
If Completely Is Selected, Then Skip to Q45 
Response 
Refer to Ranks in Q39 
DM (1) 
Rank 1 
DM (2) 
Rank 2 
DM (3) 
Rank 3 
 
Completely  (1)       
Somewhat (2)       
Not at all (3)       
Don’t know (97)      
No response (100)   
Q44 If not at completely, whose interest do you think persons who hold decision making power represent? 
No Prompt: One Answer per type of authority 
Response 
Refer to Ranks in  Q39 
DM (1) 
Rank 1 
DM (2) 
Rank 2 
DM (3) 
Rank 3 
 
Their own interest  (1)       
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The interest of their supporters  
(2) 
      
The interest of the community (3)       
Don't know (97) 
 
      
Others Please specify (98) 
____________________________
_______________ 
      
No response (100)   
Q45 Are community grievances heard 
and addressed by decision 
makers? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Every time (1) 
 Sometimes (2) 
 Not at all (3) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q46 In cases where decision makers 
are seen to make decisions that do 
not serve the interest of the 
community as a whole, is there 
any way/mechanism of taking 
action against them? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
If Don’t know or No response is 
Selected, Then Skip to section 4.2 
 
 Yes (1) 
 Sometimes (2) 
 No (3) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q47 If yes or Sometimes, Please 
provide an example 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________
___________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________
___________________________ 
 
 No response (100) 
Q48 Do you consider this process to be 
simple? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
If Don’t know or No response is 
Selected, Then Skip to Section 4.2 
 Very simple (1) 
 Somewhat Simple (2) 
 Not at all simple (3) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q49 What are the potential 
consequences of a removal of a 
decision maker? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Building consensus between clans (1) 
 Inter-clan conflict (2) 
 Sub clan disintegration (3) 
 Don't know (97) 
 Other (Please Specify) 
(98)________________________________________________ 
 No response (100) 
Section 4. 2. JUBALAND INTERIM ADMINISTRATION-REGION 
We would now like to understand a little bit more about the Jubaland Interim administration 
Q50 Have you heard of the Interim Juba 
Administration? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 No response  (100) 
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If No Is Selected, Then Skip To Q58 
Q51 Which year was this authority set 
up? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Prior to 2012 (1) 
 2012 (2) 
 2013 (3) 
 2014 (4) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q52 Who heads the JIA authority? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Answer (1) 
________________________________________________________
_________________ 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q53 How was this authority (JIA) 
established? 
 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response max.  2 
 
 Elections (1) 
 Clan selection (2) 
 Military control and power (3) 
 Control over resources (4) 
 Backing of  foreign  powers (5) 
 Backing of religious leaders (6) 
 Don't know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
______________________________________________________ 
 No response  (100) 
Q54 To what extent do you feel the 
process of establishment of the JIA 
was acceptable? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Very legitimate (1) 
 Somewhat legitimate  (2) 
 Illegitimate (3) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q55 When the IJA becomes a formal 
federal member state, how should 
it be selected? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Popular vote for candidates (1) 
 Clan negotiations (2) 
 Clan selection process (3) 
 Determined by foreign actors (4) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q56 To what extent does the JIA 
represent your interests? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
If Completely Is Selected, Then Skip 
To Q58 
 Completely (1) 
 Somewhat (2) 
 Not at all (3) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q57 If not completely, whose interests 
do you think the JIA represents? 
 
No Prompt: Multiple/Response 
max.  2 
 
 
 Interest of the Jubaland region (1) 
 Interest of a particular  clan grouping (2) 
 Interest of a particular sub-clan (3) 
 Interest of its leaders (1) 
 Interest of foreign powers (5) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
______________________________________________________ 
 No response  (100) 
Q58 How important is the establishment 
of a regional authority? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Very important (1) 
 Important (2) 
 Somewhat important (3) 
 Not at all important (4) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q59 What is the current distribution of 
power between the regional govt. 
(could be specifically asked as JIA) 
 Equal (1) 
 Somewhat equal (2) 
 Unequal in favour of the Federal government (3) 
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and the Federal government? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 Unequal in favour of the regional government (4) 
 Don't know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q60 Would you say the relationship 
between regional and Federal 
governments should change? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q61 If yes, why? If not, why not? 
 
Text response 
_________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________
_____________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
 
No response (100) 
Q62 Do you think the IJA is currently 
able to distribute and manage 
resources to all of Jubaland region? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q63 Do you think the Govt. in 
Mogadishu us currently able to 
manage and distribute resources 
for the Jubaland region? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q64 Since the introduction of the IJA do 
you feel that the decision making 
authority has come closer to you? 
 
No Prompt: One Answer 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q65 In an ideal situation which level of 
government should have greater 
power? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Local (1) 
 Regional (2) 
 Federal (3) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response  (100) 
Q66 Which authority should manage the provision and distribution of the following services? 
 
Prompt: Multiple/Response ask for each type of service 
Response SFG (1) IJA (2) IJA+SFG (3) District (4) D/K (97) 
National security (1)           
Policing (2)           
Judicial system (3)           
Provision of basic services (4)           
Taxes-collection and distribution (5)           
Management of extractive 
resources-charcoal, oil, minerals (6) 
          
Management of natural resources-
lakes, land, water, etc. (7) 
          
Relationship with international 
donors (8) 
          
Relationship with foreign actors? (9)           
Reconciliation mechanisms (10)           
Don’t know (97)           
No response (100)   
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Section 5. FEDERALIZATION 
 
Currently the Somalia is going through a process to create what are known as federal states –  the Interim Jubaland 
Administration is an example of a federal state. This process is broadly known as federalisation and would see a change in the 
amount of power the central government would have and the power exercised by federal states would have. Each federal state 
would have a governing authority which would have responsibility for particular services – in this case, the IJA. We are keen to 
understand your perspectives on the creation of such federal states and the kind of responsibilities such states should have. 
Q67 Have you heard of the 
federalization process? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
If Completely Is Selected, Then Skip 
To Q71 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q68 Do you feel informed about the 
process? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Very informed (1) 
 Informed (2) 
 Somewhat informed (3) 
 Not at all informed (4) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q69 Do you feel the federalisation 
agenda is relevant to you? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No  (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q70 Do you feel consulted about the 
process? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No  (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q71 Do you think the introduction  of 
the regional authority can better 
unify communities? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 Yes (1) 
 No  (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q72 How do you think a regional 
authority can best serve your 
interest? 
 
Text response 
 
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
No response (100) 
Q73 Is the federalisation process 
something that you want to see 
take place? 
 
Prompt: One Answer 
 Yes (1) 
 No  (2) 
 Don’t know (97) 
 No response (100) 
Q74 If yes to Q90, why? 
Prompt: Multiple/Response no 
limit 
 Better distribution of power 
 Better distribution of resources 
 Decision making closer to communities 
 Reduce conflict 
 Improve reconciliation 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
______________________________________________________ 
 No response (100) 
Q75 If no to Q90, why not? 
Prompt: Multiple/Response no 
 Increase conflict 
 Fears over distribution of power 
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 limit  Impact on decision making 
 Adversely affect distribution of resources 
 Don’t know (97) 
 Other (Please specify) (98) 
______________________________________________________ 
 No response (100) 
Note: The following questions are not compulsory, only ask if you feel the respondent will be comfortable answering the 
questions. 
 
Q76 What is your primary clan affiliation  
_________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
 
No response (100) 
Q77 What is your primary sub clan 
affiliation? 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
 
NA (0) 
Q78 Could you share your first and last 
name 
 
_________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
 
No response  (100) 
Q79 Could you share with us your cell 
phone number? 
 
 
                         
 
No response (100) 
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